A REVIEW OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING AND THE CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP (CaLP) 2005–2015 AND BEYOND

JOSEPHINE HUTTON, SHAWN BOESER AND FLOOR GROOTENHUIS

Front cover: Pakistan, March 2011. Ali Hassan in the village of Noor Muhammad holds up the cheque he has just received from Oxfam for work he has done in his village. Credit: Sam Tarling.
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April 2014

About the author

Josephine Hutton is an independent humanitarian and disaster management advisor. She has worked with or consulted for donors, international organisations, the UN and international NGOs. She works as a senior manager, advisor and consultant in humanitarian programme management and strategy, policy, advocacy, training and capacity building, evaluation and review, and operational management.

Shawn Boeser is a humanitarian information management advisor who has worked primarily for OCHA in several emergencies since 2003.

Floor Grootenhuis is a freelance food security and livelihoods consultant with a background in household economy. Formerly a regional advisor for Oxfam, she now focuses mainly on cash based programing and program evaluations.

Contact the team at johutton@yahoo.com
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACAPS  Assessment Capacities Project
ACF  Action Against Hunger/ACF International
ACT Alliance  Action by Churches Together Alliance
Adeso  African Development Solutions
ALNAP  Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development (now the Australian government's overseas aid programme within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
BRC  British Red Cross
CaLP  Cash Learning Partnership
CBHA  The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CBO  Community-based organisation
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency (now Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development)
CTP  Cash transfer programme/programming (includes cash or vouchers delivered by multiple means)
CWG  Cash Working Group
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
DFATD  Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (Canada)
DRC  Danish Refugee Council
ECB Project  Emergency Capacity Building Project
ECO  European Community Humanitarian Office (now the European Commission Directorate Generale for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection)
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council (of the UN)
EFSP  Emergency Food Security Programme (of OFDA)
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWSNET  Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFP  USAID Food for Peace
FSL  Food Security and Livelihoods
FTS  Financial Tracking System (of the UN)
GB  Great Britain
GBP  Pound sterling (British currency)
GenCAP  The Gender Standby Capacity Project
HC  Humanitarian Coordinator (of the United Nations)
A review of cash transfer programming and the cash learning partnership (CaLP) – 2005–2015 and beyond

HQ Headquarters
HSP Humanitarian Support Personnel
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRC International Rescue Committee
INGO International non-governmental organisation
JIPS Joint IDP [Internally Displaced Persons] Profiling Service
JSI Joint Standards Initiative
LNGO Local non-government organisation
MIRA IASC Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NFI Non-food item
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within USAID
PMU Programme Management Unit
ProCAP Protection Standby Capacity Project
RC Resident Coordinator (of the United Nations)
SCUK Save the Children United Kingdom
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
ToR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD United States dollar
WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP World Food Programme

How to use this report
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The review team would first like to thank all the stakeholders and informants who gave their time to complete the online survey and/or agreed to be interviewed. Your insights, history and practical examples have formed the bulk of this research. We would specifically like to mention the current members of the CaLP Steering Committee, CaLP staff, former CaLP staff and former Steering Committee members, for your honesty, your detailed recollection of CaLP's history (including recounting strategic changes and key decisions) and your positive and practical suggestions.

We would also like to acknowledge those individual researchers and teams who have recently (and not so recently) completed very useful complementary pieces of research which have fed into this review.

Special thanks go to Sara Almer (the CaLP Coordinator), Pete Garratt (the CaLP Steering Committee Chair in 2013) and Mark Henderson (the CaLP Steering Committee Chair in 2014), for guiding this review.

This research was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), with the generous support of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the British Red Cross (BRC).

The British Red Cross is a volunteer-led humanitarian organisation that helps people in crisis, whoever and wherever they are. BRC enables vulnerable people at home and overseas to prepare for and respond to emergencies in their own communities. And when the crisis is over, BRC helps people recover and move on with their lives.

The European Union's humanitarian aid funds relief operations for victims of natural disasters and conflicts outside the European Union. Aid is provided impartially, directly to people in need, without discrimination of their race, ethnic group, religion, gender, age, nationality or political affiliation.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The core purpose of this review, commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) www.cashlearning.org, is to evaluate CaLP’s progress since inception and examine the status and continued needs in cash programming in emergencies. This will enable the CaLP Steering Committee to make decisions on the appropriate role and shape of CaLP in the future. It is also envisioned that this review will provide a useful discussion for agencies and donors engaged in cash transfer programming (CTP) in emergencies as it also examines the status of CTP including barriers, and investments needed.

CTP represents a significant shift in the way humanitarian aid can be delivered. For a range of key humanitarian stakeholders it represents the future of humanitarian aid. CTP challenges many of the normative ways of designing, delivering, measuring, funding and coordinating programmes. These have tended to be done sectorally and through direct delivery of services and goods. CTP has broad acceptance as an important cross-sectoral modality, and for some humanitarian agencies it is very much part of normal business, but it is not yet routinely considered across the humanitarian sector. While the use of CTP is perceived to have increased globally in the last few years, the lack of an agreed definition by humanitarian actors of what constitutes CTP, along with the lack of a reliable baseline and effective and universal method of accounting for CTP expenditure, means that this is difficult to measure.

CTP is increasingly being used across multiple sectors (shelter, education and public health) and multi-sectoral responses; however it is still predominantly used in the livelihoods and food security sectors. Although CTP has been implemented in larger emergency responses since 2011, to date the majority of CTP responses in emergencies have been small-scale. Most examples of large-scale CTP programmes are in protracted and chronic situations, and social protection programmes. However, the Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response in the Philippines may represent an emerging picture of larger-scale, widespread CTP, implemented by a significant number of actors. There is no agreed definition of ‘cash at scale’ – whether this be total volume, relative volume, widespread multi-sectoral usage, or as a percentage of total programming. There is much interest in testing and observing where CTP can be used at a larger scale and a number of larger humanitarian agencies have invested in institutional reform to that end. In many agencies, barriers related to the acceptance, institutionalisation and implementation of CTP remain, and a range of investments are still needed to ensure appropriate and quality CTP.

