

# LOCALISATION IN PRACTICE

## EMERGING INDICATORS & PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS





By K. Van Brabant & S. Patel  
Global Mentoring Initiative

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Designed by Alice Hale

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## ACRONYMS

- ADCAP:** Age and Disability Capacity Building Programme
- CHS:** Core Humanitarian Standard
- CSO:** Civil society organisation
- DEPP:** Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme
- DFID:** UK Department for International Development
- DRC:** Democratic Republic of Congo
- GMI:** Global Mentoring Initiative (consultancy)
- ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross
- INGO:** International non-governmental organisation
- L/NA:** Local and national agencies (governmental and non-governmental)
- LPRR:** Linking Preparedness, Resilience and Response Project
- OCHA:** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- OECD:** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- UNHCR:** United Nations High Commission for Refugees Agency
- UNICEF:** United Nations Children's Fund
- WFP:** World Food Programme

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The concept of localisation of aid has been present in the humanitarian sector for decades in the form of ‘building on local capacities.’ However, in regional consultations prior to the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, it came to the forefront in the bid to find solutions to the shortfall in global humanitarian funding. Before and after the Summit, there have been many discussions about making the humanitarian system more effective and relevant, by ensuring that humanitarian preparedness and response capacity sits with those nearest to the crisis affected-populations as they are best placed to respond quickly and appropriately – and stay longest. The Grand Bargain Commitments agreed at the Summit are a landmark attempt at reforming the international humanitarian system.

The Start Network has also made some specific commitments to localisation. The Start Network’s Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) was a multi-stakeholder, three-year programme that has invested in building national capacity for disasters and emergencies preparedness in 11 countries made up of 14 projects overall. This report was commissioned by the DEPP Learning Project to contribute to learning on best practice for localisation, and to move forward the discussions on localisation.

The research had two primary purposes:

- Test, refine, deepen and where needed adapt, a framework developed in 2017 for the Start Fund and Network, commonly referred to as the ‘Seven Dimensions of Localisation’<sup>1</sup>

| FUNDING  | PARTNERSHIPS   | CAPACITY   | PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION  | COORDINATION MECHANISMS                             | VISIBILITY  | POLICY   |
|--|--|--|---|---|---|--|
| 25%<br>As directly as possible<br>Better quality | Less sub contracting<br>More equitable relationships | Institutional development<br>Stop undermining local capacity | Participation of crisis affected communities<br>Inclusion: Gender, age, disability. | National actors have greater presence and influence | Roles, results and innovations by national actors | National actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates |

Figure 1: The Seven Dimensions Framework for Localisation

- Reflect whether and how DEPP projects have contributed to ‘localisation’ and provide tips or recommendations for further similar preparedness-strengthening work, without duplicating the already extensive reviews and evaluations of the various projects and bearing in mind that the framework did not exist when the projects were designed.

The research was undertaken between mid-November 2017 and end March 2018. Financial limitations only allowed a few days of direct conversations with DEPP and non-DEPP agencies in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), several more days in Bangladesh (Dhaka and Cox Bazar district), and sessions at DEPP

conferences in London and Geneva. Other conversations were led by members of the DEPP Learning team in Kenya, Pakistan, the DRC and at a conference in Bangkok. Reports from the DEPP, as well as others related to the topic but not produced under DEPP, were also consulted. This report also draws on a rapid, real-time review of the overall response to the Rohingya influx in Cox Bazar, Bangladesh (February 2018), and on GMI’s longstanding and ongoing engagement with local, national and international actors around issues now grouped under ‘localisation’, since the 2005 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition study of the ‘Impact of the International Response on Local and National Capacities.’<sup>2</sup>

1 The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions, Smruti Patel & Koenraad Van Brabant, Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017, <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/3hs09ryakami7n8hjljaruaaw9ycir4r>, p12

2 E. Schepers, A. Parakrama & S. Patel 2006: Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

## KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Persistent lack of awareness and confusion: Beyond small circles in Europe and perhaps North America and Australia, key commitments to localisation, notably in the 2016 'Grand Bargain' (commitments 2 and 6) and the 2016 Charter for Change, are generally little known among the full spectrum of actors in aid-recipient countries.** That includes governments, donors, UN agencies, INGOs, and local/national civil society organisations, as well as humanitarian advisors and evaluators. Most have not received practical guidance on whether implementing such commitments is a priority and why, and what to do differently in practice. Some staff of INGOs who are aware of the commitments choose to disregard them. On the other hand, there are some local CSO leaders, often individuals who participated in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, who are well informed but increasingly concerned about the seeming lack of interest among international agencies to live up to these and other commitments they have undertaken. The confusion results partially from ambiguity about the 'why' of localisation. Do we want

**Recommendation 1: Develop clear practical guidance for country-level decision makers and staff and set up a monitoring mechanism to ensure that GB and Charter for Change commitments are being implemented.**

**Recommendation 2: Continuous communication through verbal or written briefing notes and via short video or audio clips are necessary to explain the why, what and how of 'localisation.'**

This research confirms that a distinction needs to be made between 'local' and 'national' agencies, as socio-geographically 'local' agencies can sometimes also feel pushed out and undermined when national agencies (governmental and non-governmental) or even agencies 'local' to other parts of the country, come in and take over a lot of space in response to a crisis in their area. Local and some national CSOs may have reservations about fully joining INGOs in one inclusive NGO forum. Not because they are unwilling to cooperate, but because they don't want to be part of a structure heavily dependent on (volatile) foreign funding, have a different basis of legitimacy and a much

localisation because of the global humanitarian financing gap that the 'Grand Bargain' strongly refers to? Or is it a matter of principle that we engage with local and national agencies, on a basis of 'equality', even if there is asymmetry of financial resources and perhaps technical-thematic expertise? Long-standing references to respect for and building on local capacities, (e.g. the Red Cross Code of Conduct, the Sphere Standard, or the Core Humanitarian Standards), as well as the spirit of the Grand Bargain (reinforce rather than replace local capacities, make design and management decisions responsive to the views of communities and people), and the motivation behind the Charter for Change, suggest a strong sensitivity to the principle of equitable relationships. In the longer term, this may be strategically inevitable as populations, national governments and local/national non-governmental agencies in various countries are becoming more assertive. The global financial and political context is also changing, and a reducing dominance of the West and less popular support there for overseas aid may lead to shrinking space for INGOs.

longer time-perspective, and want to maintain their own channels of communication with local and national authorities. They may position themselves as *'with you but not like you.'* They are also weary of coordination environments that are 'not enabling,' because the meetings are, for example, in rapid and variable accented English, full of acronyms and references that are part of the international relief discourse, and with speaking and decision-making styles and rhythms that are different from local ones. **Such autonomy must not be resented, as it can create opportunities for tactical and strategic complementarity.**

**Recommendation 3:** Ensure that there is special attention to recognise and support the capacity at local level, which could include community based organisations, local civil society groups, local authorities, etc.

**Recommendation 4:** Ensure space for and support already existing local level networks and forums, as it helps them to collaborate and strengthen their own collective capacity to communicate and respond to issues in their own communities.

Local and national agencies are weary of the often-quoted slogan ‘as local as possible, as international as necessary,’ for at least two reasons: First, typically international agencies assume that local and national agencies have ‘low’ capacities and therefore will determine that their active presence is necessary. Having the power of the purse, they can impose their own subjective assessment. Secondly, the

phrase can be used by international actors to erode shared responsibility for crises that are not of the making of the country concerned (extreme weather events, rising sea water levels, an influx of refugees from a neighbouring country). The issue is not that international solidarity is unwelcome, but how it is shown: does it ‘reinforce’ or ‘replace’ local and national capacities?

**Recommendation 5:** In contexts of chronic or recurrent crisis, in-between times provide the opportunity to map and strategically reinforce the eco-system of collective capacities. That will reduce the need to rely heavily on international surge capacity. Global surge preparedness should include policies, procedures and competencies to support and reinforce local capacities in a crisis situation.

Who should drive localisation? Given the lack of knowledge, confusion and even resistance at country-level, local and national activists on localisation feel that the burden is on them to remind the international actors what they committed to, and to translate that into practice. Admittedly, local/national agencies

are not simply ‘entitled’ to more direct funding and leading roles, they have to demonstrate the ability to handle greater responsibility. However, local/ national actors have already demonstrated this ability in developmental, human rights, and peacebuilding roles.

**Recommendation 6:** The leaders of international organisations and donors should articulate more clearly what is expected of their staff to ensure implementation of the commitments to localisation.

A more localised international humanitarian practice requires more than changes at the operational level. This research has revealed

that it will require efforts at four related, but also somewhat distinct, levels, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Levels of change

The levels in Diagram 1 correspond to the following questions:

1. How do we make our collective, global, or 'system-wide' capacity better prepared to respond to a crisis in ways that maximise the participation of affected populations and reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities?
2. What will make our own organisation better prepared to do this?
3. What strategic decisions around a particular crisis response can create enabling conditions for this?
4. What does localisation mean for our individual (and collective) operational practices?

The first question relates to investments in global emergency preparedness and how much goes to local/national and regional

capacities, as well as greater sophistication in surge capacities and practices. Currently international surge is geared towards a 'comprehensive approach' that replaces rather than reinforces (with further incentives coming from a highly competitive relief market). The second question relates to policies and procedures, expected competencies, behaviours and mindsets of staff, but can also touch upon the business model of the organisation. The third question points to strategic decisions in the face of a concrete crisis. It may refer to the questions of who are the first receivers of the bulk of funding and whether pooled funds are set up that are accessible to local and national actors. The fourth question refers to the effectiveness of the approaches to ensure early and meaningful participation of affected populations, the quality of relationships with local/national agencies, the quality of funding provided to them and their presence and role in task forces and coordination mechanisms.

**Recommendation 7: Relief actors, individually and collectively, need to take action at the above four levels if they are to succeed in adhering to their commitments. The 'Seven Dimensions Framework' will assist action most directly at operational level.**

## EMERGING INDICATORS

The key challenge for successful localisation is to know what 'localisation' means in practice, how we should plan for it, and how we know if it is happening. At present no such specific detailed indicators have been articulated which can be used for action planning and assessing and monitoring progress made by programmes, organisations and countries. However, both Grand Bargain and Charter for Change documents articulate some general commitments which can be developed into indicators.

This report identifies three sets of specific indicators that address the above questions. The first set is derived from the Grand Bargain

document itself. It can be applied to the strategic response level and also relates to system-wide preparedness. The second set is derived from the Charter for Change commitments that relate more to the organisational level. These sets are illustrative and need to be tested, complemented and refined by other work. The third set derives from the testing, deepening and refining the 'Seven Dimensions Framework,' which is most applicable at operational level.

The use of the term 'emerging indicators' is deliberate. To become a 'benchmark,' there needs to have broad though not universal agreement that it is a relevant reference or 'standard.'

**Recommendation 7: More detailed indicators increase the utility of the seven dimensions framework. It provides a more comprehensive perspective on the diverse issues that shape the relationship between international and local/national agencies. Increasing detail under each 'dimension' allows for more precise assessments, preparation for a focused and structured conversation/negotiation, prioritisation and planning specific steps to advance localisation.**



## CONTEXTS-PATHWAYS-SPEEDS

Varying factors will influence progress towards a 'participation revolution' and 'reinforcement' of local/national capacities in different contexts. The report identifies several 'contextual' (country, sub-national area, cross-border zone etc.) factors that create more enabling or constraining conditions for localisation, and that will lead to different localisation pathways and speeds. The key influencing factors include: The active and leading role of the government in crisis management; the overall political climate of tolerance to citizen-input and international involvement, or restrictive environment; the legal/political space for domestic civil society

and international action; whether the security situation allows or restricts direct international presence; the level of practical experience with major relief operations in-country; the type of crisis: a recurrent or protracted one, or a large-scale sudden-onset; the level of global media attention the crisis attracts and the levels of funding available for it; and the density of international presence in-country and its preparedness for emergency response.

**It is the combination of these influencing factors, more than a single one, that will also influence the trajectories and speeds of progress towards a 'participation revolution' and 'reinforcement' of local/national capacities in different contexts.**

**Recommendation 8: Contextual analysis is essential, and reflecting on the above influencing factors to assist in determining the pathways/speeds and the type of investment that is necessary for localisation to succeed.**

## DEPP AND LOCALISATION, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

The Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) was a three year programme worth £40m which was designed to improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries at risk of natural disaster or conflict related humanitarian emergencies. It was meant to increase and strengthen the capacity of the humanitarian system at all levels, although support was weighted towards training and development for local humanitarian workers at national level. National preparedness and

early warning systems were also developed under the programme. **The relevance of DEPP for localisation can therefore be confidently asserted and is illustrated in the report by a variety of examples.**

Going forward the question can be asked: Should future design that builds on DEPP achievements and approaches focus again on 'preparedness' with 'localisation' as a sub-objective, or rather on 'localisation' with 'preparedness' as sub-objective? Notwithstanding the intentional references to 'localisation' in more recent DEPP reports and communications, DEPP in the past years focused on the former.

**Recommendation 9: Further preparedness initiatives and programmes that seek to promote 'localisation' should be based on following principles:**

- **Strategic interventions rather than projects:** Capacity strengthening efforts should be designed after a joint strategic analysis of the 'preparedness and response eco-system' in a particular country, should focus on areas of greatest strategic relevance, and should intentionally pursue synergies and cumulative impact between different interventions and projects.
- Internationally supported capacity-strengthening efforts should seek to **rely on existing national/local structures and reinforce their ability to be self-sustaining at a good enough level of quality.** They should also create or boost national/local/regional entities to become the primary centres of expertise and capacity-support.
- Inevitably, that means that future programmes should have a **much stronger bottom-up design that has broad local/national ownership.**

- Preparedness interventions should also **work intentionally and intensively with international agencies** already present in a country or likely to respond to a crisis there in order to **strengthen their individual and collective readiness to allow space for local/national actors to lead. They should aim to develop the individual and organisational competencies to play an 'effective and trusted supporting role' rather than maintaining full control.**

## CONCLUSION

Localisation has been debated and researched for a full two years now. While there are many laudable small examples of change, a lot remains to be done. Overall progress remains slow and there is little evidence of structural or systemic change. Local and national actors who were present at the World Humanitarian Summit are becoming sceptical, wondering whether it was more than an expensive public relations event. It is not acceptable that so many in-country decision-makers and advisors, including from agencies that have signed up to the Grand Bargain or the Charter for Change, are still unclear about what that means in practice. Details may remain that need further reflection and

discussion, but there is sufficient clarity now about what the justifications and motivations are for localisation, what the overall intent is (*'reinforce'* rather than *'replace'*) and how that translates into operational practices. This report offers a provisional set of indicators that enable detailed assessment and planning. We know enough to start applying this with confidence, as individual agencies but also in a collective response, particularly in contexts with favourable conditions. The donors also need to create an enabling environment and prioritise investment in local and national actors, which will permit a faster pace of localisation.

# THE SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION FRAMEWORK: EMERGING INDICATORS

**TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGING INDICATORS FOR THE SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION FRAMEWORK**

| DIMENSION                                      | EMERGING INDICATORS  |
|--|--|
| <b>RELATIONSHIP QUALITY &amp; PARTNERSHIPS</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International actors use a nuanced vocabulary to describe the nature of the collaborative relationship with local and national actors, which is reflected in formal agreements such as contracts and MoUs</li> <li>• Verbal and non-verbal communications between collaborating entities or between aid agencies and affected populations always express basic respect and take into account cultural sensitivities and differences around what is considered ‘disrespectful’ behaviour</li> <li>• Principles and criteria for partnership are clearly articulated, inclusive and transparent</li> <li>• Partnership MoUs include a clause on joint reciprocal evaluations and monitoring of the quality of relationship at regular intervals as a sign of a genuine partnership</li> <li>• Whistle-blowing and complaints and response procedures are embedded in the partnership policy</li> <li>• Purely formalistic and unnecessary due diligence assessments are avoided</li> <li>• International agencies do not demand that the collaborating L/NA gives continuous primacy to their relationship</li> <li>• Ending a partnering relationship is done with practical responsibility and respect for the other partner</li> </ul> |
| <b>PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION</b>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crisis responses are designed, implemented and reviewed in ways that are empowering for affected populations</li> <li>• People have an early say in the design and planning phase of response</li> <li>• Formal communication, feedback and response mechanisms are set up with participation from the community and are regularly tested</li> <li>• Crisis-affected populations are involved in reviews and evaluations</li> <li>• All people are treated with full human dignity</li> <li>• Expected standards of staff behaviour are widely known</li> <li>• The collaborating agencies demonstrate practical competency in working with conflict-sensitivity</li> <li>• Community/survivor-led funds are utilised where conditions allow</li> <li>• Donors and operational agencies plan for adaptation</li> </ul>  |

**FUNDING & FINANCING**

- Quality of funding is given equal attention as quantity
- L/NA receive appropriate funding to attract, retain and maintain qualified human resources
- Un-earmarked overhead costs are allocated for management and future institutional development
- Existing organisational systems are reinforced rather than disrupted
- No extra conditions are added to those of the donor
- International agencies encourage and enable direct contact between L/NA and donors
- Co-managed pooled funds that are accessible to L/NA are a primary funding modality
- National (or regional) grant-making bodies are actively sought, and reinforced to play that role
- Donors encourage proposals in line with localisation commitments
- Open budgets or budget transparency is the goal in partnering relationships
- Fraud and corruption risks on all sides are acknowledged and managed
- Reporting, accounting and MEAL procedures and formats are harmonised between different international agencies collaborating with L/NAs, also in a subcontracting relationship
- Increased financial autonomy and sustainability of the L/NA is a strategic objective in all partnering relationships

**CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT**

- Capacity-enhancing investments are strategic
- Capacity-strengthening investments are cumulative and mutually reinforcing
- Nothing new is created without certainty that what exists is beyond repair
- Local/national/regional capacity-resource centres are supported and reinforced
- Capacity-strengthening efforts are purpose and need-driven, not supply-driven
- The underlying goal in a partnership is capacity-sharing
- Capacity-development investments are managed like any other objective
- Organisational or network capacity-strengthening is an ongoing process, not an event

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT (CONTINUED)</b></p>                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• When capacities have been strengthened, role changes must follow</li> <li>• Capacity-development support is provided by competent professionals with contextual knowledge</li> <li>• Negative impacts on existing capacities are anticipated and avoided. Where some negative impact happens, corrective action is taken</li> <li>• No direct implementation without purposeful and simultaneous capacity-support</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>COORDINATION, TASK FORCES &amp; COLLABORATIVE CAPACITIES</b></p>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaboration is recognised and rewarded</li> <li>• Support provided to pre-existing local and national networks to avoid establishing multiple new platforms</li> <li>• L/NA are actively present in local and national task forces and coordination mechanisms</li> <li>• Government in principle co-leads all coordination mechanisms</li> <li>• Coordination is led by people with the required competencies</li> <li>• L/NA presence and participation is effectively ‘representative’</li> <li>• The coordination and collaborative environment is enabling for L/NA</li> <li>• Deliberations and decisions are informed by in-depth situational understanding, including the views of affected populations</li> <li>• Coordination imposes discipline but leaves openness for creative innovation</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>VISIBILITY</b></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The roles, work, risks taken, and contributions of L/NA are rendered visible</li> <li>• L/NA need to agree on communications that could put them at risk</li> <li>• Innovative ideas and practices developed by L/NA are publicly acknowledged</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>DISASTER &amp; HUMANITARIAN POLICIES, STANDARDS &amp; PLANS</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stakeholders can effectively input into government policy and planning</li> <li>• Local and national agencies influence international policy debates and standards discussions on relief and humanitarian action</li> <li>• Individual participants from L/NA that participate in national, regional and international policy, planning and standards debates are truly ‘representative’ and accountable</li> </ul>   |

# I. INTRODUCTION

## BACKGROUND

The Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) was a three-year programme worth £40million that was designed to improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response in countries at risk of natural disaster or conflict-related humanitarian emergencies. It was meant to increase and strengthen the capacity of the humanitarian system at all levels, with a particular focus on training and capacity development for local humanitarian workers at national level. The DEPP also aimed to strengthen national preparedness systems. Therefore, although ‘localisation’ as such was not an explicit objective of the DEPP at the time of design, it was implicit in the major objectives of the programme, and later became an explicit objective of many projects. In July 2017, the DEPP Learning Project<sup>3</sup> organised a Regional Learning Conference on Localisation in Manila. The conference brought together over 100 representatives from local, national and international non-governmental organisations (both DEPP and non-DEPP) and government ministries from seven countries affected by disasters in Asia and Africa, as well as representatives of the Start and CDAC Networks and DFID from the UK. The conference involved two days of discussions on the localisation of humanitarian action and provided a unique opportunity for programme staff, local partners and external stakeholders to share robust lessons from work undertaken to increase the voice and influence of local actors in line with the 2016 World

Humanitarian Summit commitments (expressed in the Grand Bargain<sup>4</sup> document) as well as the Charter for Change.<sup>5</sup> This conference led to several action points, including developing localisation markers and a framework, with relevant indicators, that would act as a basis for action planning and assessing progress made by programmes, organisations and countries.

## PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

This report was commissioned by the DEPP Learning Project. It builds on, and further develops, the Seven Dimensions of Localisation Framework that was developed by Global Mentoring Initiative (GMI) during a baseline assessment of where the Start Fund was on localisation between October 2016 and April 2017.<sup>6</sup> Several DEPP projects had already been using the seven dimensions in different ways.<sup>7</sup> Very active and relevant support was provided to the consultants for this research by the DEPP Learning Team, with its central, regional and country-level learning advisors. It was largely funded by the DEPP Learning Project, with complementary contribution from GMI.

This report addresses two broad questions:

- 1. The Seven Dimensions Framework for Localisation:** does this provide a basis for planning localisation-in-practice, and monitoring progress? Is it understandable and complete enough? Is it a workable reference or does it need to be revised/further developed? What might be different priorities or pathways to greater

<sup>3</sup> The DEPP Learning Project is special among the 14 DEPP projects in that it aims to promote collaborative learning and sharing across the programme as well as collate the experience of the programme to evidence what does and does not work in humanitarian capacity building. See the DEPP Learning Platform, managed by the Learning Project, for all the evidence and learning pieces developed by the DEPP so far: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/>

<sup>4</sup> The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need, Istanbul, Turkey, 23 May 2016, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand\\_Bargain\\_final\\_22\\_May\\_FINAL-2.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Charter for Change, 8 commitments, 2016, <https://CharterforChange.org/>

<sup>6</sup> The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions, Smruti Patel & Koenraad Van Brabant, Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017, <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/3hs09ryakami7n8hjliaruaw9ycir4r>

<sup>7</sup> The Protection-in-Practice (PiP) and Talent Development projects, for example, listed after each dimension two sets of observations: “Relevant experience and results from the PiP” and “Recommendations for the future.” For the SEPS Myanmar, the same set of “Results” was listed for each dimension, but then complemented with a second set “Relevant External Developments.”

localisation, in different contexts? What would be key benchmarks and indicators, certainly for the priority areas for localisation, in some specific contexts?

**2. DEPP contributions to localisation:** Are the various DEPP projects contributing to and practicing ‘localisation’? Are there illustrative examples of relevant and good practices, but also of challenges and

opportunities related to localisation, that can be found in the rich DEPP experience? Here it should be noted that the framework did not exist when the DEPP programmes and its various projects were designed, and during most of their implementation. This report does not evaluate any aspect of the DEPP projects in relation to their performance against the framework.

| FUNDING  | PARTNERSHIPS   | CAPACITY   | PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION  | COORDINATION MECHANISMS                             | VISIBILITY  | POLICY   |
|--|--|--|---|---|---|--|
| 25%<br>As directly as possible<br>Better quality | Less sub contracting<br>More equitable relationships | Institutional development<br>Stop undermining local capacity | Participation of crisis affected communities<br>Inclusion: Gender, age, disability. | National actors have greater presence and influence | Roles, results and innovations by national actors | National actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates |

Figure 3: The Seven Dimensions Framework for Localisation<sup>8</sup>

## STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Section II of the report explains the methodology and sources drawn upon to explore the above questions.

Section III comes back to the question, how do we understand ‘localisation’? This is necessary as our conversations and observations, during and beyond this exercise, show that there remains significant confusion about it. After reiterating some fundamental insights, it presents new findings from the conversations and consultations at country level. Importantly, it introduces a new analytical differentiation between the collective and individual organisational ‘preparedness for localisation,’ and the strategic and operational decisions that are made in a particular response, and that will have a strong conditioning influence on the opportunity to put our commitments into practice.

Section IV offers a range of ‘emerging indicators’, worked out in most detail for the operational level. The choice of the wording

‘emerging indicators’ is deliberate. For something to be considered a ‘benchmark’, there must be fairly broad-based recognition that it is a quality reference. That is currently not (yet) the case. The future will show whether some or more of these ‘emerging indicators’ will become ‘benchmarks.’ This section also presents several ways in which these indicators can be practically used.

Section V offers a set of contextual factors that also create enabling or constraining conditions for more rapid and deeper localisation. These could not be derived from a broad comparative analysis, so they are worth testing and refining further. Three illustrative case studies (Ethiopia, Marawi-Philippines, Rohingya response-Bangladesh) can be found in Annex 2.

Section VI offers a perspective on DEPP contributions to localisation, with illustrative examples, and various tips for further work along these lines.

Section VII concludes with the key message that, after two years of debate and much

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The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions, Smruti Patel & Koenraad Van Brabant, Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017, <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/3hs09ryakami7n8hjliaruaw9ycir4r>.

research, there is now more than enough understanding about the why, what and how of localisation, to start advancing it rapidly, notably in contexts where the conditions are favourable. Further learning needs to be grounded in practical experiences. This is all

the more important as international agencies risk losing credibility if local and national actors do not see any significant difference between before and after the World Humanitarian Summit.

## II. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This report is based on qualitative inquiry, relying on multiple group and individual discussions, semi-structured interviews, a document review, and observation (particularly in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh). It also draws on documentary sources from beyond the DEPP as well as conversations in Ethiopia and in Bangladesh that included individuals not associated with any DEPP project. The table below shows the number of events held in different countries.

**TABLE 2: EVENTS AND CONSULTATIONS FOR THIS RESEARCH**

| LOCATION                   | EVENT  | DATE            | ATTENDEES  |
|----------------------------|--|-----------------|--|
| London,<br>UK              | Half day reflective group conversations on the application of the localisation framework to the DEPP | 23.11.2017      | 28 individuals involved in various DEPP projects, among them a few working at country or regional (outside of Europe) level, led by GMI  |
| Addis Ababa,<br>Ethiopia   | One and a half day reflective workshop on the progress of localisation in Ethiopia                   | 29-30.11.2017   | 40 individual participants from different agencies, including a few governmental and multilaterals <sup>9</sup>  |
| Dhaka,<br>Bangladesh       | Day event of reflection and discussion about DEPP and localisation                                   | 29.01.2018      | 17 participants from INGOs and national agencies involved in DEPP projects in Bangladesh, led by GMI   |
| Cox's Bazar,<br>Bangladesh | Half day discussion session  | 5.02.2018       | Representatives from five INGOs  |
| Geneva,<br>Switzerland     | DEPP Preparing for Shock Global Conference – summary of preliminary results                          | 15.03.2018      | Approximately 40 people attended the session, led by GMI together with panellists Daniel Gebremedhin from the Shifting the Power project in Ethiopia, and 'Nanette' Salvador-Antequisa from ECOWEB Philippines |
| Cox's Bazar,<br>Bangladesh | Review of the international & national response to the dramatic influx of Rohingya refugees in       | 30.01-8.02.2018 | The review drew on individual or group conversations with four government entities (including the Army), individuals from two key UN agencies (including HQ staff), 19 INGOs (including HQ staff), two         |

<sup>9</sup> Several attended both consecutive days, commenting that they found it useful to get a briefing on what 'localisation' is about, the different possible motivations and interpretations for it, and why there is ongoing debate about it among international agencies.



|  |  |            |  |
|--|--|------------|--|
|  | Cox's Bazar district, Bangladesh, through a 'localisation' lens. This also involved observing 6 working group meetings |            | INGO networks, 17 national/local CSOs, three L/N CSO-NGO networks, two 'dual identity' agencies (Bangladeshi but part of international networks), one 'southern INGO,' five interagency coordination groups, and four donor agencies |
| Dhaka, Bangladesh  | Initial feedback event on findings from the Bangladesh visit   | 11.02.2018 | 30 Participants from INGOs, UN, local and national NGOs  |
| Dhaka, Bangladesh  | Major conference in Dhaka  | 3.03.2018  | 25 participants including senior UN officials, government officials and representatives from INGOs, NNGOs and LNGOs  |
| Geneva, Switzerland  | Lunch-time localisation meeting organised by ICVA  | 16.03.2018 | Representatives from 10 INGOs  |
| Additional group conversations and conference sessions were also led and facilitated by DEPP Learning Advisors in Bangkok and Pakistan (S. Arif), Kenya (B. Bobson) and the DRC (Y. Ngunzi). A case study on the response to the forced displacement from Marawi (Philippines), included in Annex 2, was provided by Regina 'Nanette' Salvador-Antequisa, director of the Philippine CSO ECOWEB. |  |            |  |

GMI team members also draw on wider experiences, among them as a team member in CDA's 'Listening Project' in Thailand, carrying out extensive consultations with local and national CSOs in Asia, Africa, Lebanon and Turkey for other pieces of research, involvement in Charter for Change discussions, advising and appreciating the influence of the Grand Bargain on the operations of the Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA) as part of a final overall DRA evaluation, as Chair of the Project Commission of the Swiss Solidarity Foundation, and of course from its 2017 baseline study of localisation for the Start Fund and Start Network.

**Constraints:**

As is often the case, there were obvious constraints: financial limitations meant that GMI could only be directly present in two operational locations (Ethiopia, Bangladesh) for a limited number of days, and not be part of subsequent conversations among those based in those countries, or the conversations facilitated by DEPP Learning Advisors.

The volume of documentation (reviews, evaluations, communications materials, learning reports, meeting reports, etc.) produced by the 14 DEPP projects is also vast, and continued being added to during the period of this exercise. It was not possible to absorb it all within the time constraints. Helpful guidance, which directed us to key documents, was provided by the DEPP Learning Project.

While both constraints may be reflected in this report, from a broader perspective they are not critical; conversations about localisation will and should continue in many locations around the world, and it is the actors based nearest to crises-affected areas who have to take the lead on this. Finally, there is already ample documentation from DEPP that has increasingly referred explicitly to 'localisation', and this work need not be duplicated here.

## III. UNDERSTANDING LOCALISATION

### BACKGROUND: FUNDAMENTALS OF LOCALISATION

#### The Localisation Commitment is Older than the Grand Bargain

The essence of a ‘participation revolution’ and localisation agenda has been present in key references for humanitarian action since before the Grand Bargain or Charter for Change. The Red Cross and INGO Code of Conduct commits its adherents to “**attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.**”<sup>10</sup> The Sphere Standards require aid agencies to “*support local capacity by identifying community groups and social networks at the earliest opportunity and build on community-based and self-help initiatives.*” The Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) looks for a humanitarian response that “strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.” References to the same can also be found in the humanitarian policies of various donors. Other aspects of the Grand Bargain like the harmonisation of donor procedures and requirements have been long-standing commitments, and were derived from the various ‘High-level Meetings on Aid Effectiveness’<sup>11</sup> (Rome in 2003, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008, Busan 2011).

#### Why Localisation?

The rationale for localisation is not clearly articulated in the Grand Bargain document. However, in light of the continued debate about the nature and even desirability of localisation, this is a key question. By listening to the conversations surrounding localisation since the World Humanitarian Summit, GMI has identified three possible rationales for localisation:

- **The financial argument:** Localisation is

needed because it is more cost-effective. Local and national actors are cheaper than international ones, and funding them directly, or providing cash to crisis-affected people, reduces transaction costs. This financial justification is strong in the Grand Bargain, which is strongly grounded in the earlier report by the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing<sup>12</sup>. This report drew attention to the growing financing gap between global humanitarian needs and available humanitarian funding.

- **The principle argument:** We should not, because we have more financial resources at hand, treat local and national actors as subordinate. They too make necessary and valuable contributions to the collective effort, and often do significant parts of the work, sometimes at high risk.<sup>13</sup> Local and national organisations arguing for more equitable partnerships typically do this on the grounds of principle.
- **The strategic argument:** The strategic objective of all international cooperation in situations of crisis or ‘development’ should be to support and enhance the capacities for those receiving the international assistance, so that they can deal with these situations by themselves. This is in the medium-term financial interest of the donors; while deploying large international resources every time there is a crisis in Haiti or in South Sudan may be good business for specialised international aid agencies, it is not in the interest of the taxpayer, or the interests of the Haitians or South Sudanese. Investing in localisation is also a pragmatic move in a world where more aid recipient countries and citizens are asserting their

<sup>10</sup> The further clarification of that commitment is no longer fully in line with current understanding: “*All people and communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local non-governmental humanitarian agencies as partners in planning and implementation and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate.*” International organisations employing national staff for example, is not now accepted as an expression of ‘localisation’.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectiveness.htm>

<sup>12</sup> [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hlp\\_report\\_too\\_important\\_to\\_failcoaddressing\\_the\\_humanitarian\\_financing\\_gap.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hlp_report_too_important_to_failcoaddressing_the_humanitarian_financing_gap.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> The Red Cross and INGO Code of Conduct, the Common Humanitarian Standard, reports from the ‘Missed Opportunities’ group of British NGOs, and the Charter for Change signed up to by a wider group of INGOs, appear more motivated by principle.

national pride and autonomy. Certainly in situations of violence, and where the state is one of the involved parties, international solidarity with the victims must be asserted. But in other situations, a more respectful attitude will be expected and demanded.

The 'why' question should refer us back to the ultimate motivation of international agencies, who are present (and seek to exercise influence) in other countries. We must ask ourselves, 'what is our ultimate strategic goal?'

- **To work ourselves out of a job.** By supporting local and national capacities to the point they can face most challenges by themselves, at which point we exit.
- **To stand in solidarity with people suffering.** Our continued presence is an expression of that solidarity. However, there is no room for superiority and inferiority, or growing dependency, in a relationship of solidarity.
- **To create a global movement for global change.** Why then do we create and prioritise national affiliates of ourselves, while we advocate for diversity? Why not create a global movement made up of diverse actors that have the same goal?
- **To expand our business** into old and emerging markets?

### 'Transformation' more than 'Decentralisation'

Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that interpretations of 'localisation' fluctuate between 'decentralisation' and 'transformation'.<sup>14</sup>

- **A decentralisation interpretation** focuses strongly on the problem of excessive 'centralisation' of strategic (and financial) decision making about relief responses, and acknowledges a need to be more cost-effective. Under this interpretation, 'localisation' can be achieved if strategic, operational and financial decisions are made close to the 'at-risk' or affected areas, and if 25% of financial resources go 'as directly as possible' to 'local' actors (here defined as

those in proximity to the crisis area), irrespective of who they are. In that interpretation, more direct funding of the nationally registered offices of international agencies and/or the national affiliates of international alliances, counts as contributions to the 25% objective. This interpretation takes a more technical-operational perspective; when it considers 'power', it looks mostly at the distribution of this power between 'HQ' and the regional/country offices.

- **A transformation interpretation** sees localisation success in terms of much stronger national capacities and leadership. Strategic, operational and financial decisions should be made by undisputedly 'national' actors (governmental and non-governmental) in support of which 25% of the available international resources go directly to them. Proponents of this interpretation take a broader historical and systemic view. They argue that the 'domineering' presence and attitudes of international agencies are important obstacles to national leadership and to building strong and sustained national capacities. This obstacle will continue until international organisations are prepared to share at least part of the global purse for humanitarian financing. They look beyond the 'humanitarian economy' to its 'political economy'. 'Transformers' are also concerned that localisation as 'decentralisation' turns into an incentive to accelerate the 'multi-nationalisation' of INGOs: creating more and more national offices and national affiliates, that will also have to compete in fundraising from the domestic market. This does not diversify the organisational eco-system, because there is no level playing field for those who do not have these structural international relations. Increased competition in the domestic market will further reduce the space, especially for national civil society organisations, who are already under financial and sometimes also political pressures.

The spirit of the Grand Bargain suggests that the appropriate interpretation of 'localisation' is more one of 'transformation' than of 'decentralisation'.

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K. Van Brabant & S. Patel 2017: Understanding Localisation Debate. <https://www.gmentor.org/localization> & S. Patel & K. Van Brabant 2017: The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions. Start Network & Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017 <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/3hs09ryakami7n8hjiaruaw9ycir4r>

## ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING AND NEW FINDINGS

### Persistent Confusion

The discussions that GMI has been involved in have revealed that many individuals, including in senior organisational and programme positions, are not very conversant with the Grand Bargain, or clear about what localisation is, and why it is a major commitment. That also applies to key personnel among donor and host governments, senior managers of UN agencies, INGOs and local/national CSOs,

humanitarian advisors, and evaluators. One deputy country director of a UN agency in a country with a major humanitarian crisis, for example, stated “*We are localised because the majority of our staff are nationals.*” Of the seven humanitarian advisors (5 internationals, 2 nationals) we spoke with in Bangladesh, three were knowledgeable about localisation discussion and commitments and committed to localisation, while four knew very little about it and did not consider it relevant. The text bundles below show the responses of over twenty participants taking part in an event on localisation in Addis Ababa.




Figure 4: Responses to the question “what does localisation mean to you?” during a localisation event in Addis Ababa

Upon consultation, INGO staff stated that one of the reasons for this lack of knowledge is that many senior staff at country level have not received much practical guidance on what to do differently after the World Humanitarian Summit and release of the Grand Bargain. This was even seen in agencies that have formally committed to the Grand Bargain<sup>15</sup> (59 signatories, 24 donors, 13 UN agencies, 19 INGOs, 2 Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and OECD). For over a year now, Grand Bargain working streams have been created around each of the ten commitments. Though these have produced research and analytical reports<sup>16</sup> and also tips and guidance<sup>17</sup>, they are not widely known at country level.

Despite there being some understanding of the commitment to provide more support and

funding tools to local and national actors, the one concrete expression of this that has drawn most attention and generated most debate is the indicator on financial resource allocation: “By 2020 a global, aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible, to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transactional costs.”<sup>18</sup> However central the funding question, reducing localisation to a quantitative money flow question is, as per the ‘seven dimensions framework’, inadequate. As a Bangladeshi CSO leader pointed out, “there is clear language in the Grand Bargain document, what localisation is about”. Text Box 1 summarises the text from the Grand Bargain document.

#### TEXT BOX 1: EXCERPTS FROM THE GRAND BARGAIN ON THE SPIRIT OF A PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION AND LOCALISATION

*“We need to include the people affected by humanitarian crises and their communities in our decisions to be certain that the humanitarian response is relevant, timely, effective and efficient.”*

*“We need to provide accessible information, ensure that an effective process for participation and feedback is in place and that **design and management decisions are responsive to the views of affected communities and people.**”*

*“The Grand Bargain recognises that, faced with the reality of our woefully under-resourced humanitarian response, the status quo is no longer an option.”*

*“We commit to support local and national supporters on the frontline...(We) engage with local and national responders in a spirit of partnership and aim to reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities”.*

*“An understanding inherent to the Grand Bargain is that benefits are for all partners, not just the big organisations.”*

*“The Grand Bargain is a level playing field where we all meet as equals.”*

15 [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/grand\\_bargain\\_signatories\\_and\\_membership\\_-\\_1017\\_pg\\_-\\_pdf\\_-\\_docx.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/grand_bargain_signatories_and_membership_-_1017_pg_-_pdf_-_docx.pdf)

16 E.g. Rana R. 2017: Provision and Conditions of Core/Overhead/Indirect Costs for Local/National Humanitarian Actors. Initial research. For the Localisation of Aid/Workstream 2/Grand Bargain co-chaired by IFRC and the Government of Switzerland. The Wolf Group & IFRC

17 For example, guidance from the Grand Bargain working group on ‘participation’ <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57ffc65ed482e9b6838607bc/t/5975c0022e69cf20a289e05d/1500889093313/20170718+FINAL+Participation+Revolution+workstream+Recommendations.pdf> or from the Global Cluster Coordination Group <http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/localizationtipsandgoodpracticesfinal.pdf>

18 The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need, May 2016, Commitment 2, page 5, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand\\_Bargain\\_final\\_22\\_May\\_FINAL-2.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf)

### New Findings

- In terms of the broad debate and understanding of the term localisation, this research has highlighted additional aspects which are presented in this section.
- **Differentiate between ‘local’ (and sub-national) and ‘national’ actors:** The Rohingya influx in Bangladesh for example is fully concentrated in the Cox’s Bazar district of the southeast. Various ‘local’ and ‘subnational’ Bangladeshi CSOs have been working there for a long time, on poverty reduction, disaster risk preparedness, rights, gender equality etc. They made a clear distinction between them and Bangladeshi CSOs that operate nationally or primarily in other parts of the country. Critical views were expressed about international agencies that brought Bangladeshi partners from other parts of the country, with no prior programming in Cox’s Bazar and no insight into the local context (see Annex 2, example 3 for details).
- **Joint CSO/NGO forums:** Internationally and in-country, there are many platforms or forums that bring together international and national/local CSOs or NGOs. Yet in both Marawi (annex 2, example 2) (Philippines) and in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh), local CSOs have expressed reservations about fully integrating into an overall CSO forum. While they are very willing to cooperate and coordinate, three considerations were mentioned to also maintain autonomy: they don’t want to be part of a forum that is fully dependent on foreign funding; as organisations that have had and will continue a long-term presence in a certain area, they have a different perspective, and they want to maintain their own channels of communication with local and national government; with regard to international agencies, they may position themselves as ‘with you but not like you’.
- **As local as possible, as international as necessary:** At surface level this is an attractive slogan, in practice this phrase is seen to be problematic; local/national actors and international ones tend to have fairly different assessments of what the

right proportion of the response should be attributed to each. With the power of the purse, it is typically the views of the international actors that prevails. This approach also misses a key point; it is less about whether international actors are present or not, and more about how they are present. Notably in Bangladesh, several of our interlocutors pointed out that ‘localisation’ cannot become an excuse for ‘disengagement’ by the international community. International solidarity remains very much needed. For example, Bangladesh alone cannot shoulder the responsibility for burdens (rising sea water levels, refugee influxes) that are not of its own making. So the international community should support and reinforce, rather than replace national capacity.

- **Who should drive ‘localisation’?** Several local and national actors in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, some of whom were present at the World Humanitarian Summit, express surprise that many international actors in-country seem unaware of the Grand Bargain (and Charter for Change) commitments, or uninterested in putting them into practice. They feel that the burden is on them to argue, lobby, and sometimes campaign to get it on the agenda of the senior management of the country offices of international NGOs.<sup>19</sup> In such environments, at-risk or crisis-affected populations, and local and national agencies, should not have to remind international agencies of the commitments they have freely, and publicly entered into. It has been observed that “localisation will be a long and negotiated process”.<sup>20</sup> That may be the case, but it should be the international actors inviting the local and national ones to the negotiation table, not the other way around. At the same time, L/NA cannot treat these commitments of international relief actors as an entitlement. The ability to exercise leadership, make decisions, and take control of the financial means to implement these decisions all come with responsibility. L/NA too need to be realistic about their capacities and their limits. They also need to address the organisational competition and at times interpersonal rivalries that exist among

19 As part of their campaign, a grouping of Bangladeshi CSOs has issued a ‘Charter of Expectations’, of international organisations: “Our Common Space, Our Complementary Roles: Equitable partnership for sovereign and accountable civil society growth.” <http://coastbd.net/our-common-space-our-complementary-roles-equitable-partnership-for-sovereign-and-accountable-civil-society-growth/>

20 Ben Emmens, at a Start Network event in London, 22 November 2017

them too, and the ‘front’ organisations whose main purpose is to serve the interests of a founder, a leader, a particular family. To make a strong case, they should come up with evidence of the consequences of unhelpful practices by

international agencies, and with thoughtful proposals that address the legitimate concerns of international funders. They also have to demonstrate that they are able to practice ‘deep participation’ of affected populations.

## ADVANCING LOCALISATION: PROGRESS NEEDED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

In this research, the exploration of what localisation means in practice has highlighted the need to explore four related, but also somewhat distinct, levels which correspond to four questions (shown in figure 5 below):

1. What will make our collective, global or ‘system-wide’ capacity better prepared to respond to a crisis in ways that maximise the participation of affected populations, and reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities?
2. What will make our organisation better prepared to do this?
3. What strategic decisions around a crisis-response will facilitate this?
4. What does it mean for our operational practices?




Figure 5: Levels of change

### Strategic decisions shape the initial landscape

In every emergency or crisis response, strategic decisions can create the conditions that favour a localised response with early and strong participation of affected populations. Examples of key scene-setting strategic decisions would be: where bilateral donors allocate the majority of their money (e.g. whether a pooled fund is created, what proportion of overall funding is allocated to it); whether the national authorities allow ‘new’ international agencies into the crisis area; whether international agencies are allowed direct implementation or obliged to work with and through L/NA<sup>21</sup>; whether the government insists on leading and controlling the coordination; or whether a common framework with salary parameters is set for all actors responding in a given operating

environment etc. Such strategic decisions shape the nature of the overall response and create a more or less enabling overall environment for localisation.

### Operational practices

Individual international agencies also make influential decisions on operational practices, including whether to support L/NAs to rapidly scale up for the response that the L/NA has decided on, to find an L/NA to implement a response as dictated by the international agency, or to scale up heavily itself in order to directly implement. Also of great importance is the profile of staff in decision-making positions: they may be all expatriates, expatriates working under national staff, and/or international experts seconded to an L/NA partner as an additional resource. Similarly, an international agency can burden its collaborating L/NA with heavy financial

accounting requirements, second finance staff to the L/NA to 'unburden' it, or keep financial reporting light. The international agency can also decide whether or not to provide the collaborating L/NA with quality funding that includes the needed operating facilities and equipment.

Does the Grand Bargain change this fundamental strategic, planning and operational question? Text Box 2 offers a possible rephrasing of this fundamental question, in a post-World Humanitarian Summit climate. To ensure that strategic and operational decisions support the Grand Bargain, more enabling conditions will need to be created in order to make the global 'system' and individual organisations more 'fit-for-localisation' and better prepared to reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities.

### Organisational preparedness

International organisations will have to review not just their operational practices in any particular response, but their mission, their legal framework, their policies, their administrative requirements, their procedures,

the required core competencies of their staff, their business model, fundraising and external communications strategies etc.<sup>22</sup> At a deeper level, it may also require an evolution of mind-sets. As one INGO staff member tasked with identifying the implications for her organisation puts it, "this goes to the DNA of the organisation."

### System-wide preparedness

The global response capacity is currently well prepared for a 'comprehensive response' that replaces rather than reinforces local and national actors.<sup>23</sup> Better preparedness for localisation may mean:

- A greater readiness to establish pooled funds early on, to have them jointly managed by international and national actors, and to channel a larger proportion of the available funding through local responders.
- Creation of coordination environments that are more enabling for local and national leadership, in terms of who participates, the languages that can be used, and in their conversational and decision-making culture.

### TEXT BOX 2: REFRAMING THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC, PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL QUESTION

**Key question without localisation:** *How do we deliver relevant aid and protection fast, at scale and with adequate quality?*

**Key questions with localisation:** *What goods and services do these affected populations need, that will save lives but also increase their ability to cope, and how do we get it to them fast, at scale and with adequate quality, in ways that reinforce rather than replace and undermine local and national organised capacities?*

*What legacy do we, as international actors, want to leave in terms of strengthened capacities of not just individuals, but social groups, organisations and eco-systems in which different organisations collaborate effectively for greater cumulative impact, thereby increasing the value of our spending, by making it simultaneously an investment?*

22 The first progress report of the signatories to the Charter for Change contains many examples of organisational adaptations, such as the reviews and amendments of various organisational documents and guidance documents related to partnership, capacity assessment, HR policies and procedures etc. Charter for Change Coordination Group 2017: From Commitments to Action. Progress report 2016-2017

23 See B. Ramalingam & J. Mitchell 2014: Responding to Changing Needs. Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian action. London, ALNAP p. 29-30; and E. Schepers, A. Parakrama & S. Patel 2006: Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



- Individual and collective international surge-capacity is refined so that it is better able to respond with ‘fitness-for-context’. In practical terms that implies that, for example, emergency response rosters also have people with particular ‘partnering competencies’ and ‘partnership brokering’ expertise, with rapid ‘applied anthropology/research’ experience, and organisational development expertise. Part of the preparedness training of a significant number of international experts ready to be deployed anywhere at short notice will be to work within and in support of local and national organisations.<sup>24</sup> Critical

components of preparedness-enhancement of local and national actors would be the organisational ability to manage a rapid scaling up and scaling down and effective leadership in crisis management coordination. These do not appear to be a standard component of the humanitarian capacity-building repertoire.

The greater the organisational and system-wide preparedness for a participation revolution and localisation, the more likely strategic and operational decisions in a particular crisis will be aligned with these commitments.

## IV. LOCALISATION: EMERGING INDICATORS

Here we offer three sets of emerging indicators related to systems at the organisational, operational and strategic decision making levels. The first, derived from the Grand Bargain, can be applied to the strategic response level and also relates to the system-wide preparedness. The second, derived from the Charter for Change, relates more to the organisational level. The third, derived from GMI/Start Network’s ‘Seven Dimensions Framework’, relates most directly to the operational level.

We have deliberately called these emerging indicators and not benchmarks. To become a benchmark, there has to be broad (though not universal) agreement that something is a relevant reference or standard. We are not there yet, hence the status of ‘emerging indicators’, with full openness that further

work and discussion may mean that these evolve and change. This is a work-in-progress; the indicator sets are not necessarily complete, prioritised, or correlated to each other. However, they make localisation-in-practice much more concrete and clear.

### **EMERGING INDICATORS AT STRATEGIC AND SYSTEM-WIDE LEVEL**

Although it contains the inevitable ambiguities of any internationally agreed document with broad backing, the Grand Bargain also contains a set of very concrete points that can easily be rephrased as indicators. These relate to the strategic decisions made during a particular response, but are also relevant for the system-wide preparedness to reinforce rather than replace. Text box 3 shows what this would look like.

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K. Van Brabant, one of the GMI co-directors, led the development of a course on ‘effective advising’ on request of the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who wanted to broaden the skills and enhance the preparedness of those in its own ‘expert pool’.

### **TEXT BOX 3: EMERGING STRATEGIC LEVEL INDICATORS FROM THE GRAND BARGAIN**

#### **PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION**

- The leadership and governance mechanisms at the level of the humanitarian country team and cluster/sector mechanism ensure engagement with and accountability to people and communities affected by crisis;
- Common standards and a coordinated approach are applied for community engagement and participation, with emphasis on inclusion and supported by a common platform for sharing and analysing data to strengthen decision-making, transparency, accountability and limit duplication;
- Local dialogue is used as well as technologies to support agile, transparent but also secure feedback;
- There is a systematic link between feedback and corrective action to adjust programming;
- Donors provide time and resources for this and fund with flexibility to facilitate programme adaptation in response to community feedback;
- All humanitarian response plans – and strategic monitoring of them - as of the beginning of 2018 demonstrate analysis and consideration of inputs from affected communities (from Commitment 6 ‘participation revolution’);
- Data collection is coordinated and streamlined to ensure compatibility, quality and comparability, thus minimising intrusion into the lives of affected people (from Commitment 5: Improve joint and impartial needs assessments);
- Cash transfers are used routinely, alongside in-kind assistance, service provision and vouchers (from Commitment 2 ‘cash-based programming’);

#### **SUPPORT AND FUNDING FOR LOCAL AND NATIONAL RESPONDERS**

- There is multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response and coordination capacities. This is also being achieved in collaboration with development partners and through the incorporation of capacity strengthening in partnership agreements;
- Barriers that prevent organisations and donors from partnering with local and national responders are removed, and their administrative burden reduced;
- National coordination mechanisms are supported where they exist, and local and national responders are included in international coordination mechanisms, as appropriate and in keeping with humanitarian principles;
- By 2020, a global aggregate of minimum 25% of humanitarian funding goes to local and national responders as directly as possible, reducing transaction costs and improving outcomes for affected people;
- A ‘localisation marker’ is used to measure direct and indirect funding to local and national actors;
- Greater use is made of funding tools which increase and improve assistance delivered by local and national responders, such as country-based pooled funds (from Commitment 2: More support and funding for local and national responders);
- There is a noticeable increase in multi-year, collaborative and flexible planning and multi-year funding instruments, and the impacts on programme efficiency and effectiveness are documented. Oversight is exercised to ensure that recipients apply the same funding arrangements with their implementing partners (from Commitment 7: Increased collaborative, multi-year humanitarian planning and funding);
- Partnership agreements are harmonised and partner assessment information is shared (from Commitment 4: Reduce duplication and management costs);
- There is only a low level of earmarked funding from donors and regional groups to first receivers and from first receivers to those they collaborate with and channel funds to. By 2020, 30% of global humanitarian funding is non-earmarked or softly earmarked (from Commitment 8: reduce the earmarking of donor contributions);
- Reporting is simplified and harmonised, with a common report structure, centred on core requirements and a common terminology (from Commitment 9 on reporting requirements);
- Donor’s funding is traceable throughout the transaction chain as far as the final responders and, where feasible, affected people (from Commitment 1: greater transparency).

## EMERGING ORGANISATIONAL INDICATORS

The Charter 4 Change also offers emerging indicators that can become references for organisations practicing localisation, which are highlighted in Text Box 4. They are more relevant for the reinforcement of local and national organisational capacities than for a participation revolution.

### TEXT BOX 4: EMERGING ORGANISATIONAL INDICATORS FROM THE CHARTER FOR CHANGE

- By May 2018 at least 20% of our own humanitarian funding is passed to southern based NGOs;
- The types of organisation we cooperate with in humanitarian response are documented, and we are fully transparent about the resources we transfer to them; we publish these figures (or percentages) in our public accounts using a recognised categorisation such as the GHA in real-time and to the IATI standard;
- We actively encourage North American and European donors (including institutional donors, foundations and private sector) to increase the year on year percentage of their humanitarian funding going to southern-based NGOs;
- We advocate to donors to make working through national actors part of their criteria for assessing framework partners and calls for project proposals;
- We introduce our NGO partners to our own direct donors with the aim of them accessing direct financing;
- We practice the Principles of Partnership, (Equality, Transparency, Results-Oriented Approach, Responsibility and Complementarity) introduced by the Global Humanitarian Platform in 2007;
- We involve local and national collaborators in the design of the programmes at the outset and participate in decision-making as equals in influencing programme design and partnership policies;
- We identify and implement fair compensation for local organisations for the loss of skilled staff if and when we contract a local organisation's staff involved in humanitarian action within 6 months of the start of a humanitarian crisis or during a protracted crisis, for example along the lines of paying a recruitment fee of 10% of the first six months' salary;
- We support local actors to become robust organisations that continuously improve their role and share in the overall global humanitarian response. We pay adequate administrative support. By May 2018 we have allocated resources to support the capacity-development of our partners;
- By May 2018, we publish the percentages of our humanitarian budget which goes directly to partners for humanitarian capacity building;
- In all communications to the international and national media and to the public we promote the role of local actors and acknowledge the work that they carry out and include them as spokespersons when security considerations permit.

## EMERGING OPERATIONAL INDICATORS FOR THE SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION

The “Seven Dimensions Framework on Localisation” speaks mostly to the relationship practices between international and national organisations at the operational level. It

complements the provisional indicators on the strategic/systemic and organisational levels and may provide some orientation for the further development of these. As mentioned, the task in this research was to test, adjust and refine the original framework, reinserted here for easy reference.<sup>25</sup>

| FUNDING  | PARTNERSHIPS   | CAPACITY   | PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION  | COORDINATION MECHANISMS                             | VISIBILITY  | POLICY   |
|--|--|--|---|---|---|--|
| 25%<br>As directly as possible<br>Better quality | Less sub contracting<br>More equitable relationships | Institutional development<br>Stop undermining local capacity | Participation of crisis affected communities<br>Inclusion: Gender, age, disability. | National actors have greater presence and influence | Roles, results and innovations by national actors | National actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates |

Figure 6: The original order of the seven dimensions of localisation framework

As figure 6 shows, we integrate ‘participation revolution’, the sixth of ten commitments in the Grand Bargain document, into the concept of ‘localisation’. We do this because the ultimate purpose of localisation is not only to have strong national and local intermediaries, but also more resilience among the populations that are at risk of, or affected by, crisis. Acknowledging the participation revolution commitment when discussing localisation also signals that, while we may want to give more decision-making power to national and local organisations, these organisations need to actively and proactively involve the intended beneficiaries into their decision-making.<sup>26</sup>

Three questions came up repeatedly during the conversations in Ethiopia and Bangladesh:

### Where are transparency and accountability?

They are indeed not explicitly listed but are obviously present in different dimensions;

transparency comes into play, for example, in the dimensions of ‘funding & finance’, ‘partnership’ (or relationship quality), ‘participation revolution’, and ‘visibility’. So does accountability, which can also be invoked under the ‘coordination & collaboration’ dimension.

**What about humanitarian principles?** A major concern about localisation remains in conflict settings and centres on the ability and willingness of L/NA to abide by fundamental humanitarian principles.<sup>27</sup> Given the frequency with which international agencies pursue projects and programmes with L/NA through remote management, and the difficulties that international agencies may experience, this concern may be a bit overstated. But it is correct that humanitarian principles are not an integral part of the framework. That doesn’t invalidate the framework but relegates the issue to the contextual considerations (see infra).<sup>28</sup>

25 S. Patel & K. Van Brabant 2017: The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions. Start Network & Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017 <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/3hs09ryakami7n8hjliaruaaw9ycir4r>

26 Oxfam’s definition of ‘localisation’ is of a “transformational process to recognise, respect, and invest in local and national humanitarian and leadership capacities, to better meet the needs of crisis-affected communities.” In Parrish, Ch. & a. Kattakuzhy 2018: Money Talks. This differs from our interpretation which sees the ‘participation revolution’ as an integral part of localisation. We are therefore not just looking at the needs, but also at the capacities and power of affected populations.

27 In September 2017, the ICRC organized an internal workshop, facilitated by Groupe URD, with the following objectives: 1) to take stock of the institution’s experience in engaging with and supporting local and national actors, 2) to identify areas where the ICRC could improve its own practice, and 3) to draw from its operational experience in order to inform the localization discussion. While recognising challenges, it did not see a fundamental obstacle to localisation in conflict.

28 Elsewhere, GMI has argued that the question of humanitarian principles is very relevant but is too easily generalised by stereotypical assertions that local and national actors are unable or unwilling to work with neutrality and impartiality, and that international agencies, as a category, are far superior in doing so. GMI 2017: Understanding the Localisation Debate pp.6-7 <https://www.gmentor.org/localization/>

**Is there a priority order?** Best remembered from the localisation commitment in the Grand Bargain is the 25% funding as directly as possible to L/NA, by 2020. While utterly relevant highlighting the money side is not

usually a good starting point to build a constructive collaboration on. Mostly we compete for limited funds.