CaLP was formed in 2005, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, as a small learning and knowledge sharing initiative. Since then CaLP has grown to become the leading inter-agency initiative working on: improving the quality of and capacity to implement CTP; increasing the consideration of CTP; and raising awareness through sharing, learning and advocacy. The work of CaLP is widely lauded and appreciated; it is seen as having brought CTP to the forefront of the humanitarian agenda and having developed a common understanding around CTP. Its main achievements are: the creation and delivery of quality training; development of tools; evidence building and sharing; and building and supporting a community of practice, and influencing changes in attitude and practice. Despite this almost universal praise, CaLP has struggled to get the longer-term and strategic financial support it needs, both from donors and from its members. The greatest challenges for CaLP have not been related to its work, but in the nature of its governance structure, and in getting adequate, appropriate and consistent funding. Much of this is not visible to its community of practice, but it has had great impact on the internal workings of CaLP, especially on its staff and Steering Committee members, and has tied CaLP to project implementation more than achieving strategic goals.

There is almost universal support for CaLP to continue and grow, especially given CaLP’s neutrality and acknowledged leadership in CTP. CaLP should continue as a partnership to maintain and grow its role as an inter-agency platform. However, to take on this challenge CaLP will need to harness the kind of stable and suitable financial support it needs (from both members and donors). A more formally recognised and supported place for CTP (and possibly CaLP) in the humanitarian architecture, will also be essential. CaLP will need to reform its governance structure, including: broadening its membership to bring in a wider constituency of actors from the humanitarian and development worlds, as well as getting higher-level representation on its board.

Outlined below are the key findings and their corresponding recommendations – targets for each recommendation.
are highlighted. The full set of findings and recommendations are in the report.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THE STATUS OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING, INCLUDING BARRIERS

Key findings

- CTP has grown in acceptance, volume, breadth, geographic spread and cross-sectoral and multi-sectoral use in the last few years. Accurate figures on this growth, and actual scale of implementation, remain elusive.

- A number of INGOs and UN agencies have undertaken, or are in the process of, organisational and systems change to support CTP, including financial and logistics systems, policy shifts and capacity building. Institutional reform and humanitarian leadership are essential to progressing acceptance, consideration and appropriate adoption of CTP.

- No common definition of ‘CTP at scale’ exists in the humanitarian sector, thereby making it difficult to ascertain whether, where, and how, CTP is being implemented at scale. There are thus wide-ranging perceptions of whether CTP has been implemented at scale, and most examples are for protracted situations or social protection programmes.

- The key barriers to the growth of CTP, and preventing implementation of CTP at scale, are primarily: systemic and organisational issues within humanitarian agencies; attitudinal blockages (fear, risk and lack of awareness or open-mindedness); the lack of an agreed place for CTP in the humanitarian architecture and the lack of leadership related to this; and the perceived challenges with donor funding and reporting.

Recommendations

- Agreement of a common definition of what is included in CTP, and the development of a more accurate baseline on CTP expenditure, should be a priority, including an effective system for tracking CTP expenditure. Target – CaLP, Donors, Community of Practice, Humanitarian Agencies

- CaLP should propose and seek broad agreement on a definition of ‘CTP at scale’ for the humanitarian sector, differentiating between rapid response and protracted situations, and focusing on volume as opposed to proportion of response. Target – CaLP, Community of Practice, Humanitarian Agencies

- What is needed to move CTP from experimental and small-scale, and to overcome many of the current barriers, is for humanitarian agencies to commit to institutional reform in: policies; systems; ways of assessing, designing, implementing and measuring programmes; staff and management attitude and capacity. Target – CaLP, Donors, Community of Practice, Humanitarian Agencies
EVALUATING CaLP’S SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

Key findings
- The direct influence of CaLP is difficult to measure, but there is widespread perception that CaLP has been instrumental, perhaps the lead, in improving capacity, evidence, awareness and collaboration around CTP to ultimately improve the quality of cash and humanitarian programming.
- CaLP’s success was largely driven by the visionary and strategic decision to establish and grow the initiative at a key point of change in relation to CTP, and by the commitment and hard work of key individuals in CaLP and the member agencies.
- CaLP has influenced attitude and practice in CTP, primarily through training, tools, research and coordination. It has been instrumental in budgetary increases and CTP policy and practice shifts in a number of humanitarian agencies.
- CaLP is perceived as having had most success with individuals and agencies already aware of and engaged in CTP, and less success at reaching out beyond the inner circle of humanitarian agencies and advocating and influencing the senior leadership of humanitarian agencies.

Recommendations
- See relevant recommendations in section 3.4 and below in: ‘The Future of CaLP including Strategic Focus and Governance’.

EVALUATING CaLP’S GOVERNANCE MODEL

Key findings
- CaLP is viewed as a successful inter-agency initiative, and only a few external stakeholders are aware of its governance model or any challenges with it. CaLP’s governance model was appropriate for its first few years, but as CaLP has grown, and its work has become more complex and diverse, the model has become a limiting factor and caused increasing management challenges.
- CaLP membership consisting of only of the current five agencies has limited its possible reach and impact, as has the level of seniority of representatives from the member agencies.
- The commitment of key individuals in agencies has not been mirrored by organisational commitment, and global commitment to collaboration by CaLP has not been mirrored at country level.
- A strategic approach to funding has been absent for much of CaLP’s life to date, and accessing funding and the management of funding have both been a struggle and a preoccupation for CaLP, especially since 2010.
- Donor in-principle support for CaLP has not been matched by adequate, long-term, core funding for CaLP. Also, the nature of some of the funding CaLP has received has been too project-based.
Recommendations

- CaLP should expand its membership in the future to invite more agencies with substantial or influential experience in implementing CTP, in order to be more representative and to have greater leverage and influence. Target – CaLP

- The functions of the current CaLP Steering Committee needs to be split into two parts: a high-level board and a technical advisory group. Target – CaLP

- Key donors should demonstrate their support for CaLP, their recognition of its vital and unparalleled role in advancing CTP, and the pivotal role that CTP will play in the future of humanitarian aid, by providing large-scale (ideally a minimum of USD 750,000 per year per donor), multi-year grants (three year minimum) to CaLP for a core programme of work. Target – Donors, CaLP

THE FUTURE OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Key finding

- There are a number of areas that require further investment and action from a range of CTP stakeholders. These relate to: shifting organisational and key stakeholder mindsets; improving leadership and coordination; institutionalising CTP in humanitarian organisations; investment at country level with host governments and support to NGOs and CBOs; and funding frameworks and programming support.