Now we suggest a different arrangement of the seven dimensions, as follows:

| RELATIONSHIP QUALITY   | PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION                                 | FUNDING & FINANCING     | CAPACITY  | COORDINATION MECHANISMS                             | VISIBILITY  | POLICY   |
|--|--|-------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Respectful and equitable<br><br>Reciprocal transparency and accountability | Deeper participation of at-risk and affected populations | Quality<br><br>Quantity | Sustainable organisations and collaborative capacities<br><br>Stop undermining capacities | National actors have greater presence and influence | Roles, results and innovations by national actors | National actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates |

Figure 7: The revised order of the seven dimensions of localisation framework

First and foremost is the quality of relationship, which means building and maintaining good relationships with at-risk and affected populations as well as local and national actors. Much more becomes possible if there is a general atmosphere of respect (which is compatible with differences) and at least basic trust. Secondly, given that the at-risk and affected populations are the primary stakeholders, we give them more prominence too.<sup>29</sup>

The research has enabled a greater detailing of the specific indicators under each dimension. In Annex 1, these are phrased as tension, frustration, or ‘pain points’ in the relationship between L/NA and international actors. The following table offers positively phrased emerging indicators. The table is divided into three columns. The first column states the dimension, the second the specific indicators and the third provides comments to explain the indicators.

**TABLE 3 : EMERGING INDICATORS OF SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION IN OPERATIONAL PRACTICE**

| DIMENSION                                      | INDICATORS   | COMMENTS   |
|--|--|--|
| <b>RELATIONSHIP QUALITY &amp; PARTNERSHIPS</b> | <p><b>International actors use a nuanced vocabulary to describe the nature of the collaborative relationship with local and national actors, which is reflected in formal agreements such as contracts and MoUs<sup>30</sup></b></p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuanced language should differentiate between subcontractors, project-focused consortium, project implementation collaborator; strategic partner, etc.</li> <li>• The word ‘partnership’ is reserved for a qualitatively superior relationship that strives to be equitable. In practice this means that all are ‘decision-making partners’, and have input and influence in the conceptualisation, design, planning and adaptive management of a joint action, and take full part in reflections, reviews and learning. This can still be a ‘project partnership’ and need not be open-ended or of long duration. The word ‘partnership’, thus used, implies joint responsibility for the success of the action, and reciprocal transparency and accountability</li> <li>• Bringing larger financial resources to the partnership does not lead a superiority in the relationship</li> <li>• Entering into a ‘partnership’ is a choice of each participant, and the L/NA also makes this choice</li> <li>• Participants in a ‘partnership’ recognise that this type of collaboration carries risks for each, but also combines strengths and therefore creates opportunities</li> <li>• Donors can encourage greater clarity about the nature of the collaborative relationship by asking, in their proposal guidelines, precision about the nature of the relationship</li> <li>• The different qualities of relationships can also be considered in real time reviews and evaluations of operations</li> </ul> |
|  | <p><b>Verbal and non-verbal communications between collaborating entities or between aid agencies and affected populations always express basic respect and take into account cultural sensitivities and differences around what is considered ‘disrespectful’ behaviour</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respectful behaviour derives from fundamental personal values, reinforced by organisational expectations of acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour. It requires self-awareness and interpersonal / collaborative skills.</li> <li>• In an equitable partnership, relationship management receives the same active attention as the management of the joint action</li> </ul>   |

30 The nature of a collaborative relationship is not fixed. It can evolve to become richer and deeper, or more transactional. Helvetas, a Swiss INGO, in its Partnership Policy talks about “gradients of a partnership.” So as not to lose the qualitative meaning of ‘partnership’, we recommend ‘gradients of a collaborative relationship’, and reserving the word ‘partnership’ for a high quality relationship.

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| <b>RELATIONSHIP QUALITY &amp; PARTNERSHIPS</b> | <b>Principles and criteria for partnership are clearly articulated, inclusive and transparent</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International agency principles and criteria of partnership are available to the L/NA</li> <li>• The reasons for refusal of 'partnership' by either side should be clearly shared</li> <li>• L/NA may propose their own principles</li> <li>• An MoU will state the mutually agreed principles and the mechanism(s) of alert if one or the other feels these are not respected</li> </ul>  |
|  | <b>Partnership MoUs include a clause on joint reciprocal evaluations and monitoring of the quality of relationships at regular interval as a sign of a genuine partnership</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partnering agencies periodically reviews, together, the quality of the relationship. Where there are tensions, such review can be assisted by a trusted and qualified third party.<sup>31</sup></li> <li>• Partnering agencies may also put in place a mechanism where they can alert each other quickly, when a possible friction point comes up</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>Whistle-blowing and complaints and response procedures are embedded in the partnership policy</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• L/NAs often do not have clear paths for raising issues about unfair practices to the international partner. Often if there is a problem and complaint, the issue gets blocked at country level. A robust complaints and response procedure will ensure that the L/NA partners have confidence that they can raise more sensitive issues and they will be dealt with in fair, safe and confidential manner<sup>32</sup></li> </ul>  |
|  | <b>Purely formalistic and unnecessary due diligence assessments are avoided</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due diligence processes focus on the actual functioning of a L/NA, not just on its 'policies' and 'procedures'</li> <li>• When a local/national agency can show that it has gone through a credible due diligence process in recent times, the findings of that are accepted, or complemented with an additional 'light due diligence.'</li> <li>• When considering a quality partnership, the international agency also shares with the L/NA its internal practices of checks, balances, and quality control</li> </ul> |
|  | <b>International agencies do not demand that the collaborating L/NA gives continuous primacy to their relationship</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International agencies recognise that L/NA first and foremost are or must be embedded in local/national relationships, and that effective 'national capacities' derive from strong collaborative capacities among L/NA: they encourage this, and are mindful that they should not demand or force the L/NA to prioritise the relationship with them above all others</li> </ul>  |

31 Several INGOs have used the Keystone Accountability framework, allowing partners across the globe to safely comment on their experience of the international agency.

32 One Swiss NGO for example, makes it possible for partners in any country to communicate a complaint via its website. That message goes directly to the internal audit unit.

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| <b>RELATIONSHIP<br/>QUALITY &amp;<br/>PARTNERSHIPS</b>  | <b>Ending a partnering relationship is done with practical responsibility and respect for the other partner</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• True ‘partnerships’ are not dependent on money only, they can live on ‘beyond the money’; still, partnerships may also come to an end<sup>33</sup></li> <li>• Details of full project or programme budgets are shared with L/NA partners and overhead costs are jointly decided</li> <li>• The partnership relationship changes over time to facilitate and promote L/NA work</li> </ul>   |
|   | <b>PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION</b>   | <b>Crisis responses are designed, implemented and reviewed in ways that are empowering for affected populations</b>   |
| <b>People have an early say in the design and planning phase of response</b>  |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At-risk populations have an effective say, from the design and planning phase onwards, in risk reduction and crisis preparedness policies and plans intended for their benefit</li> <li>• As quickly as possible, crisis-affected populations are consulted not only on their needs, but also on options of response</li> <li>• Active effort is made to ensure that all sections of a population have the necessary information and can express their views.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Formal communication, feedback and response mechanisms are set up with participation from the community and are regularly tested</b> |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are tested not once but regularly, to verify they continue to be trusted and work for all social groups in practice. Affected populations are also invited to offer ideas and suggestions how things can be improved</li> <li>• Formal mechanisms for feedback and complaints that work do <i>not</i> make quality human interactions superfluous</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Crisis-affected populations are involved in reviews and evaluations</b>  |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are involved in the identification of core areas of attention of real time reviews and subsequent evaluations, and/or learning exercises and can insert questions important to them</li> <li>• They are fully involved in value-for-money planning and assessment, as they are primary stakeholders in the determination of ‘value’</li> </ul>  |

33 See e.g. de Geoffroy, V. & F. Grunewald 2017: More than the Money. Localisation in Practice. Trócaire & Groupe URD; Lewis, S. 2016: Developing a Timeline for Exit Strategies. Experiences from an action-learning set with the British Red Cross, EveryChild, Oxfam GB, Sightsavers and WWF-UK. Oxford, INTRAC; and Lewis, S., G. Buttner, A. Selliah, K. Edussuriya, H. Raharimanana & Y. Orengo 2017: What’s it Like to be on the Receiving End of Exit? A partner and country office review. London, BOND.

34 A phrase we have taken from the response to the Marawi crisis, in the Philippines.



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| <b>PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION</b> | <b>All people are treated with full human dignity</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At risk and crisis-affected people are not treated as data sources and numbers that make up statistics, but as individuals and social groups, worthy of being treated with dignity and respect</li> <li>• All relief workers regularly dedicate quality time to interaction with the people they work with/for, informing, explaining but also listening, and following up &amp; feeding back</li> <li>• Self-awareness, interpersonal and cross-cultural skills are core competencies for any relief worker</li> </ul>   |
|                                 | <b>Expected standards of staff behaviour are widely known</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All assisting agencies communicate collectively what standards of behaviour are expected from their employees, consultants and contractors, what is not acceptable, and where and how to confidentially report perceived instances of inappropriate behaviour</li> </ul>  |
|                                 | <b>The collaborating agencies demonstrate practical competency in working with conflict-sensitivity</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ability to work with active conflict-sensitivity is a core responsibility and core competency for any operational actor, including researchers and enumerators</li> <li>• Since certain interventions (e.g. in a protracted crisis) seek to promote change in the existing political economy of power, those most at risk of backlash have a strong say in the choice of tactics and determine the threshold of acceptable risk<sup>35</sup></li> <li>• International and L/NA actors pursue risk management, protection, conflict sensitivity and accountability to at-risk and affected populations under one framework, not as separate activities<sup>36</sup></li> </ul> |
|                                 | <b>Community/survivor-led funds are utilised where conditions allow</b>                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International and L/NA enable and experiment with 'community/survivor-led' funds, particularly in environments where social groups operate with a high degree of inclusivity</li> </ul>   |
|                                 | <b>Donors and operational agencies plan for adaptation</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As much and as soon as possible (when there is no acute emergency) donors step away from predesigned and predetermined 'projects' whose content, objectives, and timeliness are (largely) decided by relief agencies without significant input from the intended beneficiaries, and insist on meaningful input by the latter</li> <li>• Contracts also enable justified adaptations based on evolving needs, priorities and capacities, and learning-in-action</li> </ul>   |

35 See Van Brabant 2016: Conflict Sensitivity: Some misunderstandings and a blind spot? Blog post, accessible on [www.navigation360.org](http://www.navigation360.org), blog, conflict-peace-violence.

36 See Van Brabant 2017: Conflict Sensitivity, Accountability to Affected Populations, Risk Management & Protection: How do they relate to each other? Blog post, accessible on [www.navigation360.org](http://www.navigation360.org), blog, conflict-peace-violence.

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| <b>FUNDING &amp; FINANCING</b> | <b>Quality of funding is given equal attention as quantity</b>                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whatever the nature of the collaborative relationship, including sub-contracting, quality of funding is given as much attention as quantity and all necessary core costs (indirect costs) are covered, preferably by a flexible management fee that is proportionate to the nature and volume of work being carried out by the L/NA (core costs include staff time for participating in coordination meetings, and strategic reflection and planning moments)</li> <li>• L/NA are provided with the same essential operating assets (office, warehousing, transport, communications, computing, printing...) that international agencies expect for themselves</li> <li>• Financial reporting &amp; disbursement procedures are set so they do not create cash flow problems</li> </ul> |
|                                | <b>L/NA receive appropriate funding to attract, retain and maintain qualified human resources</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The programme and project budgets should have appropriate funding so that the L/NA can recruit and retain qualified staff, which will ensure that in times of crisis staff are not tempted by higher salaries offered by international actors</li> <li>• The principle of equal level of compensation for same level of competencies will ensure fairness and in the salary scale between L/NA and INGOs and the UN</li> </ul>  |
|                                | <b>Un-earmarked overhead costs are allocated for management and future institutional development</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most donors allocate a certain percentage on overhead costs for HQ operations. These are normally un-earmarked funds. An equitable partnership would ensure that these funds are shared equally with the partners without reporting conditions. The L/NA can then decide how they want to invest the funds in their own organisational development.</li> </ul>  |
|                                | <b>Existing organisational systems are reinforced rather than disrupted</b>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whatever the nature of the collaborative relationship, international agencies respect the salary scales and financial procedures of the L/NA and as a matter of principle avoid imposing their own, particularly for time-bound project activities</li> <li>• If financial procedures are not strong enough, then the effort is directed at strengthening them overall, rather than imposing their own solely for the specific project</li> </ul>   |

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| <b>FUNDING &amp; FINANCING</b> | <b>No extra conditions are added to those of the donor</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where international agencies act as intermediaries for a donor, they do not add constraints and restrictions beyond those imposed by the donor. If the latter should be obviously counter-productive, they will make the case for greater flexibility with the donor</li> <li>• Donors make public any restrictions they impose and the rationale for it, and keep active oversight that intermediaries do not add additional ones</li> </ul>  |
|                                | <b>International agencies encourage and enable direct contact between L/NA and donors</b>              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National and local partners are invited to attend donor meetings with their international partner agencies</li> <li>• Direct contact with donors can open up channels of open communication and trust building with donors and national partners for future funding, and donors can also hear directly from L/NNGOs about issues that concern them.</li> </ul>   |
|                                | <b>Co-managed pooled funds that are accessible to L/NA are a primary funding modality</b>              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors make more use of pooled funds that are co-managed (at strategic and operational level) by national and international governmental actors, and that operate with procedures that are enabling for L/NA</li> </ul>  |
|                                | <b>National (or regional) grant-making bodies are actively sought and reinforced to play that role</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where donors continue to rely on intermediaries that can handle a multitude of contracts on their behalf, they actively seek out a capable, impartial, and widely respected national, local or regional entity to play this role, or encourage the emergence/creation of such</li> </ul>   |
|                                | <b>Donors encourage proposals in line with localisation commitments</b>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where donors fund bilaterally, they encourage international agencies to submit proposals that include a 'localisation plan' as well as a growing number of proposals with L/NA in the lead and international ones in a supporting &amp; reinforcing role</li> </ul>  |
|                                | <b>Open budgets or budget transparency is the goal in partnering relationships</b>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The default mode for partnering relationships is full transparency about at least project &amp; programme budgets, and not being fully transparent requires compelling justification</li> <li>• L/NA know that international budgets have different cost-structures than their own, but knowledge of the full budget makes it possible for them to make suggestions where they believe greater cost-effectiveness can be achieved</li> <li>• Full transparency is not a requirement or goal in sub-contracting relationships, though quality funding is</li> </ul> |
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| <b>FUNDING &amp; FINANCING</b> | <b>Fraud and corruption risks on all sides are acknowledged and managed</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fraud and corruption happen in international and L/NA - all parties refrain from making generalising statements about such risk in any category of agencies</li> <li>• Where fraud or corruption is suspected or confirmed within an actor in a collaborative relationship, the agency concerned is first allowed to deal with it – only if that would not be done adequately can other collaborating agencies come in</li> <li>• Contributions in cash, kind or through voluntary time investment, by L/NA, are also entered into the accounts and financial reporting, reflecting the true cost, and respective contributions, of a collaborative action</li> </ul>   |
|                                | <b>Reporting, accounting and MEAL procedures and formats are harmonised between different international agencies collaborating with L/NAs, also in a subcontracting relationship</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where different international agencies collaborate with the same L/NA, they make a concerted effort to harmonise reporting and accounting procedures and formats, which increases the overall cost-efficiency in the collaboration, and contributes to <i>'less paper, more aid'</i></li> <li>• International agencies that want to report on aggregated 'global results' cannot impose the systems to meet their needs on L/NA, and if that proves impossible, the international agencies must provide the L/NA with the additional resources (financial, material, human, time) needed to meet their respective requirements</li> </ul>   |
|                                | <b>Increased financial autonomy and sustainability of the L/NA is a strategic objective in all partnering relationships</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the strategic objectives of all international agencies operating in another country is to reduce the financial dependency on international funding and increase the financial stability of L/NA. To this effect, they not only support the capacities of L/NA to raise funds from the mainstream international donors, but to also develop strategies for greater and more regular domestic revenue raising. This may require collaborative effort to create enabling legislation. It may also involve collaborative engagement with government on how a structural national capacity for crisis-preparedness and response can be financed from its public revenue.</li> <li>• Meanwhile, international agencies refrain from fundraising in the domestic market, directly or through a national affiliate, until there are many purely L/NA with the organisational competencies to genuinely compete in offering choice to potential contributors</li> </ul> |

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| <b>CAPACITY-ENHANCEMENT</b> | <b>Capacity-enhancing investments are strategic</b>                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A strategic approach to strengthening local and national capacities is informed by a prior strategic analysis of the ‘eco-system’ of L/ NA (and possibly regional ones) in a given environment, and their current collaborative abilities and practices (across sectors i.e. governmental, private, not-for-profit...)</li> <li>• Some core areas of attention will be: financial sustainability; collaborative capacities; rapidly scaling up and down; effective coordination in crisis management</li> </ul>  |
|                             | <b>Capacity-strengthening investments are cumulative and mutually reinforcing</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity strengthening activities and investments by different international (and local/national) actors build on prior investments and fit within a broader strategic framework</li> <li>• The number of isolated and repetitive efforts is significantly reduced</li> </ul>  |
|                             | <b>Nothing new is created without certainty that what exists is beyond repair</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New entities, networks or platforms are not created unless it is very clear that the existing ones are not willing or able to perform the desired functions</li> </ul>   |
|                             | <b>Local/national/regional capacity-resource centres are supported and reinforced</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic investments are made in creating or enhancing national entities that are or become national, local (and regional) resource centres</li> </ul>  |
|                             | <b>Capacity-strengthening efforts are purpose- and need-driven, not supply-driven</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focused capacity-development efforts prioritise those individual competencies and/or organisational/collaborative capacities that are essential to the achievement of the common objectives, followed by those that will strengthen organisations or networks &amp; collaborative platforms</li> </ul>   |
|                             | <b>The underlying goal in a partnership is capacity-sharing<sup>37</sup></b>          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The underlying objective in any quality collaboration is ‘capacity-sharing’ and joint ‘capacity-enhancement’</li> <li>• Each partner brings experience, insight, competencies and ‘resources’ to the collaboration</li> <li>• Capacity-assessments therefore highlight what each can contribute, what capacity-development opportunities the collaboration brings for each, where the collaboration as a whole has relevant ‘capacity gaps’, and how it will address this</li> <li>• This requires a willingness to have an honest and realistic perspective on the actual capacities an organisation has, in a given operating environment</li> </ul> |

|                             |   |   |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| <b>CAPACITY-ENHANCEMENT</b> | <b>Capacity-development investments are managed like any other objective<sup>37</sup></b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They are treated as any other project or strategic objective: with clear objectives, with proper progress monitoring and dedicated evaluation attention</li> </ul>   |
|                             | <b>Organisational or network capacity-strengthening is an ongoing process, not an event</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organisational and network development in practice requires a sustained process, with most of it happening ‘on-the-job’</li> <li>• This is best enabled through a combination of focused learning events within a longer-term periodic accompaniment and mentoring, underpinned by it being a strategic objective of the organisation or collaborative platform concerned</li> </ul>   |
|                             | <b>When capacities have been strengthened, role changes must follow</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be it on the individual or collaborative level, when capacities have been successfully strengthened, roles can and need to change. What previously had to be done or tightly controlled by one individual or agency, can now be left in the competent care of another who has learned.</li> </ul>  |
|                             | <b>Capacity-development support is provided by competent professionals with contextual knowledge</b>                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organisational (and network) capacity development is a field of expertise and professional competency that goes well beyond the ability to provide training on a certain technical-thematic topic</li> <li>• Effective capacity development and support is context-specific and not context-blind</li> </ul>   |
|                             | <b>Negative impacts on existing capacities are anticipated and avoided, and corrective action is taken if negative impacts happen</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International agencies significantly reduce their negative impact on local and national capacities, e.g. by hiring away their best staff with higher salaries and more opportunities, fuelling inflation that increases the overall cost of operating &amp; competing on the domestic fundraising market</li> <li>• When negative impacts happen, adequate corrective action is discussed with the L/NA and taken</li> </ul> |
|                             | <b>No direct implementation without purposeful and simultaneous capacity-support</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where international assistance is needed, and the direct operational abilities of international agencies are called upon, the latter design their intervention so as to also play a resource role for L/NA</li> <li>• This goes beyond training of their own ‘national’ staff, who may not remain as an ‘organised capacity’ when the international agency leaves</li> </ul>   |

37 The term was first heard from an L/NA participant in the DEPP conference in Geneva, 15 March 2018.

38 See for example: Simister, N. & R. Smith 2010: Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity-Building. Is it really that difficult? Oxford, INTRAC.