Recommendations

- CTP institutionalisation should be a priority across the humanitarian sector, with support to NGOs and governments prioritised. Donors should provide substantial investment for this. CaLP with its member agencies would be best placed to manage and support a broad programme of institutionalisation with donor support. Target – CaLP, Donors, Community of Practice, Humanitarian Agencies

- There needs to be high-level agreement, through the IASC and the global clusters, on a place for and leadership of CTP within the global humanitarian architecture. A reformed CaLP, working as a neutral inter-agency initiative with broader membership, could be the nominated lead for CTP coordination and mainstreaming. Target – CaLP, Donors, Community of Practice, Humanitarian Agencies

- Donors, UN agencies and INGOs should proactively look to establishing and funding consortia for CTP in large emergencies, to provide a simpler, coordinated means to fund large-scale CTP responses. Target – CaLP, Donors, Humanitarian Agencies
THE FUTURE OF CaLP INCLUDING STRATEGIC FOCUS AND GOVERNANCE

Key finding
• There is almost universal support for CaLP to continue and to grow in its scope of action, its reach and influence, and ultimately its impact.

Recommendations
• CaLP should continue with an open-ended role. It is needed and it has a substantial future role in enhancing CTP, along with others. Target – CaLP

• CaLP needs to be more ambitious in terms of advocacy and influence in order to remain a catalyst for change in attitudes and practice around CTP. For CaLP to have impact it must be, and must be seen to be, a neutral, inter-agency, inter-cluster, inter-sectoral initiative. Target – CaLP

• CaLP’s future focus should be on the following: outreach and influencing; capacity building; evidence building, sharing and promotion; and facilitating and promoting effective collaboration. This will be done through: strategic and mainstreamed advocacy; training; support for CTP institutionalisation; documenting and sharing learning; coordination, or facilitating collaboration; and building key alliances and partnerships. Target – CaLP

• CaLP should remain a partnership with a consortium (lead agency) model. The choice of a hosting member for CaLP would be best determined by a clear set of criteria. Target – CaLP

• CaLP should retain regional focal points, and should make the appointment of a Middle East focal point a priority. CaLP should consider re-instating country focal points where there is demand, and consider a range of operational models for country focal points. Target – CaLP

Yemen, October 2012: An Oxfam Cash distribution at 22 May School in Bayt al-Faqih city. Credit: Rashad Saeed/Oxfam
1.0 BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

1.1 THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS REVIEW

The authors were commissioned to conduct a review of progress of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) since inception, along with an examination of the continued needs in cash programming in emergencies. The purpose of this is to enable the CaLP Steering Committee to make decisions on the appropriate role and shape of CaLP in the future.\(^1\)

The CaLP Steering Committee set itself a potential phase-out date (in 2011). This was done in the spirit of ensuring its continued usefulness and relevance. This review has been commissioned to support the decision-making process on the appropriate future role of CaLP post 2014. This includes considering that CaLP’s role may not be needed. The CaLP Steering Committee has indicated that the views of stakeholders are critical in determining the future of CaLP. The CaLP Steering Committee envisages this as a learning and discussion document to understand the possible continued role that CaLP can play in addressing quality programming of cash in emergencies. It is also anticipated that the review will provide a useful discussion for agencies and donors engaged in cash transfer programming (CTP) in emergencies.

The key focus areas for this review, defined by the review team and the Steering Committee, are:

1. **Evaluation of CaLP ways of working and progress to date** in meeting its objectives and identifying key lessons – this includes a review of achievements to date, barriers, level of reach, good practice, lessons identified and reflections on the operational set up of CaLP.

2. **External environment gap and needs analysis** in ensuring quality CTP at scale and barriers to adopting CTP as part of a response – this includes analysis about the broader humanitarian community, architecture and trends that CaLP sits within, cash programming in a broader context, coordination structures and other relevant mechanisms for capacity building and advocacy.

3. **Potential future role and relevance of CaLP** in addressing the gaps and needs identified in the previous section.

4. **Future structure of CaLP**, which includes options for CaLP’s institution type, structure and ways of working in relation to fulfilling any future role including the option that CaLP may phase out from 2015. Other models for how the needs for support to cash programming could be met are also considered – this includes an examination of other relevant models for the kind of role CaLP has and the needs identified.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

A team of three consultants conducted the review and, in consultation with the Steering Committee, defined each of the review components above. The primary data collection method was semi-structured qualitative interviews (solo, roundtable and email), complemented by an online survey. The reviewers made use of existing learning and concurrent studies. In the absence of primary research, direct attribution of outcomes and transformation in the humanitarian sector to CaLP is limited. The indicators are more indirect and proxy, except where reported by primary stakeholders. There are some quantitative results which came out of the online survey; however the greater portion of results are qualitative in nature. Recommendations for the future have been driven by the review team, the collective views of stakeholders and insights gained from other consortia. Additional consultants assisted with French translation and interviews and roundtables.

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\(^1\) CaLP Review Terms of Reference (2013).
The stakeholder list was developed with CaLP staff and the Steering Committee, and a number of stakeholders/people outside this list were also consulted. Ninety-two people were interviewed directly and an additional 14 individuals provided responses by email. A total of 264 people were invited to participate in the online survey (190 in English and 74 in French) and 94 responded (36%). Most survey respondents were from non-CaLP member international non-government organisations (INGOs), followed by United Nations (UN) staff, and donors/consultants/others (CaLP and research institutions). Respondents to the English version were based in 23 countries with the majority of participants based in Kenya, Thailand, the UK and the USA. French survey respondents and interviewees were mainly based in West Africa. Most stakeholders consulted were familiar or very familiar with CTP and CaLP, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 below. Quotations are used throughout the report but names have been withheld to maintain anonymity.

**Figure 1: Familiarity with CTP**  
(source: online survey)

**Figure 2: Familiarity with CaLP**  
(source: online survey)

### 1.3 LIMITATIONS

The breadth of subject matter and time span for this review was ambitious and perhaps beyond the limit of one report. The inability to directly measure the impact of CaLP over time is a limitation. This is especially so as CaLP is not an operational or implementing agency and it also does not have a universally recognised role in relation to CTP, so CaLP cannot be entirely held to account for or credited with shifts in CTP. The review assesses CaLP’s achievements against objectives covering the 2008–2012 period; however it does not consider the current 2013–2014 strategy, which was only finalised in mid-2013. To do so would be inappropriate for this kind of long-range review and would best be done through a mid-term review of that strategy.

Trying to ensure a broad representation of key stakeholders and interested/relevant parties to CTP and CaLP was essential, but also meant that the potential interviewee list was long and geographically very diverse. There was also some interview/evaluation fatigue with some stakeholders who had been consulted by different review pieces covering similar topics, during the same time period. Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines rendered a number of respondents unavailable. Gathering key internal CaLP documents to provide the full historical perspective on CaLP was also challenging, and had to come from a number of sources.

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2 See list of those interviewed/consulted in Annex 11.
2.0 CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING IN THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR

In this section the current status of CTP is discussed along with barriers to its institutionalisation. This emerges from both key recent literature and feedback provided by stakeholders through the review.

2.1 STATUS OF CTP

‘There has been a tipping point… there is critical mass…’

‘The future is multi-sector, and cash crosses the continuum.’

A focus of this review is to examine whether CTP is broadly accepted, routinely considered, growing in importance and being used ‘at scale’ to help meet changing and increasing humanitarian needs. CTP is seen by many as one of the most significant shifts in the humanitarian programming landscape. As one interviewee said, ‘there are not many good examples of procedural change in the humanitarian sector … one of the most salient examples is cash … [it is] an unusually visible one’. As another interviewee said, ‘cash can change the humanitarian sector; there’s nothing more holistic than cash’.

In recent reports, researchers have tried to estimate the use of CTP via tools such as the UN’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) and with data from individual donors. The figures reached (1–2% of global humanitarian assistance) are now being widely referred to, but this may not be helpful as there is general agreement, including by the authors, that there is currently no accurate nor comprehensive way to measure CTP. Mowjee writes, ‘… without hard data, it is not possible to assess whether financing for CTP is increasing or decreasing in relation to in-kind assistance and to judge whether it is fulfilling its potential.’

A number of review participants were surprised at how low the above figure of 1–2% was, and did not feel it reflected the true picture. It is clear that FTS data does not necessarily include funding raised and programmed directly by humanitarian agencies, nor funding from all donors. It also does not account for the different types of CTP modalities (such as cash for work, vouchers, and conditional/unconditional grants). It may also miss CTP expenditure where it is a small component of a larger programme, or used cross-sectorally, or in a multi-sector response. CTP tracking remains an area that needs significant further investigation and a much more robust and comprehensive form of measurement.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming opinion of the stakeholders consulted for this study is that CTP is generally increasing across the humanitarian sector (96% said this in the survey), that many examples now exist of CTP at scale, and that key donors are increasingly supportive of CTP. Stakeholders overwhelmingly responded that CTP has increased in their organisations in the past three years (see Figure 3 below). Many felt that CTP exists in many portfolios without individual agencies or donors tracking it specifically or in a standard format.

Those interviewed agree that CTP is an important modality (95% according to the online survey), and many say it has reached ‘critical mass’ and has passed ‘a tipping point’, in terms of acceptance if not actual implementation.

CTP has been used as an effective and appropriate response in a wide variety of contexts, especially when markets are functioning and resilient. CTP is also often the chosen modality when traditional in-kind responses are not possible due to insecurity. One stakeholder noted that three years ago only a few agencies were implementing CTP and now, ‘most agencies have some experience’ in CTP in an increasing range of sectors. As one interviewee said, ‘the sectoral divide is so behind … it is not the future … the future is multi-sector and cash crosses the continuum’.

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1 Institutionalisation of cash transfer programming (CTP) is defined for the purposes of this report as: CTP is part of routine planning for emergencies; agencies have sufficient and adequately trained staff and managers; agencies have appropriate systems and agreed procedures for CTP in emergencies; and CTP has management and staff buy-in.


3 In the online survey the review team used a broad definition of scale as being ‘a significant component of any humanitarian response’ (given that there is no agreed definition).

4 The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO – also called the European Commission Directorate Generale for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) was possibly the first donor to try to fully account for its CTP spend in 2008. Since 2013 ECHO has been grouping all CTP actors from Burkina Faso in a common logframe. This meant that they would use common targeting criteria, the same amounts of cash, the same transfer systems, and the same monitoring and evaluation system. There was also an additional objective to make the link with nutrition. This successfully brought humanitarian, government and development actors together and allowed them to develop institutionalised safety nets. ECHO is trying this in Niger too, but has not yet been able to in Mauritania and Chad.