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| <b>COORDINATION, TASK FORCES &amp; COLLABORATIVE CAPACITIES</b> | <b>Collaboration is recognised and rewarded</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As crisis-related challenges typically are too big for one actor to address, donors put a premium on collaborative approaches, and support the efficiency and effectiveness of collaboration mechanisms</li> </ul>  |
|   | <b>Support is provided to pre-already existing local and national networks avoid establishing multiple new platforms</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New platforms and mechanisms are not created until it is very clear the desired objectives cannot be achieved with and through existing ones, and/or the existing ones are unable or unwilling to operate with inclusion and impartiality</li> </ul>  |
|   | <b>L/NA are actively present in local and national task forces and coordination mechanisms</b>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is a regular and structured flow of information between local and national mechanisms</li> </ul>  |
|   | <b>Government in principle co-leads all coordination mechanisms</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The exception can be where government is party to a conflict, or puts political interests above human rights and humanitarian needs</li> </ul>  |
|   | <b>Coordination is led by people with the required competencies</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All co-leads have strong crisis management and proactive coordination competencies, and know how to run meetings that are both 'inclusive' and 'effective'</li> <li>All participants are encouraged to make suggestions about how the efficiency and effectiveness can be enhanced</li> </ul> |
|   | <b>L/NA presence and participation is effectively 'representative'</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Given their often-large number, non-governmental L/NA presence is ensured via 'representatives' who are elected through due process, and are responsible for consultation and effective information sharing and feedback reporting to their 'constituents'</li> </ul>                         |
|   | <b>The coordination and collaborative environment is enabling for L/NA</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Task forces, cluster meetings and coordination mechanisms operate in a manner that creates an enabling environment for L/NA (languages of communication, acronyms and international references, but also communicating and decision-making styles and procedures)</li> </ul>                  |

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| <b>VISIBILITY</b>  | <b>Deliberations and decisions are informed by in-depth situational understanding, including the views of affected populations</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deliberations and decisions of task forces and coordination mechanisms are informed by a constant first-hand engagement with affected populations</li> <li>• They regularly invite bona fide members of such populations to participate</li> <li>• As much as possible the task force/coordination group presents their emerging ideas for action for comment by the affected populations</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>Coordination imposes discipline but leaves openness for creative innovation</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Task forces and coordination mechanisms promote the active pursuit of complementarities and synergies between different interventions: they also impose (and can enforce) constraints on what operational agencies can do and how to prevent fragmentation, overlap and confusion</li> <li>• However, task forces also remain open to and encouraging of thoughtful experiments with innovative approaches, as long as this learning is brought to the collective</li> </ul> |
|  | <b>The roles, work, risks taken, and contributions of L/NA are rendered visible</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All external communications (to donors &amp; wider public) by international agencies and L/NA correctly acknowledge the roles and contributions of all actors, which are named and, where applicable, have their logos included</li> <li>• The nature of the collaborative relationship is also clear from the text of the report</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>L/NA need to give their agreement on communications that could put them at risk</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where external communications can put an agency in the collaborative relationship at risk from political and/or armed actors, no communication goes out until the latter approved the content, timing and even the decision to communicate publicly</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>Innovative ideas and practices developed by L/NA are publicly acknowledged</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• When an international agency improves and takes to scale an innovation by a L/NA, due credit will still be given to the latter</li> <li>• L/NA also credit international agencies for innovative ideas and approaches they take up</li> </ul>  |
| <b>DISASTER &amp; HUMANITARIAN POLICIES, STANDARDS &amp; PLANS</b> | <b>Stakeholders can effectively input into government policy and planning</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At risk populations and local/national non-governmental actors have early and influential input into local and national government policies, preparedness and action plans that are intended for their benefit</li> <li>• They will ensure that local knowledge and risk management practices are known and considered by all policy makers and planners</li> </ul>  |



|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <b>DISASTER &amp; HUMANITARIAN<br/>POLICIES, STANDARDS &amp; PLANS</b> | <b>Local and national agencies influence international policy debates and standards discussions on relief and humanitarian action</b>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>L/NA are actively engaged in and can influence international policy debates on relief and humanitarian action, and efforts to develop or evolve standards</li> <li>L/NA are leading voices in the regional/national/local adaptations of such policies and standards</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>Individual participants from L/NAs that, participate in national, regional and international policy debates, are truly 'representative' and accountable</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individuals from aid-recipient societies who participate in such international/regional/national forums must consult with and communicate the views and input of a sizeable constituency, to which they regularly provide all relevant information, and feedback. Regular failure to do so disqualifies them from further participation.</li> </ul> |

## USES OF THE ENRICHED FRAMEWORK

This new version of the framework with more detailed indicators has increased utility and enables a richer repertoire of potential uses, some of which are outlined below:

- **A comprehensive perspective:** It provides a good overview of the diverse issues that can complicate the relationship between L/NA and international ones. The Grand Bargain only recognised two aspects of localisation: the quantity (but not the quality) of funding, and the participation revolution. We also need to recognise other dimensions that interconnect to shape those relationships.
- **Structuring the conversation:** Without such a framework, conversations about the relationship between international and L/NA will bring up many of these issues, but more haphazardly. Now we can discuss the different aspects of our relationship in a structured manner.
- **Meaning in practice:** The detailing of key issues under each dimension gives a clearer sense of what localisation and a participation revolution mean in practice.
- **Assessment:** The emerging indicators make it possible to assess with greater precision the state-of-affairs in a bilateral or collective relationship between international and L/NA.
- **Preparing for negotiation:** When confronted with unfavourable terms of collaboration, L/NA ask themselves the question of whether they would dare to negotiate and if so, how? The participation revolution and localisation commitments, freely engaged into by many major international actors, legitimises negotiation and campaigning. L/NA can prepare themselves with the detailed framework, to consider what they see as a priority, what is fundamental and non-negotiable, and where compromises may be acceptable.
- **Prioritising:** When there is agreement that participation and localisation must be deepened, the framework again can help identify some priorities, as it is not possible to advance on everything at the same time. Subsequently, the emerging indicators can be adapted to assess progress.
- **Partnership review:** The emerging indicators in the 'quality of relationship' dimension can be useful for a periodic partnership review, where the relationship aspires to be more than transactional.<sup>39</sup>
- **Planning:** Agreements around priorities now can be turned into a jointly agreed plan.

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The emerging indicators of a collaborative relationship may be necessary but not sufficient to capture a quality 'partnership'. To capture it, a commonality of purpose and enough convergence of values are probably also needed. These are not explicitly listed as emerging indicators but can be added at the wish of any actor engaged in a collaboration.

For assessment or planning purposes, an adjusted version of the framework can easily be created to help to plan and track progress against aspects of the seven dimensions. This might resemble Table 2.

**TABLE 4: A POSSIBLE WORKSHEET FOR AGREED ASSESSMENT AND  
ADVANCEMENT ON LOCALISATION**

| <b>OUR AGREED OBJECTIVES</b>                        | <b>WHERE ARE WE NOW?</b><br>(With regard to the priority issues we want to address) | <b>WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?</b><br>(What do we need to continue doing, what do we need to do differently, what do we need to stop, what do we need to start doing?) | <b>WHAT PROGRESS MARKER DO WE WANT TO ACHIEVE BY WHEN?</b> (and how will we assess this?) | <b>WHAT OBSTACLES CAN WE ANTICIPATE &amp; HOW WILL WE OVERCOME THEM?</b> | <b>WHAT WOULD A 'GREAT SUCCESS' END STATE LOOK LIKE?</b> |
|---|---|--|---|--|--|
| For the quality of relationship                     |   |  |   |  |  |
| For the funding                                     |   |  |   |  |  |
| For capacity-sharing and joint capacity-development |   |  |   |  |  |
| For a participation revolution                      |   |  |   |  |  |
| For visibility                                      |   |  |   |  |  |

## V. ADVANCING LOCALISATION: CONTEXTS, PATHWAYS AND SPEEDS

Increasing the involvement of at-risk and affected populations in decisions about what is done for their benefit, and more leading roles for local and national assistance and protection providers, will follow different pathways and happen at different speeds in different contexts. The geographical context can be the national territory, a region within that territory, or a cross-border region.

A thorough comparative analysis of a range of contexts was not possible within the constraints of this research. Short case studies on three contexts (Ethiopia, the Marawi response in the Philippines and the response to the latest Rohingya refugee influx in Bangladesh) can be found in Annex 2. Additionally, and based on conversations with people operating in other contexts and our own exposure to such, some of the influential contextual factors that emerge are:

- **Role of government:** Are we dealing with a government that is actively engaged in crisis management, or not? Examples would be most EU countries or India where government (assisted by auxiliaries like the Civil Defence and the national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society) leads the response and organises the delivery of assistance or compensation packages. Localisation here will mean that the government (co-)leads the coordination, and that international agencies provide practical assistance to local and national authorities;
- **Overall political climate:** Giving at risk and affected populations a substantive say will be easier in more participatory or 'democratic' environments than in authoritarian ones. In the latter, people or citizen-voice may be selected and orchestrated. Governments may also consciously constrain much international presence in crises that are politically sensitive – de facto giving more space for local and national actors. That could be seen in the Marawi crisis in Mindanao for example, compared to the situation after Typhoon Haiyan;
- **Legal and political space for local/national and international actors:** For example, current Ethiopian legislation and procedures makes it difficult for Ethiopian CSOs to do much domestic fundraising and to receive international financing. It also forces international agencies to choose between being a 'donor agency' or an 'implementing agency', creating disincentives to take a supporting role to national or local ones. Other countries also put constraints on the amount of foreign funding that local/national NGOs can receive;
- **Security situation:** Where security concerns lead (most) international agencies to a 'remote management' approach, de facto there is more space for local/national actors. Iraq, parts of Syria and south-central Somalia are illustrative examples of this;
- **Relief experience in country:** In countries like the Philippines or Bangladesh, there is significant governmental and non-governmental experience with relief and crisis management. In others, possibly Togo, Guyana or Paraguay, far less. The more relief experience there is, even when the country is confronted with an unprecedented crisis, the more we can rely on the left side of the localisation mantra '*as local as possible, as international as necessary*'. However, this is only possible if international agencies are willing to acknowledge that there are strong capacities to 'build on';
- **Type of crisis:** For recurrent crises such as flooding in Pakistan, drought in northern Kenya, or internal displacement in Colombia, we should see L/NAs play an ever-increasing role over time. So too for chronic crises like refugee populations in Lebanon and Jordan. In unprecedented, large-scale, sudden onset disasters, like the 2015 Nepal earthquakes, we may see a substantive role for international agencies, at least in the first period of response;
- **Global media attention and funding levels:** Localised responses are more likely to happen in crises that receive less

global media attention, and therefore less overall funding. Global headlines and large-scale funding tend to trigger the “we need to be there (and be seen to be there)” and “this is a great cash influx opportunity” reflexes among top management of international agencies;

- **Density and nature of the international presence:** The more international agencies are already present in country and oriented towards relief work, the greater the likelihood they will give themselves a central role in any crisis response. In light of localisation commitments international agencies need to have a dialogue with local actors and reflect on what role they can play in reinforcing rather than direct implementation.

It is the combination of factors, not a single one, that will influence the trajectories & speed of progress towards a participation revolution and localisation in different contexts. Some of the implications of this are as follows:

- In some contexts, strategic advancement on localisation will mean working not only on strengthened preparedness, but also more enabling conditions (e.g. legislative and policy frameworks);
- Contexts where lack of funding or restricted access reduces the presence and role of international agencies, are interesting cases to document how local and national actors have dealt with the challenges.
- In some contexts, where there is an active governmental infrastructure and an experienced and enabled civil society (e.g. Bangladesh and the Philippines) bold steps towards localisation (e.g. pooled funds co-managed by national and international actors, or even a fund managed by a national grant-making actors) are possible and should be made.

See Annex 2 for further exploration of different contexts, pathways and speeds of localisation, in the form of three case studies.

## VI. LOCALISATION AND PREPAREDNESS: BUILDING ON THE DEPP

This section provides one perspective on the DEPP’s relevance and contribution to localisation, but as mentioned, it is not an ‘evaluation.’<sup>40</sup> When the DEPP projects were designed, what was meant by ‘localisation’ was still rather unclear in its specifics, and there was no framework for reference. Also, although more recent publications and briefs of DEPP projects often refer to localisation, it may still be too early to properly appreciate its eventual contributions/impacts from that perspective. Finally, it was beyond the scope of this exercise to comprehensively review the DEPP’s contribution to localisation, particularly since there have been different mixes of DEPP

projects in ten different countries. Given the differences in contexts, it is only to be expected that the contributions to localisation in each country will differ.

Rather, this section seeks to illustrate some of the general good practices conducted by the DEPP that are in line with localisation, and highlight emerging opportunities or potential challenges for future preparedness programming to address. The good practices and considerations for future preparedness programmes are structured around the seven dimensions of localisation.

## THE RELEVANCE OF THE DEPP PREPAREDNESS INTERVENTIONS FOR LOCALISATION

The very high relevance for localisation of the Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme can be confidently asserted: the goal of all of the projects is to strengthen different local and national capacities, sometimes of at-risk-populations, sometimes of individual organisations, but also of organisations in relation with each other (as components of an eco-system). Listed below is an non-exhaustive overview of how the projects contributed to localisation.

- **Supporting at-risk populations:** Particularly relevant here are the Better Dialogue, Better Information, Better Action project (CDAC-N), which developed country-level working groups to improve communication between at-risk communities and responders; the Linking Preparedness, Resilience and Response project (LPRR) which worked directly with communities to improve their resilience strategies; and the Age and Disability Capacity Programme (ADCAP), which focussed on mainstreaming age and disability inclusion to better address the needs of vulnerable populations.
- **Strengthening of individual local/national organisations:** The Shifting the Power project worked with local and national organisations to help them self-assess their capacity gaps and develop capacity-strengthening plans, and the Protection in Practice project worked with national partners to help them mainstream protection principles.
- **Strengthening of components of the local/national eco-system:** Transforming Surge Capacity developed national and regional surge rosters, Financial Enablers encouraged the development and capacity strengthening of seven national consortia in the Philippines, and the ALERT project developed an open-source and accessible preparedness platform. Also, various projects connect at-risk populations with governmental actors by developing preparedness and early warning systems, such as Improved Early Warning-Early Action Ethiopia, Public Health Emergency Preparedness in

Gambella (Ethiopia), Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Systems in Myanmar, Urban Early Warning-Early Action (Nairobi-Kenya).

- The Talent Development project focused on strengthening the competencies of individual humanitarian staff as well as government employees, so does not fit in the previous categories. The project's contribution to localisation will depend on the current or future positioning of these individuals and whether they stay with local/national organisations or join international ones.

Having confirmed the relevance, a word of caution is also needed: The focus in this section on DEPP contributions does not mean that DEPP has been the main or even the major contributor to 'localisation' in the various countries in which it has worked. Other agencies, or agency networks and coalitions may very well be active and sometimes more influential. In Bangladesh, for example, the network of Bangladeshi CSOs that has been campaigning on localisation was not connected to or inspired by a DEPP project, but rather drew on their understanding of international 'aid effectiveness' and Grand Bargain commitments. In addition, INGOs active in DEPP projects also pursue other initiatives relevant for localisation, outside of the DEPP framework.<sup>41</sup>

## PREPAREDNESS AND LOCALISATION: GOOD PRACTICES AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

For each of the seven dimensions of localisation below we highlight some good practices from the DEPP projects around more localised preparedness, followed by some considerations on aspects that can be improved or further addressed by any future preparedness programmes. The examples below are not exhaustive nor presented as 'representative', only as 'illustrative.'

### 1. PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION

#### Good practices

#### Ensuring participation of affected

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For example, Oxfam's Empowering Local and National Humanitarian Actors project in Uganda and Bangladesh, or ActionAid's work on creating an alternative perspective and practice around 'value-for-money'.

### populations in planning and policy

**development:** For example, the LPRR project consulted with over 320 crisis survivors and first responders to develop six core principles for strengthening community resilience and better linking humanitarian response to longer-term development. The project also worked directly with local governments and community committees to allow the latter to select their own preparedness priorities and solutions. Another example includes how the SEPS Myanmar project had communities lead in a participatory analysis of risks, vulnerabilities and capacities, to feed into risk reduction and emergency preparedness action plans.

### Strengthening two-way communication with the affected populations:

The CDAC-N project in Bangladesh, South Sudan and the Philippines has influenced member organisations to programme this more intentionally, and led the Humanitarian Country Teams to include this into needs assessments, sit reps and joint response plans. The PHEP Gambella project has also trained community volunteers, who are the first alert for possible disease outbreaks, to work with local health authorities.

### Considerations for future preparedness programming

- Build on the findings of the LPRR research with crisis-survivors.<sup>42</sup> Incorporate evaluations of humanitarian response led by aid recipients, such as the CDA's 'Listening Project.'<sup>43</sup> The CDA's listening exercises were broad in scope, as they heard people on the receiving end of all types of aid, many of those reflected on relief aid.
- Consider whether the six principles identified by the LPRR project relate equally to survivors of natural disasters and conflict. Is close coordination and work with 'government' a key principle in all politically charged situations? Would, for example, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, or the internally displaced Syrians in Idlib province today, articulate

that principle in those terms?

- Are 'communities' too easily portrayed as inclusive social groups? Consider power dynamics, hierarchies and patterns of exclusion in social groups, and what this means for more extensive 'participation.'
- How far are relief agencies (whose development & government colleagues may very well be promoting 'open budget' practices) prepared to go with sharing a budget with social groups, and allowing the latter to decide what they want to prioritise and what would provide them with greatest value-for-money?<sup>44</sup>

## 2. COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIPS

### Good practices

**Collaborative relationships have been a strong component of DEPP projects, with national and local actors taking the lead:** In Bangladesh and South Sudan the CDAC-N project working groups are made up of national actors who developed the 'communicating with communities' platforms themselves. In the Philippines, the Financial Enablers project allowed the project to be largely run by the national consortia involved, with limited reporting requirements; the one DEPP project staff member worked more in an advisory role.

**Building quality relationships and partnerships has been key aspects of some of the DEPP projects:** The successful partnership with the Nairobi County Government led the latter to take responsibility for the implementation of the Urban EWEA for the next five years already, and budgeting for the system of surveillance / monitoring of indicators in its Integrated Development Plan. Protection in Practice significantly limited the bureaucracy for participating L/NA: reporting could be light, for some simply a powerpoint presentation on how they had spent the money. Shifting the Power project in Kenya has been discussing

42 See: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/LPRR.-Community-Resilience-Building-in-Humanitarian-Response-Insights-from-Crises-Survivors-and-First-Responders-002.pdf>

43 Anderson, M., D. Brown & I. Jean 2012: Time to Listen. Hearing people on the receiving end of international aid. Cambridge MA, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

44 For a fresh perspective on value-for-money, see D'Emidio, Fr. et alii 2017: Value-for-Money in ActionAid: Creating an alternative. ActionAid, [https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/actionaid\\_-\\_value\\_for\\_money\\_-\\_creating\\_an\\_alternative.pdf](https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/actionaid_-_value_for_money_-_creating_an_alternative.pdf)

entry and exit strategies with at-risk communities. Some INGOs participating in DEPP invite long-term partners to participate in their strategic & programme planning and reviews.