5 One proxy indicator could be the increasing number of job vacancies across the sectors that are now requiring or desiring skills in CTP.
Some other key findings from the survey are:

- CTP is still predominately used in the food security and livelihoods (FSL) sector.
- CTP is increasingly being used cross-sectorally – namely for non-food items (NFIs) and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and shelter programmes, and is beginning to be used in multi-sector responses.\(^8\)
- The geographic spread of CTP is variable – it has been used most consistently in the African Great Lakes region, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan and most recently the Middle East (Syria Crisis) and in South-East Asia, mostly at small-scale for natural disasters (one of the exceptions being Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, as discussed later).\(^9\).
- A number of examples were given of CTP at scale (as defined in the survey – see footnote 5 above), but these were primarily protracted emergencies and long-term situations of vulnerability such as Niger, Syria and Somalia.
- Organisational uptake is variable. In the survey: 86% indicated their organisation’s capacity for CTP had increased in the previous three years, and 82% of survey respondents indicated that their management had actively encouraged them to implement CTP in the previous three years.
- Forty-eight per cent of respondents indicated that their organisation had institutionalised CTP somewhat in the previous three years and 28% said they had done so to a great extent (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Participants view of CTP institutionalisation** (Source: online survey)

Q27: How well has CTP been institutionalised in your organisation?

There are a significant number of INGOs implementing CTP (according to the CaLP Cash Atlas, approximately 30 as at March 2014, but this is likely under-reported).\(^10\) Specific non-CaLP INGOs who have grown their programmes, invested in systems changes and training, and are often leaders in CTP at a field level include Mercy Corps, World Vision, Concern and Goal, amongst others. Less is known about the role of local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) unless they are acting as implementing partners, or about that of INGOs which are not so actively part of the humanitarian system. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has made a major investment in supporting CTP institutionalisation with national societies, and CTP programming is therefore growing across the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. There are also organisations such as African Development Solutions (Adeso)\(^11\) that have had a relatively big impact with advocacy, tools and capacity building, primarily in the East Africa region, but also in West Africa. In the United Nations, despite the presence of a common UN framework, the Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT),\(^12\) the use and knowledge of

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\(^8\) Where a number of programmes and modalities are used in combination to meet an overall set of programme goals.

\(^9\) The CaLP Cash Atlas provides a useful overview of global spread.

\(^10\) In the Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response in the Philippines, in 2013/14 alone, around 30 humanitarian agencies are known to have implemented CTP in varying degrees (according to the Cash Coordinator for Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda).

\(^11\) Adeso’s mandate has some strong similarities with CaLP.

\(^12\) In 2005, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/201 and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP) adopted the Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfer – HACT, as a common operational framework for transferring cash to government and non-government implementing partners. The HACT Framework shifts management of cash transfers from a system of rigid controls to a risk management approach and is aimed at reducing transaction costs and focusing on strengthening national capacities for management and accountability with a view to gradually shift to utilising national systems for transferring development funds and financial reporting.
CTP is variable. Interestingly, negligible mention was made of the HACT by UN agency staff consulted for this review. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have recently grown CTP as a proportion of their programme; however among the operational UN agencies the World Food Programme (WFP) is perhaps viewed as the most transformed. It should be noted that in order for CTP to really grow as a proportion of humanitarian programming, it will need to be taken on in a substantial way by UN agencies and governments.

In 2007 WFP started to make a shift to market-based interventions and local procurement. In 2008 it started to shift to cash and vouchers programming, driven primarily by substantial donor pressure and pressure from field offices, but as one senior WFP staff member said, there was 'not a conducive environment' in WFP at that time. Cash and vouchers programming was integrated into the strategic plan from 2008/9/10 onwards and it 'shifted gears' to develop an initiative called Cash for Change. This looked at all processes, systems and tools needed by WFP 'in order to really integrate cash and voucher programmes in WFP processes'. In 2011 CTP was still small, but there was a 'one-hundred per cent increase [in] 2012–13 in cash programmes'.

UNICEF has increasingly implemented CTP in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Review results indicate that there is a 'preoccupation in UNICEF on how to change' in terms of CTP. Unlike WFP, there apparently 'hasn’t been a lot of donor pressure on UNICEF to switch to cash'. However, there are indications that UNICEF is interested in increasing the use of CTP, including at headquarter management level where it has been integrated into an innovations team (which supports the needs and ideas of the country offices). According to some, it is just ‘a matter of time before UNICEF really takes it on board in a bigger way.’

UNHCR has demonstrated experience in CTP in emergencies (for example, it has been implementing a large cash transfer programme in Jordan in response to the Syria crisis) and has shown its interest in expanding CTP, especially given its cross-sectoral mandate. It is currently developing a set of CTP guidelines which are expected to be finalised shortly.

The UN Secretariat, (specifically the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is generally perceived as being slower to embrace and promote consideration of CTP within humanitarian leadership, field support and coordination. There are some exceptions to this and the Policy Analysis and Innovation section has included CTP as one of three key topics it is currently focusing on, and have written a number of internal papers on cash. Any movement forward tends to be driven more by individuals trying to progress the discussion in OCHA rather than executive guidance. Within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), CTP has been discussed at the global level, including CaLP presenting to the global IASC meeting and various clusters. However it has not progressed as far as many stakeholders would like, and there is a perceived degree of lethargy.

Some respondents indicated that CTP is so 'normal now' and so routinely considered that they now have to think more about when not to use it, or argue against using it in some cases. Another interviewee said 'cash is not mainstream, it is not usual'. According to one agency interviewed, CTP was being seen as the ‘golden bullet’ and the ‘panacea’ for the humanitarian sector, because humanitarians like to ‘leap onto the next new thing’, but this was a minority view. Another respondent from a member agency advised caution, saying that CTP is ‘not the answer to all needs’ and should be chosen when and where it is appropriate. Some felt that the crisis in Syria has been a major catalyst for CTP being the norm because it is such a significant part of programming, even when perhaps not appropriate.

Some agencies have embraced the use of CTP in some countries and not others, even where it might be appropriate. As one interviewee said, ‘it comes down to the individual, not necessarily the organisation’. It appears that the

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13 Market-based interventions are those whose primary programme objective is reinforcing markets, thereby protecting, rehabilitating and strengthening livelihoods – as defined in the Market Learning Event Communiqué, from a meeting hosted by the Food Security Cluster in London, 2013.