### Considerations for future preparedness programming

- Specialists in ‘partnering’ put quite a bit of emphasis on enough convergence in purpose between partnering agencies, and some sharing of core values. This needs to be an explicit attention point for the future partnership.
- The review or ‘evaluation/appreciation’ of possible changes in the relationship, what changes to make, for whom, and why, should be designed into projects and done preferably by an impartial third party, or at least facilitated by such.

## 3. FUNDING/FINANCING

### Good practices

**Strengthening L/NA competencies in proposal writing, fundraising and finance management:** Several projects aimed to support L/NAs to build their own capacity to successfully develop proposals, manage finances and develop fundraising strategies. The Shifting the Power project, for example, has worked with partners to strengthen these competencies, and this has allowed some of their partners to access pooled and bilateral funding that they previously had not had access to. The open-source ALERT preparedness platform will also provide a checklist of due diligence requirements from different donors, enabling L/NAs to more quickly identify what may be missing when applying for funding.

**Flexible grants for self-determining capacity and essential operating equipment:** Some DEPP projects (e.g. Financial Enablers; Protection in Practice; the CDAC-N Project) provided flexible small to modest grants for L/NAs to use for their own chosen capacity development priorities. This was reported as well-received by L/NAs and in several instances may have led to strengthened response. For example, in the Philippines rapid and easy (minimum paper) access to flexible funding allowed Financial Enablers L/NA partners to quickly start assessments and responses, tailored to the particular situation

(such as Typhoon Nock-Ten and the Marawi Crisis). Another approach taken by several DEPP projects was to fund essential operating equipment for L/NAs, which is an area frequently lacking in INGO capacity support. The Shifting the Power project granted some local participating agencies essential operating equipment (office expansion, vehicles, computers, generators), and in Ethiopia the Improved Early Warning Early Action project provided valuable equipment to government institutions, including weather stations and a high-performance computer.

### Considerations for future preparedness programming

- Support should be given to L/NAs to achieve greater organisational financial stability and sustainability. Within the DEPP, this remains largely framed in terms of improved ability to compete in an already overcrowded international funding environment; no strong experiences are reported about other mechanisms to generate income (such as fundraising in what are historically aid-recipient countries). This becomes important where national governments restrict the amount of foreign funding that local and national non-governmental actors are allowed to obtain, and also in a global political environment where sustained funding from Western governments is not guaranteed.
- Increased non-earmarked funding should be directed to L/NA partners. Overall, L/NAs have even greater difficulty than international agencies to obtain low or non-earmarked funding. Reduced earmarking is commitment 8 of the Grand Bargain so any future preparedness programme should consider including a greater number of non-restrictive grants to L/NAs. Promoting greater representation of L/NAs within global or country-level flexible funding mechanisms, like the Start Fund, would also work towards this commitment.
- International agencies should facilitate more L/NA interaction with donors. The documents reviewed during this report did not mention participating L/NAs of the DEPP being directly introduced to donors, and several L/NAs expressed frustration at the number of intermediaries between them and the donor.

## 4. CAPACITY STRENGTHENING

### Good practices

#### **Community capacity strengthening by L/NAs has been a component of some DEPP projects:**

For example, the LPRR project developed a resilience training package for their local partners, which allowed participants to co-design their own solutions for better resilience-based programming. Over 60 community groups and CBOs in Myanmar, Kenya and the Occupied Territories were provided pilot-funding to translate the methodology into practical, context-specific action.

#### **Some DEPP projects focussed on building collaborative capacities and L/NA capacity sharing:**

Financial Enablers (Philippines) deliberately supported collaborative capacities by engaging with networks/platforms of L/NAs, which led to better coordination of protection responses for the forcibly displaced from Marawi and an overall increased capacity to respond to various smaller to medium crisis at the same time. Five L/NAs that participated in Protection-in-Practice, which included a Training of Trainers component, were also subsequently were asked to train other national agencies but also international agency staff, including UNHCR and ICRC (Lebanon, DRC, South Sudan and the Philippines).

#### **Organisational capacity strengthening was based on L/NA self-assessment of capacity gaps:**

For example, Shifting the Power worked with 55 local partners on the SHAPE framework, which allowed them to self-assess their current organisational capacities and draw up their own action plans to address their priority areas.

#### **Working to strengthen governmental capacity:**

No less than six projects worked closely with national government on early warning and preparedness, while nine out of the thirteen included government staff in training. This is particularly relevant as increased competencies and capacities in government can have larger-scale and more sustained impact than among non-governmental actors, where staff turnover

tends to be higher. Involvement of relevant government officials already in the design and development of preparedness projects (done thoroughly in Ethiopia and less so in the Urban EWEA project in Nairobi) enhances their engagement and ownership.

#### **Developing freely-accessible tools and guidance for local and national actors to use:**

The programme has produced 34 guidelines and 29 tools for humanitarian programming, most of them on-line and for global use. See the DEPP Learning Platform for an overview of these tools.

#### **Considerations for future preparedness programming**

- Consider how to find and 'select' local/national agencies to participate in localisation-oriented programmes or projects. Should preference be given to existing 'partner' agencies of the international project lead(s)? Does that result in the most strategically relevant 'reinforcement'?
- Is capacity strengthening envisaged as something that is led by international agencies for L/NAs? Is there explicit recognition of capacity weaknesses among the INGOs (and UN agencies)? Are capacities that L/NAs do have sufficiently highlighted and recognised? Agencies should develop more of a language and practice around 'capacity-sharing.'
- Earlier capacity development investments taken into account and built-upon, and a reflection or evaluation on what has delivered sustained improvements (and what has not) should take place.<sup>45</sup>
- Capacity development initiatives do not always need to be led by international agencies. Are there suitable existing national resources? Can the strategic investment in broadening and deepening the abilities of national capacity-strengthening resources be a better option?
- A critical organisational capacity for crisis response is managing a very rapid scaling up and scaling down. International agencies often justify their taking over with the argument that national organisations are 'overstretched' (in their



ability to manage well). Do investments in preparedness devote adequate attention to this challenge?

- A critical inter-agency capacity for crisis response is effective 'coordination.' Often coordination is primarily a 'tour de table' of who is doing what. Running effective interagency meetings and especially effective crisis management meetings is not a widespread skill. Does the emergency preparedness investment adequately address this?
- Adding a training of trainers component to a thematic training is in principle a good move to spread the knowledge. Is enough consideration given to the risk that, without deep personal, practical experience, 'trainers' only transmit theoretical knowledge, and the simpler basics of practice?
- Capacity development investments are often more oriented more towards larger and national NGOs. How do we target smaller, local organisations that are closer to at-risk populations? Is there a risk of reinforcing the already existing imbalance between them?
- More topical guidance (e.g. Minimum Standards for Age and Disability Inclusion, produced by the ADCAP project) is very valuable. On the other hand, agencies should consider how to streamline this guidance: the overall proliferation of guidance on a growing number of topics becomes overwhelming as no agency can absorb this into practice.
- Strengthening the competencies of individuals for emergency preparedness (e.g. Talent Development) and creating rosters of experienced individuals (e.g. the Surge project) contributes to 'localisation' as 'decentralisation,' but not necessarily as 'transformation' (see above in 'Understanding Localisation'). Indeed, it may very well be that the primary beneficiaries of these new resources are international agencies, who hire them as regular national staff or when scaling up during surge. How will this be monitored, and minimised? How is this risk reduced?

## 5. COORDINATION, TASK FORCES AND COLLABORATIVE CAPACITIES

### Good practices

**DEPP projects place emphasis on coordination between consortia agencies but also stronger roles for L/NAs as**

**coordinators:** In northern Kenya, SIKOM and CARITAS Malal took up the role of country cluster co-ordinators of the peace & security pillars in West Pokot and Samburu counties respectively. In Pakistan, Shifting the Power introduced its national partners to platforms such as the Human Resource Development Network and the national Pakistan DRR Forum. It also supported the latter to establish a provincial chapter in Sindh province. In the DRC, HEAL Africa now coordinates the Mandya Protection cluster from previously having been only an intermittent attendant and CARITAS evolved from observer to permanent member of the Humanitarian Country Team.

**Promoting local leadership in during response:** In the Philippines, the Humanitarian Response Consortium led the local coordination around the Nock-Ten Typhoon response. In Bangladesh the Shongjog Communicating with Communities platform is chaired by the national government, and its South Sudan equivalent is chaired by two national organisations.

**Stimulating collaboration at the local and national level:** the Surge project stimulated more collaboration around surge, through shared rosters and shared training. Financial Enablers in the Philippines offered funding for local and national organisations collaborating as a consortium: only one of the seven consortia who received funding existed before, and six of the seven consortia responded collaboratively for the first time in the responses to typhoons Nock-Ten and Haima. They are also committed to continuing operating as consortia after the FE project ends.

### Considerations for future programming

- A real problem for the participation of local and national non-governmental organisations in several countries is their sheer number. Agencies must consider this dilemma and find practical solutions to ensure that the number of participants is kept manageable, yet the information put in and generated by coordination meetings is shared effectively with a large number of such agencies. Developing more local and national consortia or networks may be one potential solution.

## 6. VISIBILITY

### Good practices

#### L/NA visibility in reports and documents:

The 2016 Learning Report referred to the project names more than the INGO consortia around them, and named local partners (governmental and non-governmental) when the information was available. Short articles or podcasts about the work of specific local partners are posted on the webpages of the Start Network and the Learning Platform. Partner names and logos appear in the Shongjog webpage (Bangladesh) and a video about the response to the Marawi forced displacement (Philippines).

**Visibility at national forums:** The creating of new 'humanitarian'-focused platforms, such as NAHAB in Bangladesh and the National Humanitarian Network in Ethiopia, can increase the visibility of L/NA. Participation in Joint Needs Assessments also gives L/NAs greater visibility among all other in-country actors (Shifting the Power Bangladesh/Ethiopia) and more easily enables them to develop their own proposals.

**Visibility in global forums:** Many DEPP projects also supported the participation of their L/NA partners in global forums, to raise their profile.

### Considerations future preparedness programming

- L/NAs themselves should try to be more proactive about credibly communicating about their achievements.
- Could there be an institutional directive that makes it mandatory to name all collaborating agencies and add their logos (unless this would put them at risk)?
- How do organisations resolve L/NA

visibility with the fundraising and external communications colleagues in INGO headquarters who, in a crowded and competitive funding environment, may feel they need to put their organisation central in the messaging?

- New inter-agency platforms focusing on 'humanitarian' issues can also add to the confusing proliferation of platforms, lose their momentum if there are not regular crises to bring them together, and lose their focus and added value during a prolonged rehabilitation and recovery period. How will this risk be managed?

## 7. POLICIES, PLANS & STANDARDS

### Good practices

#### L/NA participation in developing national policy and standards:

In three counties in Kenya, Shifting the Power partners have contributed to the development of the County Disaster Management Acts, and some are advocating to have at-risk communities also provide input into preparedness plans and developing their own. Shifting the Power in the DRC has supported three L/NA networks on a common advocacy strategy towards government, OCHA, INGOs and the private sector, the goal being a 'national humanitarian policy' and provincial laws on humanitarian affairs. In the Philippines, the CHAP consortium that participated in the Financial Enablers project intensified their advocacy and lobby efforts with the Committee on Human Rights in the House of Representatives, to achieve a Bill of Law regarding the rights of displaced persons.

**International and Global Standards:** Two Shifting the Power partners in Ethiopia and six in Bangladesh have been supported to become members of the CHS Alliance. Some Protection in Practice partners have been invited to join the community of practice of the Global Protection Cluster.

### Considerations for future preparedness programming

- How can L/NAs themselves develop an accountability standards which can create more wider ownership, increased accountability, and increased trust in their own communities?
- How can INGO partners accompany L/NAs not only to become members, but also to accompany organisations in a sustained

way and provide adequate funds to implement standards?

- How can L/NAs develop their own advocacy platforms that connect across regions and influence international humanitarian policy and standards?

### ATTENTION POINTS FOR ADVANCEMENTS OF LOCALISATION WITHIN FUTURE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMMES

The DEPP programme in its current form ends in the spring of 2018, but there will be various new initiatives to build on and take further several of its achievements. Over time, localisation has grown in importance in the programme, as it was implemented simultaneously with the growing debate, research and change initiatives around localisation.

A strategic question now has become: does future work focus on 'localisation' with 'preparedness' as a sub-component, or rather on 'preparedness', with 'localisation' as a sub-objective?<sup>46</sup> Strategically the two go well together: their shared strategic objective is to increase the individual and eco-system capacity of at-risk and affected populations, and local and national responders, to reduce the need for robust international response and lighten its footprint.

Here we offer, for reflection, four general principles for future design of preparedness programming, and a series of more specific attention points for several of the localisation dimensions.

#### General principles for the design of future preparedness programmes (with a 'localisation' lens):

1. **Bottom-up design:** DEPP stakeholders are aware that, for a mix of reasons, the overall design of 10 out of the 14 projects was overwhelmingly conducted by the participating INGOs and done in the UK. Once implementation started, L/NA were able to influence it more. Future design of comparable initiatives has to be bottom-up with close involvement from the outset of at-risk populations and local and national responders.
2. **Strategic interventions rather than projects:** The project ideas were obviously drawn from reflected experience and while highly relevant, they were not informed by a strategic (and joint) analysis of the 'eco-system' of and gaps in disaster and emergencies preparedness in the respective countries. Which project eventually came to which country seems to have depended mostly on the particular interest and capacity of the INGOs in the respective project consortia. Partially because of a slow start up, involved INGOs sometimes brought in their existing local/national 'partners,' as this was quicker. In doing so, they may have missed engaging with some partners that would have been more strategic to invest in. Furthermore, DEPP projects in the same country tended to operate for quite a long time in silos. Efforts to stimulate learning exchanges between them came late, and there may not have been as much cumulative influence as was possible. To a degree, we see here a missed opportunity to be highly strategic and be seen as such by a wider range of stakeholders in each country. Future design should start from a joint strategic assessment of the nature and health of the 'eco-system' in the country and at risk-subzones of the country. A risk analysis also has to take into account crises in neighbouring countries that may have spill-over effects.
3. **Owned by and embedded in national/local structures:** Projects, during the period of their implementation, do not seem to have been strongly embedded in existing national service-infrastructure.<sup>47</sup> By and large, they remained in the hands of the respective INGO consortia, operating yet another 'new' initiative in parallel or in addition to what already existed. As one Bangladeshi mentioned during our DEPP-reflection meeting in Dhaka: *"We have seen so many project-based initiatives here, most of which decline rapidly when the project and associated funding come to an end."* Long-term sustainability requires strategic attention. In GMI's work on the Rohingya response in Bangladesh, we invite relief agencies to develop the organisational habit of 'legacy planning', in situations

46 Conversation with Isha Singh, a consultant for the Start Network, commissioned to produce an 'options' paper for post-DEPP.

47 Closely working with national government structures does not automatically equate with 'embedded in.' The latter term implies there are dedicated financial and human resources and maybe adapted rules, regulations or policies.

that are very likely going to become ‘chronic crises.’

4. **With attention to the attitude and role changes of international ‘assistance’ agencies:** Support to local/national capacities requires also intentional and intensive work with the international agencies already present in the country or likely to respond to a crisis there. They need to strengthen their individual and collective readiness to step-back a bit and allow space for local/national actors, while developing the individual and organisational competencies to play an ‘effective and trusted supporting role’ rather than maintaining full control.

## VII. CONCLUSION

Localisation has been debated and researched for more than two years now. Local and national actors, particularly those that were present at the World Humanitarian Summit, are getting increasingly impatient and sceptical, wondering whether this was more than an expensive public relations event.<sup>48</sup> The first collective stock-taking exercise acknowledges that many efforts are reported but that *“it is not yet possible to demonstrate improved outcomes for people affected by crisis,”* and that *“there is little evidence yet of structural or systemic change that would allow a more flexible international footprint according to national and local capacities and context or increase the representation of local actors in humanitarian decision-making.”*<sup>49</sup>

It is not acceptable that so many in-country decision-makers and advisors, including from agencies that have signed up to the Grand Bargain or the Charter for Change, are still unclear about what that means in practice. While there may remain details that need further reflection and discussion, there is sufficient clarity now about what the justifications and motivations are for localisation, what the overall intent is (‘reinforce’ rather than ‘replace’) and how that translates into operational practices. This report offers a provisional set of indicators that enable detailed assessment and planning. We know enough to start applying this with determination, as individual agencies but also in a collective response, particularly in contexts with favourable conditions.

48 Question posed by a well-informed Ethiopian participant in the Addis Ababa reflection day on 29 Nov. 2017.

49 OCHA 2017: No Time to Retreat. First annual synthesis report on progress since the World Humanitarian Summit pp. 3/6.

## ANNEX 1: FREQUENT SOURCES OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL ACTOR FRUSTRATION WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

Local and national agencies (both governmental and non-governmental) have benefited and learned from their association and collaboration with international agencies. In fact, several actors have emerged out of that very association and collaboration, while others have done so through local/national social concern and initiative. There are many positives to this collaboration, which have been stated and emphasised often. More sensitive are the frustrations that are also frequently part of these relationships. These are not as easily expressed in the presence of an international agency, particularly when the local/national agency is financially dependent on that agency.

The following tables summarises frequent sources of frustration. They are derived from structured and informal listening, between 2015-2018, to almost 300 local and national organisations, primarily in Asia and Africa, as well as in Lebanon and Turkey (Syrian CSOs). Some of those related to crisis affected populations come from the findings of CDA Inc.'s 'Listening Project', which involved almost 6000 people in 20 countries.<sup>50</sup> Several of them also appear in other reports.<sup>51</sup>

Most of these are not surprises to international agencies, and the Charter for Change clearly seeks to address some of them. However, what is new is looking at them in a comprehensive manner, and utilising them as a source of reflection.