14 It should be noted that WFP does not define CTP in the same way as most other agencies – it includes cash for work, vouchers, grants, but also local procurement (instead of importing food).

15 Results of the review indicate that at present, UNICEF's CTP is more field-driven, ad hoc and opportunistic, but the organisation is planning for 2014 a 'roll-out of the Revised HACT Framework across all UNICEF offices and regions by developing a set of guidance, implementation and monitoring tools and training materials which are in line with the revised framework and responsive to UNICEF-specific Business Model'.

16 For example, in the Philippines for the Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response, the Cash Coordinator for the humanitarian community is a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff member and is housed by OCHA.
attitudes of the agency’s head of office in that location and their degree of programmatic autonomy, rather than the limitations or barriers of operating in the specific country, influence whether or not, and how, CTP is considered. Individual champions appear to be a key factor in determining whether CTP is implemented. This means that even when CTP would be the most appropriate modality or even where it is a supported and promoted option in the organisational toolbox, these factors are not necessarily enough to ensure that it is considered.

This review and other recent reports have indicated that many donors have no real barriers to funding CTP, and that in fact there is an increase in funds available for CTP. In response to the online survey, 62% of respondents actually indicated that donors had encouraged their organisation to implement CTP in the previous three years. The statistics that do exist show a general trend towards more donors funding CTP. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2012 the number of donors funding cash transfer programmes in humanitarian emergencies increased from 6 in 2006 to 21 in 2011, peaking at 41 donors in 2010 in response to the emergencies in Haiti and Pakistan. The earliest and most active donors funding CTP were the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO – European Commission Directorate Generale for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and the Swiss government. Seventy per cent of ECHO funding for emergency food assistance was done through CTP in 2012–2013. ECHO also developed guidelines for CTP in 2008/9. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Food for Peace [FFP], and the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA]) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) have also been substantial funders. DFID has recently developed a Humanitarian Guidance Note for Cash Transfer Programming. Many donors agree the question is, ‘not why, but why not?’ and would advocate CTP being considered in all humanitarian responses.

A number of donors report that over time, their position regarding CTP (and market-based responses) has shifted, from being allowed to now being encouraged and enabled. OFDA proposal guidelines specify that it prefers market-based responses in livelihoods projects. USAID/FFP recently put out a request for proposals in Yemen indicating a preference for CTP, especially vouchers. ECHO lifted the 100,000 Euro limit on unconditional cash grants in 2013. Some donors reported that they perceive NGOs as not being bold enough or creative enough, that they are risk averse, slow to change and are not putting CTP proposals, especially at scale, to donors. ECHO specifically said it is not getting enough requests for CTP, and USAID/OFDA said it had ‘never said no’ to proposals solely based on the proposition of CTP. Donors broadly recognised that CTP is still not being used enough despite knowledge and evidence to show it is an important modality.

Some broader factors or trends not specific to CTP, but significant in influencing CTP are:

- Increasing urbanisation/urban disasters – these challenge traditional aid delivery mechanisms which are not as flexible or well suited to urban contexts as CTP.
- Increase in protracted conflicts and compound crises, and the impact on vulnerability, the types of programmes and the complexity of response – accessibility to target populations for in-kind aid or direct service provision can be more difficult due to conflict, and CTP can be implemented more remotely and on a long-term basis as a form of social protection.
- Increasing anti-Western violence and non-observation of international protocols (such as those for protecting humanitarian space, and those delivering aid and recognising the impartiality of humanitarian aid) – in such a working space remote programming, of which CTP is one modality, has become more considered, necessary and effective.
- Donor funding has stabilised or decreased in the last three years due to financial crises and economic downturn, although it is reported that funding available for CTP has increased. Donors increasingly look for efficiency and value for money in aid delivery, and CTP can generally provide these.

18 It is acknowledged that there is a move to be able to define what counts as aid under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition more broadly. Examples include the United Kingdom defining pensions under aid and Australia now defining offshore processing of refugees and costs as aid. See Provost, C. ‘Rich Countries Consider Aid Overhaul’ The Guardian Weekly (Manchester) 22 Nov 2013. Print.
The internet and telecommunications have changed the face of communications with beneficiaries and provide a degree of virtual accessibility. New electronic financial services and instruments provide alternatives for reaching beneficiaries – CTP is seen as an approach which can be more flexible and adapt to many of the changes.

Findings

- CTP has grown in acceptance, volume, breadth, geographic spread and cross-sectoral and multi-sectoral use in the last few years. Accurate figures on this growth, and actual scale of implementation, remain elusive.

- CTP is not widely seen as a panacea or a default option, nor is it simply an innovation or a passing fashion – although these minority views do still exist. CTP is an increasingly utilised mode of programme delivery, and one which will likely continue to grow and have significant impact on humanitarian aid delivery and coordination.

- A number of INGOs and UN agencies have undertaken, or are in the process of, organisational and systems change to support CTP, including financial and logistics systems, policy shifts and capacity building. Institutional reform and humanitarian leadership are essential to progressing acceptance, consideration and appropriate adoption of CTP.

- In light of shifts in technological solutions in disaster-affected communities, the challenging funding environment, the increase in urban disasters, as well as diminishing humanitarian access in many crisis areas, CTP is increasingly being viewed as a logical response option to consider – including at scale.

Recommendation

- Agreement of a common definition of what is included in CTP, and the development of a more accurate baseline on CTP expenditure, should be a priority, including an effective system for tracking CTP expenditure.

2.2 CASH AT SCALE

‘Large-scale is not normal, we still don’t see many examples of quick scalable cash.’

As in other recent reports, this review found that there is no single endorsed definition of scale and that definitions vary widely among agencies, and most respondents found it difficult to provide a definition. In the survey the review team defined cash at scale as being ‘a significant component of any humanitarian response’. More than 50% of respondents believe their organisation has the capacity to implement at scale with that definition, which seems optimistic. The need for a more common definition of what ‘CTP at scale’ means, still remains. It would seem that the most useful definition would relate to true volume, not proportional or relative volume. What is most useful to understand is how CTP is being implemented with a very large number of people in a large-scale response, by a single agency or consortium – for instance 100,000 people or 20,000 households. It is this kind of response which would demonstrate the impact of CTP on humanitarian programming, on humanitarian spend, on systems, markets and so on. It is less significant to know whether CTP was 50% of a response targeting a small number of households (i.e. 2,000). It is also important to differentiate between rapid response and response in a protracted situation, as these have very different impacts on systems.

A number of examples of ‘CTP at scale’ were given, but generally it is believed that CTP is still not implemented at scale regularly, particularly to help meet needs other than food aid. As one interviewee said, ‘large-scale is not normal, we still don’t see many examples of quick scalable cash’. The response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda...

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21 Austin, L. and Frize, J. (2011) Ready or Not? Emergency Cash Transfers at Scale, CaLP.
22 Some respondents in the study indicated that ‘cash at scale’ would mean anything above 10% of the total budget of a response; others indicated 50%. Oxfam’s definition is where CTP would reach 100,000. Some just said that ‘scale’ meant that CTP was the majority of the response, or cash transfers to a large proportion of the population using wide target criteria. WFP had a programme goal until recently that 40% of all food aid should be delivered through CTP – but as noted earlier, this may include a broader definition of CTP than that used by most humanitarian agencies. Indications are that this goal may have lowered under new WFP leadership.
in the Philippines is a recent exception and may herald a new trend of large-scale CTP responses in countries or contexts where it is highly appropriate. Scale per se is not the most important consideration: appropriateness is key; and several interviewees mentioned that the sensitivities around CTP have required the humanitarian community to be more rigorous in ensuring a quality and appropriate response. Although this is something that should be common practice across sectors, it is positive to see that the cash debate is perhaps pushing the actual commitment to this. As mentioned previously, the humanitarian community will not be able to measure whether there is critical mass and CTP at scale if an agreed measure of this does not exist.

Some respondents indicated that a big barrier for CTP at scale is that few, if any, humanitarian agencies could get adequate funding to implement CTP at scale in a large emergency. Some respondents gave examples of collaborative, multi-sectoral proposals or consortiums as a way to reach scale; otherwise it may only be implemented at scale by governments, UN agencies or the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Examples of CTP being implemented at scale in the last five years are more typically in protracted conflicts or in situations of chronic poverty and food shortages (social protection programmes). These include: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Niger, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria.

Changes in the global humanitarian landscape mean CTP will be used more often where traditional methods are too challenging or likely to be ineffective, such as in urban responses or in protracted conflicts. One respondent provided an interesting example of a creative approach to using cash by UNHCR in Jordan in 2012 when planning its support of the urban refugee caseload from Syria. UNHCR reportedly took a ‘deconstructed refugee camp’ approach and examined what the refugees’ needs were and how they could best be met, and was therefore able to cover a wide range of needs in multiple sectors through cash transfers to a large target group.

Finding

- No common definition of ‘CTP at scale’ exists in the humanitarian sector, thereby making it difficult to ascertain whether, where, and how CTP is being implemented at scale. There are thus wide-ranging perceptions of whether CTP has been implemented at scale, and most examples are for protracted situations or social protection programmes.

Recommendation

- CaLP should propose and seek broad agreement on a definition of ‘CTP at scale’ for the humanitarian sector, differentiating between rapid response and protracted situations, and focusing on volume as opposed to proportion of response.

2.3 BARRIERS TO CTP IMPLEMENTATION, INSTITUTIONALISATION AND SCALE-UP

While there are specific obstacles to implementing CTP at scale, many barriers to implementing CTP in general, perceived or real, have been identified by this review and other recent papers. These are briefly outlined below (for further details on each, refer to Annex 1).

23 According to the Cash Coordinator for Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines, CTP was used at scale to deliver emergency assistance by a number of agencies early in the response, including the WFP, Oxfam, and IFRC-Philippines Red Cross. The Philippines Red Cross alone targeted 50,000 households.
24 Assuming, for example, an affected population of 100,000 people and an average of USD 100 per person for a six-month programme including administrative overhead, this comes to a budget of USD 10,000,000.
25 Somalia – five NGOs jointly proposed a CTP consortium which donors contributed to. This was out of necessity because there were no other options due to restricted access.
27 Given the ambiguity and the challenge in defining what scale is, it needs to be noted that these examples of CTP at scale are not necessarily selected using any common criteria, but rather on how the agencies have defined CTP at scale themselves.
28 In the case of Jordan, the UNHCR country office determined that as markets were functioning, food and non-food item needs were best met with cash. They also determined that, as people were largely renting or living with host families, cash support met the shelter needs, and that as people were accessing local health services, but needing to pay fees, most health needs could also be met with cash.
A wide range of systemic and organisational blockages exist. For example, skills, capacity and institutional knowledge gaps persist at all levels of humanitarian organisations, in host governments, and in all parts of the lifecycle of a humanitarian response. There remains also a lack of institutionalisation and executive-level buy-in within key humanitarian agencies.

Organisational culture within many humanitarian agencies is outdated, slow to adapt and insufficiently multi-sectoral in approach. Programming decisions are often driven by what is quick, familiar and within perceived mandates (cash is seen as a possible threat to UN agency mandates).

Fear and risk aversion to what are perceived as new or different programming approaches is linked to organisational culture, and this also hinders change and adaptation. Concerns about public perception of what humanitarian aid looks like (and whether cash transfers fits this image) is also a barrier. CTP is still missing from preparedness and contingency planning in many agencies.