**TABLE 5: FREQUENT SOURCES OF FRUSTRATION FOR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

|                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| <p><b>FUNDING &amp; FINANCING</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only a tiny amount of international relief funding is provided directly to L/NAs. This can be for a number of reasons such as: legal or administrative restrictions; the practical necessity for donors to rely on intermediaries who can manage larger numbers of contracts with implementers; donor practices that are disadvantageous for L/NAs such as short notice on call for proposals, complex formats, mandatory use of a Western language etc.; and general mistrust of L/NAs;</li> <li>• The quality of the funding provided to L/NAs is often not enabling. This can be because: it is heavily earmarked; there is little to no flexibility for budget adaptations; core costs (indirect costs) are not or only partially covered; financial procedures create cash flow problems; essential operating equipment is not provided or remains the property of the international organisations, or can only be rented; salary levels are determined by the international agency and create discrepancies in the salary scales of the L/NA; and financial procedures specific to the international agency are imposed on the finance systems of the L/NA, adding complexity;</li> <li>• International agencies are not transparent about overall budgets and how these are allocated, particularly what they spend on themselves;</li> </ul> |
|---------------------------------------|---|

50 Anderson, M., D. Brown & I. Jean 2012: Time to Listen. Hearing people on the receiving end of international aid. Cambridge MA, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

51 For example Howe, K., E. Stites & D. Chudacoff 2015: Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings. The cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. Tufts Univ, Feinstein International Center. Also Els, Ch., K. Mansour & N. Carstensen 2016: Between Sub-Contracting and Partnership. Funding to national and local humanitarian actors in Syria. Copenhagen, Local to Global Protection

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International agencies acting as intermediaries for a back-donor are not transparent about restrictions and conditions they may add to those of the back-donor;</li> <li>• The contributions of L/NAs in terms of voluntary time, in-kind or cash are not picked up in the end-accounts and hence overlooked; this also gives a wrong impression of the real cost of a project or programme;</li> <li>• L/NAs are easily portrayed as a higher risk of fraud and corruption; L/NA know this also happens in international agencies, and often see them as more wasteful;</li> <li>• L/NAs generally have difficulty accessing the back-donor directly;</li> <li>• Notwithstanding years of conversation and commitments about aid effectiveness, international agencies are still not harmonising their proposal and reporting formats, but demand that L/NAs align with all of theirs;</li> <li>• International agencies are increasingly fundraising among the new middle classes and corporates of aid-recipient countries, directly competing in a market that could have provided alternative funding to L/NAs less willing or able to rely on international funding.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>RELATIONSHIP</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International agencies abuse the word 'partnership' to refer to any collaborative arrangement, even if it is on very unequal terms and de facto one of 'sub-contracting'. At a minimum, they should be more honest about the real nature of the relationship;</li> <li>• L/NAs want a more equitable relationship, or 'partnership with dignity', where they are treated with fundamental respect even if they do not have the same financial resources. They want to be not just 'implementing partners', but more 'decision-making partners' i.e. able to contribute to and have a say in all major decisions at the times of proposal and budget development, planning, design, adaptation etc. They also want to be part of the monitoring and periodic review, evaluation and learning exercises;</li> <li>• A more equitable relationship expresses itself in reciprocal transparency and mutual accountability. The success of an action is a joint responsibility;</li> <li>• Entering into a collaborative relationship with a financially more powerful international agency also carries risks for a L/NAs, just as they are seen as a possible 'risk' by the international agency;<sup>50</sup></li> <li>• L/NAs should not have to go through due diligence assessments every time an international agency considers working with them. A mechanism has to be found that a credible due diligence assessment is carried out by a respected entity and the results, when positive, accepted by other international agencies, for a certain duration;</li> <li>• Capacity-assessments cannot be one-sided; international agencies also have capacity-gaps and weaknesses;</li> <li>• Underlying attitudes of superiority, which express themselves in verbal and non-verbal behaviours, are not appropriate and do not contribute to positive relationships;</li> <li>• International agencies should not 'monopolise' a partnership too quickly. The L/NA may very well have collaborative relationships with many international agencies, and should not be seen as 'our' partner by any individual agency;</li> <li>• International agencies should not encourage their L/NA partner to privilege that relationship above all others, but encourage them to actively connect and collaborate with other L/NAs as those relationships create the longer-lasting local/national infrastructure;</li> <li>• Genuine partnership does not end when the project and the money ends. It also doesn't have to last for ever but there are brusque and better ways of ending a relationship;</li> </ul> |

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <b>CAPACITY</b>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• International agencies have been raising funds for capacity-development of L/NA for decades, yet still claim the latter have ‘no capacity’. Obviously such systemic failure means that a serious rethink is required regarding capacity-strengthening approaches;</li><li>• While investing in capacities of L/NAs, international actors simultaneously undermine these by depriving them of quality funding, and hiring away their best staff. That can make it difficult for L/NAs to attract and retain qualified staff;</li><li>• Strategic capacities that tend to be overlooked are: creating a financially sustainable organisation; collaborative capacities; rapidly scaling up and down;</li><li>• Supporting organisational capacity-development (especially across societies) requires particular competencies; these are not widespread in most aid agencies;</li><li>• L/NAs have capacities in their context. These may be different and not easily visible to the international agency, but they still exist and create conditions for ‘capacity sharing’;</li><li>• ‘Capacity-support’ is often too supply-driven, without ‘good fit’ with the context and the particular need of the organisation (or network);</li><li>• Trainings and workshops, largely as isolated and one-off events, have virtually no lasting impact;</li><li>• Training individuals does not automatically translate into enhanced organisational and inter-agency capacities;</li><li>• Capacity-development plans are not treated like other objectives. The desired end-result is not stated in clear terms, and whether it is achieved is not systematically monitored and evaluated;</li><li>• Successful capacity-development should lead to role changes between the L/NAs and the international agency, with the former taking on more responsibilities, yet in practice the relationship may stay as it was;</li><li>• There are too many discrete, overlapping and repetitive ‘capacity-development’ inputs, that do not take build on each other;</li><li>• Due diligence assessments and capacity-development efforts focus too much on ‘form’ (encouraging L/NA to look like copies of international ones) more than on ‘function’;</li><li>• There is far too little investment in developing local and national resource centres that can become the capacity-building in their own environment;</li></ul> |
| <b>PARTICIPATION<br/>REVOLUTION</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Crisis-affected people, and particularly the most vulnerable among them, are portrayed as no longer capable of making choices for themselves – this confirms the loss of power resulting from the crisis;</li><li>• Affected populations have little or no say in the key policies and plans (e.g. around preparedness), and the programmatic choices and design of actions for their benefit;</li><li>• Crisis-affected populations have no information about the money that has been raised in their name, and how it is being used;</li><li>• Relief aid is more supply, rather than demand, driven;</li><li>• Consulting affected people when key decisions have already been taken is not very meaningful;</li><li>• Many feedback and complaints mechanisms are not working that well;</li><li>• Well-intended actions may have harmful effects. They increase risk for some people, confirm or fuel existing divisions and patterns of social exclusion, and may create new tensions and conflicts;</li><li>• Sometimes crisis-affected people are financially exploited or sexually abused by aid workers;</li><li>• Aid workers are not spending meaningful time with affected populations; the increasing interest in data collection turns affected people into data sources, reducing even further the human dimension.</li></ul>   |

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
|                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• L/NAs are under-represented in formal coordination mechanisms and thematic task forces;</li> <li>• Even if they are present, they are confronted with a 'disabling environment' such as: dominant use of a European language, fast spoken, with different accents; use of many acronyms and international jargon or references; and participants more interested in speaking than in listening;</li> <li>• Representatives of L/NAs may not have been selected by their peers as part of an inclusive process, rather they have been invited/handpicked by internationals, and are therefore not representing other L/NAs;</li> <li>• International actors create new platforms and networks, rather than first testing out whether existing ones can be supported to achieve the same objectives;</li> <li>• There is little funding available for collaborative platforms and networks, even if collaboration is necessary for greater impact;</li> <li>• International actors set a poor example, if they themselves do not abide by the agreements reached in coordination meetings.</li> </ul> |
| <b>VISIBILITY</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In communications by international agencies, L/NAs are often nameless with no logo; they become a generic 'local partner';</li> <li>• Many international agency reports to donors or the wider public do not give due credit to the work, roles played, and contribution of L/NAs, even where these have done most or all of the actual work;</li> <li>• Innovations by L/NAs are sometimes taken-up and scaled by international actors, who pretend it is their innovation and do not credit the actual source;</li> <li>• International agencies may put out analyses or stories about a country that can put L/NAs at risk, without having given them a chance to vet the proposed communication.</li> </ul>   |
|                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-governmental actors and at-risk communities have little input into and influence on governmental policies and plans, even if these are supposed to be for their benefit;</li> <li>• L/NAs have little input and influence into international policy debates on relief and humanitarian action, and into the efforts to develop standards;</li> <li>• Individuals associated with aid-recipient societies that can participate in international events or working groups are not necessarily representative of a wider constituency, and do not necessarily consult and report back to such;</li> <li>• International standards are not always fit-for-context, and may overlook and even push aside local knowledge and practices</li> </ul>  |



## ANNEX 2: CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES: THREE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

### EXAMPLE 1: ETHIOPIA

This case study is based primarily on: conversations with different agencies (national and international) operating in Ethiopia on 29-30 November 2017, some additional individual interviews, and the two reports referenced below.

#### Strong government leadership

Over the past 25 years, the Ethiopian government has taken a prominent role in the development of the country. Indeed, it projects itself as a 'developmental state'. It is also the leading actor for crisis situations. The Federal Constitution requires the government to take long-term preventive measures to avert disasters and provide timely assistance. A National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management provides the scope for a comprehensive approach, including prevention and preparedness, response and recovery. A Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Strategic Programme and Investment Framework maps the required programme components and is the tool to translate DRM Policy. An annual humanitarian response plan, developed jointly by the Government and the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team, details annual humanitarian needs, response capacities and response strategies.

The ruling coalition has long seen national food insecurity as one of the primary threats to the cohesion of the country. Within the Ethiopian context, a clear distinction is made between 'natural' disasters, mostly related to food insecurity aggravated by drought, and conflict. NGOs are not allowed to do 'early warning' related to conflict, or to get involved in conflict management.

For 'natural' disasters, the supreme political organ is the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and including all relevant ministers. The technical inter-ministerial team is led by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC). These government structures are complemented by joint stakeholder structures. The Federal DRM Technical Working Group is co-chaired by the NDRMC and OCHA. The Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team is made up of non-governmental actors (UN, donors, NGOs) and chaired by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Operational and sectoral task forces are also co-led by government and non-governmental actors. At the Regional level, these structures are matched by the Disaster Risk Management Steering Committee, chaired by the Regional President and composed of Bureau Heads. The Regional Technical Committee is chaired by the Deputy Regional President and composed of line Bureaus.

The policy intent is to decentralise disaster risk management. In practice, this isn't happening yet, which is in part due to a lack of financial resources. The policy is also that early warning and early response happen as bottom-up processes. In principle this creates the space for local actors (populations, administrations and non-governmental entities) to lead in the design and implementation of the response. Only when local (woreda-level) capacities are insufficient, requests for further assistance go up to the zonal, regional and ultimately federal level. This doesn't sit well with a system that is very centralised at the federal level, where most resources are also controlled. There is also a dilemma regarding the allocation of resources according to priorities across regions, and of the federal authorities not wanting to be criticised for what might have been the shortcomings of the regional administrations.

#### Reinforce rather than replace local and national actors

International donors and agencies provide significant support to the Government of Ethiopia, particularly at the federal level. This can be seen as a good localisation practice, i.e. strengthening the government's ability to exercise leadership and to play a meaningful role related to all crisis situations. Participants in coordination meetings on the other hand point out

that, even if different task forces and sectoral working groups are co-chaired by the government and a foreign actor, in practice the foreign actors retain a dominant voice.<sup>53</sup> As such, OCHA is at the apex of the national coordination practices, not the National Disaster Risk Management Commission.

### Obstacles to reinforcement of non-state local and national relief actors

The Ethiopian Red Cross Society (supported by the IFRC movement) is the most important non-state actor for natural disaster preparedness and response. As other Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies, it mobilises volunteers and gets private donations. As a formal auxiliary to the government, it is not entirely comparable to other Ethiopian NGOs or CSOs. Other than the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, national and local NGOs have mostly focused on development work and not played significant roles in overall disaster risk preparedness and response. Research in late 2016 found that they only rarely participated in federal and regional platforms and networks, confirming their relative marginalisation in the humanitarian architecture of the country.<sup>54</sup> International actors reportedly see Ethiopian NGOs as small, dispersed, struggling and with weak organisational systems for the compliance that internationals want. They are not able to scale-up and deliver quality humanitarian services rapidly, and are therefore not seen as offering much added value. The national and local NGOs lack indeed expertise about humanitarian action, are not aware of the platforms they could take part in, or do not have the staff to spare. Moreover, if they attend, they find little of direct relevance and value in these meetings.

### Structural factors hindering national CSO development

Several structural factors are constraining for the development of Ethiopian CSOs:<sup>55</sup>

- **The regulations of the Charities and Societies Agency:** This is a government agency under the Federal Affairs Ministry. The 2009 Proclamation requires a CSO to spend no less than 70% of its annual budget on activities directly related to its purpose, and a maximum of 30% on 'administration'. At face value, limiting administrative costs is a valid objective of the regulation. The issue here is what counts as administration; for the Charities and Societies Agency, expenditures on training, broader capacity development (including for government staff) or networking for example, count as administrative costs. So too vehicle purchases, vehicle operating costs and salaries of drivers, as well as monitoring and evaluation. The net effect of this is an overall disincentive to invest in quality measures such as regular, physical, monitoring and evaluation.<sup>56</sup> More specifically, it becomes a disincentive for INGOs to work in partnerships and invest in capacity development, as this would explode their own administrative costs. The regulation therefore becomes de facto an incentive for direct implementation.
- **Donor or implementer:** Under recent Ethiopian regulations, an international agency must be either a 'donor', in which case it cannot implement any activities itself, or an 'implementer'. Implementers cannot fund other agencies as partners. Presumably, the purpose is to reduce the number of intermediaries, each with their management costs. Once an international agency is classified as an implementer, it cannot provide funds to others. This can create a dilemma at the strategic level for international organisations who want to strengthen the national capacities, but also maintain a capacity to respond to the periodic droughts that have large scale impact. It can also create an operational dilemma. One way of resolving it is to have the national partner (which can also be a governmental entity) present the bills for the international implementer to pay. The overall effect of introducing this categorisation, however, has been that several INGOs dropped their earlier partners, instead opting for implementer status.

53 Interviews in Addis Ababa 1 December 2017

54 Mela Development Training & Consultancy Services 2016: Report on Assessment of the Opportunities and Challenges for Meaningful Participation of Local NGOs in the Humanitarian Architecture in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa (commissioned by CAFOD).

55 Participants in localisation workshops in Addis Ababa 29-30 November 2017

56 Getachew Gebreyohannes, H. 2016: The Challenges and Prospects of ChSA "70/30 Guideline" Implementation on the Performance of NGOs in Ethiopia. A case study on Food for the Hungry Ethiopia. New Delhi, Indira Gandhi National Open University, School of Management Studies

- **Hard to reconcile policies:** As per the Grand Bargain commitment, 25% of internationally available humanitarian funding should go ‘as directly as possible’, to ‘national/local’ agencies (which includes governmental ones). Signatories to the Charter for Change commit to directly passing on 20% of their available funds to southern NGOs. However, as per the formal understanding in Ethiopia, a national NGO is one that raises 90% of its funds domestically and receives no more than 10% from international sources. In practice, the two policies become hard to reconcile.
- **Administrative obstacles to NNGO directly accessing foreign funds:** Hardly any national or local NGO can access the Ethiopia Humanitarian Pooled Fund, because OCHA’s fund manager requires agencies to have a foreign currency account. Presumably this is to ensure that any unspent funds remain available in foreign currency. The National Bank of Ethiopia however does not allow Ethiopian NGOs to have a foreign currency account. Only very few, the CCRDA and SoS Sahel among them, have a foreign currency account.<sup>57</sup> Access to the pooled fund is furthermore dependent on demonstrating organisational capacities, and participation in coordination meetings. OFDA demands agencies to have a US correspondence bank account, which Ethiopian NGOs of course do not. ECHO requires a registered presence in at least one EU member state. Some of these requirements seem examples of unnecessary administrative obstacles. In 2017, the Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund allocated US\$83 million. Of this, only US\$ 1,761,000 went directly to NNGOs, and US\$3,146,000 via sub-grants. That is 5.91% of total spending, a significantly smaller proportion for NNGOs than in many other pooled funds.
- **International commitment?** Though Pooled Funds in various countries typically provide greater opportunity for L/NAs, its messaging to Ethiopian NGOs in early 2018 is not encouraging. The Ethiopian Humanitarian Fund is only interested in organisations that can operate at scale. It cannot satisfy the interests of 3000 Ethiopian NGOs, who are admonished not to look down on partnerships with INGOs and advised to “be careful what you wish for.”<sup>58</sup>

### Possible steps to advance localisation with non-governmental actors

- **Engagement of the Government of Ethiopia:** Ongoing engagement is required with the Government of Ethiopia, and notably its Charities and Societies Agency, about the interpretation of notably the 30% administrative costs. However, ongoing engagement must also make the case for complementarity of Ethiopian non-state actors, to what is otherwise a very activist state (and in that sense a fairly responsible ‘duty-bearer’).
- **Engagement with donors and pooled fund managers:** To advocate for mechanisms that make at least part of the funds accessible to a larger number of Ethiopian NGOs.
- **Engagement with donors and UN agencies:** To make more visible the roles and contributions that Ethiopian CSOs, notwithstanding the general limitations, do already play in crisis management. Ultimately, people fund those whom they trust.
- **Ongoing investment in humanitarian capacity strengthening:** Through longer term, comprehensive capacity development efforts.
- **Gradual localisation:** Following an identification of what can and must be more localised in the current conditions, and areas where it is too early. Perhaps the ‘participation revolution’ aspect of localisation, putting people-at-the-centre, is an opportunity to advance the perceived value of locally embedded, development-oriented Ethiopian CSOs.
- **Pursuing consensus or negotiation:** Within the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA) (which is the biggest and oldest NGO association, that has been strengthened by the more recently created ‘National Humanitarian Forum’ coming under its umbrella), there is a commitment to advocate for more localisation in Ethiopia, particularly in favour of Ethiopian CSOs. The view is this will require consensus building among national/local and international actors. Another perspective will argue that there will

57 SOS Sahel testifies to the value of the Shifting the Power project in introducing them directly to OCHA staff and helping them also meet the due diligence requirements. Valuable as this is, it is not an example of OCHA altering or waving the foreign currency account requirement.

58 Report from a presentation made in Addis Ababa, on 25 January 2018, at an event organised by the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA).

not be an easy consensus among both, and that localisation may turn out to be a negotiated process. In that light, national and local organisations need to develop their own perspectives, priorities, expectations and responsibilities regarding advanced localisation. That will put them in a more equitable negotiation position.

- **New law on income-generating for CSOs:** Reportedly there is a new law that may provide some opportunities for Ethiopian CSOs to do some more domestic fundraising or income-generation. There are different perspectives on its intent however. A favourable reading sees its purpose as creating a more enabling environment for increased financial self-reliance; a critical reading sees its purpose as introducing more restrictions. Others feel it is too early to make a judgment.

## EXAMPLE 2: THE MARAWI CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES

This case study was provided by Regina 'Nanette' Salvador-Antequis, executive director of ECOWEB (Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefits Inc), a Philippine local organisation.

### Context: Almost 360,000 forcibly displaced

On October 23, 2017, exactly five months after the fighting started with the ISIS-inspired combined groups of Abu Sayyaf and the Daulah Islamiya, more popularly known as the Maute Group, the Government of the Philippines declared the end of combat operations. The fighting had displaced almost 360,000 individuals from Marawi City and the neighbouring towns of Ditsaan-Ramain, Kapai and Marantao. Over 90% of the displaced stayed with host families, the rest were accommodated in 75 official evacuation centres. Based on the Mindanao Humanitarian Team report, by the end of January 2018, over 100,000 residents had been registered to return. However, security risks and restoration of basic services remain a challenge. Local authorities note that many people who have been allowed to return to Marawi City have gone back to evacuation centres and host communities due to delays in the restoration of utilities, services, schools and livelihood opportunities. Local markets are slowly resuming, but there are immediate gaps in food security and access to potable water and sanitation. A cash and market assessment in January concluded that multi-purpose cash transfers could enable and empower the most vulnerable returnees.

### Crisis response

First responses came overwhelmingly from local actors, host families and local CSOs. Some voluntary groups were formed to be able to effectively respond mainly through mobilising local resources and donations from the Maranaos diaspora. Maranao is the majority tribal population in Marawi. These organisations relied on voluntary services of the abundant number of youths. Although many of these newly formed organisations (often led by veteran CSO leaders) were new to humanitarian surge and not well-trained on humanitarian principles, they were able to do amazing work, including: rescue of hostages, advocacy for Islamic management of the dead, facilitating reunification of missing family members, mobilization of immediate relief assistance including food and non-food, and documentation of human rights violations and advocacy for IDP rights protection, among others.

It took a few weeks before practical aid from the government, international agencies and national NGOs started arriving in more significant volume, and that only after local CSOs had drawn attention to and lobbied for recognition of the needs of the IDPs staying with host families.

### Local and national coordination

Early on these local groups and volunteers saw the value of cooperation, complementation, linkage and partnership, so that resources could be maximised and more people could be served. In the context of displacement due to terrorism, local CSO leaders (the Maranaos) experienced difficulty in getting the trust from the government and the public. The non-Maranao led CSOs needed to support them.

The Bangon Marawi CSO Platform (BMCSOP) was created as a coordination mechanism for CSOs responding to the Marawi crisis. It brings together more than 40 local and national CSOs. It emerged out of a first meeting in early June 2017, facilitated by the NAPC-VDC<sup>59</sup> (National Anti-Poverty Commission - Victims of Disaster and Calamities sector). A month later, the CSOs conducted a shared visioning and strategic planning workshop with more than 150 participants (105 from 69 CSOs/NGOs; 49 IDP representatives; 16 traditional leaders; 8 Ulamah/religious leaders; 3 academics and 4 private groups, with another 18 participants from the UN/INGOs and government to observe, provide inputs or feedback). This led to the creation of the Bangon Marawi CSO Platform. It became the official mechanism for engagement with the government and for CSOs to have better coordination with the cluster system initiated by UN agencies. Of course local CSOs, especially the smaller ones, can't attend the many meetings organised by the UN agencies. The CSO platform then filled-in the gap. UNOCHA and other UN agencies just attended the CSO coordination meetings while representatives only of the CSOs attended the UN-led meetings.

Because the government did not ask for international help, limited funds poured into the Marawi crisis response. As a result, the usual cluster system did not materialise. The government organised its own coordination structure without membership from the CSOs and the UN agencies. While the UN agencies sought to help facilitate, they mainly became observers in the crisis response, led by the government led crisis response system with the CSOs. UNOCHA then created a coordination mechanism under its Mindanao Humanitarian Team and initiated coordinated sector planning among INGOs, with participation from some invited national and local NGOs. The BMCSOP attends these meetings while also pursuing its own coordination and advocacy efforts with the government. After many crises and disasters in the Philippines, this was the first time that local NGOs became actively included in the UN-led coordination effort.

### **Participation revolution**

The BMCSOP also facilitated the emergence of a companion platform, Sowara o Miyamagoyag or Voices of Marawi IDPs, dedicated to amplifying the voices of the IDPs and the wider crisis-affected population. Even if some CSO leaders were IDPs themselves, the objective was to ensure active and vocal involvement also of ordinary IDPs, without any specific CSO connection. The 'Voices of Marawi IDPs' emerged from a series of municipal and barangay assemblies of IDPs in areas of concentrated in Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Iligan City.

Several months later, in November 2017, the ongoing involvement of the IDPs culminated in a regional assembly of Marawi IDP leaders at the Institute of Peace and Development (IPDM) in Mindanao, Marawi State University, Marawi City. Through prior barangay and municipal level assemblies, over 12,000 households had representation in the regional assembly.<sup>60</sup> These were easy to organise as agencies collaborating in and with the Community-Led Emergency Action Response Network (CLEARNet) had organised IDPs into self-help groups early on in the response as part of the survivor and community-led response approach that it has been promoting. The regional assembly elected 13 IDPs to represent the voice of the IDPs.

### **Advocacy towards government**

Under a Martial Law situation and with authoritarian tendencies in the current government, it

59 The Executive Director of ECOWEB currently serves as the national sectoral representative of the NAPC-VDC. NAPC is an agency directly under the Office of the President that is created to coordinate the government and basic sectors cooperation in addressing poverty issues. NAPC-VDC is one of the 14 basic sectors recognized in the law that created the agency - RA 8425.

60 The series of assemblies of and consultations with the Marawi IDPs was made possible through the cooperation and pooling of resources of a number of civil society organizations and with support from the IOM, Christian Aid, and other funding partners of CSOs. CSOs that facilitated and provided support include the ECOWEB, Duyog Marawi, RIDO, Inc. and Sultanate groups, MARE, LDSPC, PMWC, TFMP, BMCPI, RAWATEN, Bae Rawaten, RRT, KALIMUDAN, BALAY Rehabilitation, CBCS, ASALAM, MIHANDS, 1 TABANGSA, LYC, CFSI, BAE RAWATEN, IDEALS, SLM, CLEARNet, Maradeca, among others.

proved hard for CSO and IDP representatives to become part of, and be heard in, the formal coordination structure of the government. The government seemed mostly focused on its grand plan for the rehabilitation of the devastated 24 barangays within the 250 hectares commercial area of Marawi. It did not invite CSO and IDP participation in the planning process. The UN-led mechanism also tried to influence but was kept peripheral as well.

The BMCSOP and Sowara then initiated a consultation process with the IDPs that resulted in consolidated recommendations to the government titled “Towards a More IDP-centered, Culture & Faith-Sensitive, Inclusive, Accountable and Peace-enabling Approach”. That advocacy paper was shared with the government and all aid agencies. Three months after the submission (March 2018) the government made a presentation of its plan, which only partly considered the recommendations. Thus, the IDPs outrightly rejected it. This led to heated discussion between the government, CSOs and IDP representatives that prompted the IDP leaders to stage a prayer rally in Marawi a few days later that aimed to enter into the military-cordoned ‘Main Affected Area’ of the battle between the government forces and the armed insurgents. This convinced the national government to heed the call of the CSOs and IDPs – for real consultation of the people affected.

The Task Force Bangon Marawi, supported by some international agencies, continues the popular consultations. Chinese investment to undertake the rehabilitation of Marawi is said to have been approved by the government, without the consent of the IDPs who are the owners of the land in the devastated area and have already been affected by the fighting.

### Some contextual factors

- Unlike the response to Cyclone Haiyan, the Marawi displacement and destruction remains a greatly under-funded crisis, mainly because the government did not ask for international help. But unlike the Haiyan response, where international agencies dominated, probably also because of lack of international appeal, local CSOs were able to take a much stronger lead on cooperation, coordination and initiatives that unified the voice not only of the CSOs but also of the IDPs.
- Perhaps culture also played a major factor. The long struggle for independence and identity of the Moro people may have also contributed to why the local CSOs and IDPs have demonstrated local capacities for asserting their position and rights despite the Martial Law condition.
- The Survivor and Community-Led Response (SCLR) approach to the crisis, promoted by ECOWEB, also generated appreciation by local CSOs and IDPs. For the IDPs having been organised they see the approach as more dignifying, thus enabling them to gain more confidence in asserting their rights. For Maranaos, being prideful people culturally, the approach made them appreciate the assistance as empowering. Yet although UN agencies and some INGOs have appreciated the CSO initiative of cooperation and of the SCLR approach, concrete support has remained limited. Real support came from only a few INGOs, supportive of localisation, that mainly include ECOWEB partners/engaged agencies (mainly from Christian Aid, CORDAID, L2GP and the Johanniter), Caritas supported groups (Duyog Marawi) and few national NGOs (Balay Rehabilitation). Instead of supporting the local initiatives, UN Agencies and most INGOs focus more on their own programme and coordination efforts and give little attention to the initiative of the CSOs.

### EXAMPLE 3: ROHINGYA INFLUX RESPONSE IN COX’S BAZAR, BANGLADESH

Part of this research on the Rohingya response was funded by GMI<sup>61</sup> and was undertaken in Cox’s Bazar and Dhaka between 27 January-12 February 2018. Extensive practical support was

61 The GMI 2018 report “Debating the Grand Bargain in Bangladesh. How are Grand Bargain commitments shaping the response to the FDM/Rohingya influx?” can be found on <https://www.gmentor.org/localization/>.

provided by COAST Trust Bangladesh, a local (coastal area) CSO. The summary findings here derive from individual or group conversations with four government entities (including the army), individuals from two key UN agencies (including also at the international HQ of one), 19 INGOs (including also some interlocutors in the HQ), two INGO networks, 17 national/local CSOs and three N/L CSO-NGO networks, two 'dual identity' agencies (Bangladeshi but part of international networks); one 'southern INGO', five interagency coordination groups, and four donor agencies. We also observed six working group meetings, had an initial feedback event on 11 February 2018 and shared this again at a major conference in Dhaka on 3 March 2018.

### **Context: Strong national and local capacities for disaster management**

Bangladesh is a country prone to natural disasters, notably flooding, cyclones, and landslides (and, less well known, at risk of earthquakes). Over the past several decades, it has made impressive strides in developing strong national governmental and non-governmental capacities for preparedness and response. The army, with significant peacekeeping experience, is also a major actor in large-scale crisis. The national fire and rescue services are well trained and make up another component in the Bangladesh 'eco-system'. Training on disaster management takes place within the army and certain universities, and is further organised by international agencies.

### **Refugee influx preparedness**

The 1971 war of independence created large-scale forced displacement and return. That lived experience is not well integrated into the overall disaster-preparedness. Still, since 1991 there have been various waves of Rohingya from Myanmar seeking refuge across the border in Cox's Bazar district in southeast Bangladesh. Nevertheless, neither the Bangladesh governmental and non-governmental actors, nor the international agencies present in country often for decades, were prepared for the large scale, rapid influx of almost 700,000 Rohingya in very bad condition, over the span of a few months since late August 2017.

### **Refugee influx response**

The initial responders were the Bangladesh army, local authorities in Cox's Bazar district, local CSOs, the few INGOs that had been working in the area before, the IOM, WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, and a multitude of private citizens (local, from elsewhere in Bangladesh, and from abroad). It took several weeks for a large-scale response to be organised and internationally financed. By the beginning of 2018, approximately five months into the response, more than 120 agencies were active in the Cox's Bazar district. Several international responders chose to work with national and local actors, like CARITAS Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, or the NGO Forum for Public Health. However, the main players in terms of financial resources and de facto influence became certain UN agencies (IOM; WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR – OCHA does not play a role here), a small number of INGOs, and BRAC (a huge Bangladeshi 'non-governmental' organisation, that is variously perceived as an 'NGO' or a 'corporate entity').

By February 2018, six months after the crisis erupted, the overall response can be considered a 'success' in that major morbidity and mortality were avoided, and the 'settlement' situation had become fairly stabilised. At the same time, there have been major problems of coordination and a very variable quality of services provided, and relief agencies have been criticised for not taking a strong enough position that the Rohingya should be considered 'refugees' with 'refugee rights'.<sup>62</sup>

- **Participation revolution:** Two-way communication with and accountability to affected populations (newly arrived Rohingya, earlier Rohingya refugees, and host populations) overall remained chaotic and not very effective, and tensions were rising, or being stirred up,

- among the host population.<sup>63</sup> Contributing factors to this are various: the sheer numbers, prolonged mobility and life-saving needs of the forcibly displaced; the large number of agencies, which is impossible to coordinate even with more effective coordination mechanisms; language barriers (Rohingya don't understand Bangla, though their language has about 70% commonality with the Chittagong language of the native population in Cox's Bazar district); restrictions as per the Government of Bangladesh policy (no SIM cards, no radios, no cash or cash-for-work programmes, no education in emergency); the inadequate expertise on accountability to affected populations (AAP) and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) also among international staff of established agencies; and negative ("undisciplined, aggressive, no sense of hygiene, uneducated") or disempowering ("traumatised") stereotyping of the Rohingya. Consultation in needs-assessments here cannot count as meaningful participation, especially since it was obvious that all basic needs were unmet.
- **Quality of relationship:** Still speaking in general terms while acknowledging clear exceptions to the overall pattern, the prevailing type of relationship between agencies in the first six months seems to have been one of 'sub-contracting'. Distribution-oriented projects lend themselves easily to this. This is not only the case for local/national NGOs, which for years had been called partners, but also for INGOs distributing on behalf of a UN agency. Local and national NGOs also experience this in the form of attitudes of 'superiority' among international agencies (which may also be exhibited by national staff of international agencies). A grouping of local CSOs<sup>64</sup> is demanding 'partnership with dignity'.
- **Quality of funding:** A survey by COAST Trust, a Bangladeshi CSO with long-standing experience in the coastal areas of the country, reveals very variable practices with regard to the coverage of core costs and the provision of essential operating equipment to local/national organisations. Some international agencies, typically intermediaries, only provide 'direct operating costs' while others include core costs. Some refuse to include essential operating equipment such as computers, printers, mobile phones, office space, motorbikes or vehicles in their budgets, others prefer to see those 'rented' where possible, and many retain the ultimate ownership over them (i.e. to be returned to the international agency at the end of the project).<sup>65</sup> Local/national CSOs on the other hand notice that international agencies don't spare expenses to equip themselves properly. Where local/national agencies are frequently considered a 'fraud/corruption risk', what they see among international agencies is a lot of 'wastage'.
- **Transaction costs and value-for-money:** According to the district security forces, in January 2018 there were still 1200 expatriates, mostly concentrated in Cox's Bazar town. Given the rapid turn-over in the previous five months, we can safely estimate there may have been some 3000 expatriates since the beginning of the crisis. This is a very expensive lay-out in terms of direct cost (flights, accommodation, salaries). Such expatriate density also contributes to general salary and goods and services inflation. It may also increase the number of strong international voices (and many different English accents), crowding out Bangla and Bangladeshi voices. The multitude of agencies, but also the very rapid turnover of expatriates, probably leads to an increased number of meetings and repeat debates. Bangladeshi CSOs have argued that for the cost of one expatriate during one week in Cox's Bazar, they can do much more, and that the overall internationalised response to the Rohingya crisis has led to a rapid consumption of the generous funds that were globally mobilised. As it is expected that international solidarity will shift attention elsewhere in the near to mid-term future, they also argue that earlier localisation would have made the available money last much longer.
- **Undermining local capacities:** The rapid scaling up of international agencies has created a veritable recruitment bonanza, which has particularly affected first the local CSOs, but later also the national ones and INGOs, as people with some experience and expertise continued to look for better remuneration packages, even months into the ongoing response. As repeatedly confirmed by Bangladeshi CSOs, typically references were not asked for and

63 Observations confirmed in the survey-based report 2018: Accountability Assessment Rohingya Response Bangladesh, commissioned by Christian Aid and Gana Unnayan Kendra

64 Cox's Bazar CSO and NGO Forum <http://www.cxb-cso-ngo.org/>

65 COAST Trust Bangladesh 2018: Fast Responders are Kept Far. An assessment of localisation practice in the humanitarian response of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals.



notice periods not respected. Various signatories of the Charter for Change did not initiate a conversation about fair ‘compensation’ when they recruited staff from local/national NGOs, even if it is an explicit commitment. The Bangladeshi CSOs we interacted with expressed upset that first all their best staff is recruited to become ‘capacity’ for international agencies, who then told them that they had only ‘limited’ capacity or were ‘overstretched’. Local CSOs who have been working for years in the area, and who are very knowledgeable and well-connected among the host population, some of which also have experience of working with earlier Rohingya refugees, also felt somewhat side-lined by national Bangladeshi NGOs or Bangladeshi CSOs rooted in other parts of the country but brought to Cox’s Bazar by their international partner. In addition, significant numbers of local teachers and students left schools to get employment in aid agencies. Rather than recognising that significant collective capacity had been developed in Bangladesh in recent decades (including with international assistance), international actors tended to emphasise the lack of experience and preparedness for a ‘refugee’ situation.

- **Coordination:** For the first six months, the operational coordination has been undertaken by the International Sectoral Coordination Group (ISCG), which is dominated by international agencies, with hardly any direct government participation. The same COAST Trust survey, and direct observation, confirms that there is very little presence of Bangladeshi NGOs in the many sectoral groups. Some present have been co-opted by international agencies and are not seen as ‘representing’ the wider number of CSOs. Our Bangladeshi interlocutors commented that, even when present, the fast-spoken English in different accents, use of jargon and acronyms, the pace of meetings and the short notice for comments on major documents, makes it very hard to participate effectively. Again, several local CSOs have been calling for less meetings, and much more ‘enabling coordination environment’, where Bangla is also one of the working languages. Note also that Bangladeshi CSO staff time invested in during coordination efforts may not be funded by international actors.

Bangladesh today offers conditions that overall seem very favourable for a rapid advancement of localisation, due to: a government that is actively involved in disaster management, a vibrant civil society with significant emergency preparedness and response experience, a legislative and administrative environment that does not pose significant restrictions on L/NAs receiving foreign funding, and a lot of precedents of international donors directly funding L/NAs, and even using some of them as main multiplier-intermediary (e.g. the Manusher Jonno Foundation which for over a decade has been allocating grants to over 150 local organisations, the funds for which come from DFID, USAID, the World Bank, SIDA and others<sup>66</sup>). Many Bangladeshi CSOs also have a strong practice of community consultation.

However, the latest Rohingya refugee crisis was a fast-unfolding, large-scale, life-saving emergency that received a lot of international media attention and for which significant amounts of money were rapidly mobilised. This enabled what Ramalingam and Mitchell have called a ‘comprehensive response’, which is what the international response infrastructure has mostly been designed to do. Such type of response is based on the notion of limited or no national capacity and a central role for international agencies in managing, coordinating and delivering assistance. It tends to be insensitive to context, lacks engagement with local and national actors, and has a tendency to be supply-driven. <sup>67</sup> The aggregated impact has been more one of ‘replacing’ rather than ‘reinforcing’ local and national capacities.

The response to the latest Rohingya crisis is not typical of localisation in Bangladesh, where normally local and national actors, both on their own or together with international agencies, take responsibility for most of the preparedness and response. Therefore, within an overall trend of localisation, there is a sudden occurrence of ‘internationalisation’. While it is possible to consider this a contained occurrence around a particular crisis, some Bangladeshi actors feel that the tremendous assertion by international agencies of their presence and leading influence, may have “*set back localisation with ten years*”. <sup>68</sup>

66 <http://www.manusherjonno.org/>

67 B. Ramalingam & J. Mitchell 2014: Responding to Changing Needs? Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian action: p. 29 <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/responding-to-changing-needs>.

68 Interviews in Dhaka 10 February 2018

### Advancing localisation in Cox's Bazar district

- Quality participation:** A 'participation revolution' is significantly hampered by government policies. The Rohingya for example want cash and prefer to work rather than be dependent on hand-outs, but that is not currently allowed. In addition, from a Rohingya population perspective, Bangladeshi actors are not necessarily 'local'. For them 'local' would have to be organised groups of Rohingya. Some agencies have quality interactions with beneficiaries within their project context, but in such a concentrated geographical space with very fragmented provision of aid, and with Rohingya concerned about forced repatriation, a more comprehensive interaction is needed. Active engagement with the host population will also be required to sustain the empathy for the refugees and reverse the negative environmental and economic impacts on certain members of the host population.
- Partnership with local and national organisations:** Problematically, it has required months of campaigning and lobby by a grouping of Bangladeshi CSOs, some of which participated in the World Humanitarian Summit, to remind the many international agencies that they had committed to the Grand Bargain and/or the Charter for Change. Significantly, they articulated a Charter of Expectations, with 18 major points, the final one of which asserts that "We, national and local NGOs, need to stand on our own feet with an accountable, inclusive and knowledge-based approach."<sup>69</sup> By March-April 2018, more international agencies are beginning to more closely involve the local and national agencies.
- Cox's Bazar Pooled Fund:** Pooled funds are a modality that works for governmental donors, can increase coordination, and in several instances (though not in Ethiopia) have enabled greater local/national CSO access. Rather than being managed by a UN entity, a post-World Humanitarian Summit pooled fund, like country-level Peacebuilding Funds, can have a strategic committee, made up of the government, UN, INGOs and Bangladeshi CSOs, responsible for strategic analysis, policy and positioning.<sup>70</sup> Project and programme proposals are assessed by a similar, mixed, technical/thematic committee. In principle, representatives of the displaced and the host community, identified through a proper process to ensure their legitimacy for a constituency, are part of this committee or must be consulted. The pooled fund accepts proposals for the displaced or the host population, or for both together. Proposals and reports can be presented in Bangla. Proposals that have programmatic coherence, are strong on participation and accountability to affected populations, demonstrate competency in working with conflict sensitivity, and strengthen the capacities of affected populations and the local/national governmental and non-governmental actors, will stand out. Core costs of grantees are covered correctly, without differentiation between international and national/local agencies. The pooled fund periodically commissions more system-wide real-time evaluations, by mixed teams of Bangladeshi and international evaluators, that will also trace finance flows & extensively engage the affected populations. The Fund management can offer training on proposal writing.

69 [http://coastbd.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CSO\\_Common-Space\\_Campaign-Paper.pdf](http://coastbd.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CSO_Common-Space_Campaign-Paper.pdf)

70 This is a recommendation from GMI, based on our understanding of humanitarian and peacebuilding funds.