Enough broad evidence and research exists that supports CTP as a viable modality and likely to meet multiple needs of beneficiaries and empower them. However a perceived lack of evidence is still used as a justification to not explore CTP. This seems to point primarily to an issue of perception or outdated attitude, or not being willing to accept the evidence which does exist.

A range of barriers to quality programming persist and this also influences the uptake and expansion of CTP. Market analysis is still not included in most multi-sector needs assessment tools. Proper assessments identifying needs and examining the contexts are still not routinely done or done well.

Analysis of gender, disability and culture is still not routinely done, or is done poorly. Some agencies implement high quality CTP in one sector, but are not willing to implement CTP in other sectors, nor in a multi-sector cash intervention (often due to internal silos or organisational culture).

CTP is still generally used as an alternative to other methods of programming, rather than as part of a holistic package of assistance used in combination with other methods. CTP indicators or measures are rarely, if ever, included in common needs assessments, monitoring tools, or in OCHA’s ‘Who What Where’ products.

As an internal document of one UN agency said: ‘the most striking aspect of CTP is that if it ever becomes the dominant form of humanitarian response it could impact the current humanitarian sector-by-sector response model’ and would ‘challenge cluster coordination, assessments, information management, agency specialisations [and] the way funding is requested.’

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30 Recent reports go into great detail about fear and risk aversion. See for example Humanitarian Futures Programme (2013) (above footnote 29).
31 Interviews and online survey.
32 A recent piece of research commissioned by CaLP identified a number of gaps and ideas for future research, tools and other resources that would contribute to better understanding and better quality programming. The six areas defined by Austin are: (i) a cost efficiency and effectiveness comparisons; (ii) multi-sector cash programming; (iii) water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); (iv) health potential with CTP; (v) links between social protection systems and emergency CTP; and (vi) cash in refugee contexts. See Austin, L. (2014a) Research Gaps in Cash Transfer Programming, commissioned by CaLP.
There is lack of consistent, global and country-based high-level strategic coordination of CTP, leaving a gap in leadership, resourcing and joint advocacy with donors and host governments. Humanitarian coordinators are not providing adequate leadership on CTP via Humanitarian Country Teams and cluster coordination, and CTP is often not included in preparedness or contingency planning. The humanitarian system is ‘trapped by sectors and silos’. Many host governments have ongoing reservations about CTP even where large social safety programmes exist.

NGOs and others still reported many barriers or perceived barriers with donor funding, despite some donors saying these largely do not exist. These perceived barriers include: the difficulty of getting large-scale funding for large-scale CTP responses; preference by many donors for in-kind aid; donors seeing CTP as more of a technical issue rather than a strategic approach; and sectorally driven mandates, objectives, logframes and reporting requirements of donors.

Technological barriers include: the need for more and better financial instruments; reliance on local technology and hardware for e-transfers, which does not always exist or exist equally; and data management protection (this includes guidelines, organisational policies and capabilities, and laws within countries).

### Finding
- The key barriers to the growth of CTP, and preventing implementation of CTP at scale are primarily: systemic and organisational issues within humanitarian agencies; attitudinal blockages (fear, risk aversion and lack of awareness or open-mindedness); the lack of agreed place for CTP in the humanitarian architecture and the lack of leadership related to this; and the perceived challenges with donor funding and reporting.

### Recommendations
- What is needed to move CTP from being experimental and small-scale, and to overcome many of the current barriers, is for humanitarian agencies to commit to institutional reform in: policies; systems; ways of assessing, designing, implementing and measuring programmes; and staff and management attitude and capacity.

- Key leadership figures in the humanitarian and development worlds, who are apprised of the merits of considering CTP in humanitarian and early recovery responses, the need for effective coordination and the elements of quality CTP, should work collectively to influence those key stakeholders who are not.

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33 While the option of OCHA taking this role was discussed, many feel OCHA does not have the programmatic link, nor would it be seen as independent from the UN system.

34 The Better than Cash Alliance is looking into this issue more broadly and focusing on ‘accelerating the shift to digital payments’. As indicated on its website (http://betterthancash.org) it provides ‘expertise in the transition to digital payments to achieve the goals of empowering people and growing emerging economies’. It is working on this with governments, the development community (including the International Financial Institutions) and the private financial sector.

35 CaLP developed a set of guidelines on this called Principles and Operational Standards for the Secure Use of Personal Data in Cash and E-Transfer Programmes.
3.0 CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP BEGINNINGS, SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

This section explains who and what CaLP is and evaluates the broad programmatic achievements against CaLP’s objectives over time.\(^{36}\) It includes a review of CaLP’s governance model and the role of its member agencies. These findings come from internal (current and former CaLP staff) and external feedback, as well as an analysis of key documentation and previous reviews.

3.1 WHAT IS THE CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP?

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) is a ‘networking and knowledge sharing platform’\(^{37}\) borne out of a partnership or alliance of INGOs. The group initially came together in 2005 in a bid to capitalise on the lessons learned from the wide use of cash transfers in the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004. This eventually grew into CaLP with its core aim being \textit{to improve the quality of emergency cash transfer and voucher programming across the humanitarian sector}. It is now comprised of Oxfam Great Britain (Oxfam GB), the British Red Cross (BRC), Save the Children United Kingdom (SCUK), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Action Against Hunger|ACF International (ACF). These five organisations work together under the CaLP banner to:

- support capacity building and training material development;
- undertake action research and evidence gathering;
- advocate on the appropriate use of CTP, coordination, contingency planning, and preparedness.

Representatives of these agencies form a Steering Committee and an implementing team of staff located in the member agencies at headquarters and in the field. Oxfam GB hosts the majority of the global functions of CaLP.

3.2 THE STORY OF CaLP

Understanding the unique story of how CaLP came about is essential to appreciating how it developed. It helps to reflect on what CaLP has been able to achieve despite implementation challenges, and how it can continue to adapt to them. It is important to note that specific individuals, their network of relationships, and their collegiality have played a crucial role in CaLP’s development. This is a narrative about individuals bringing organisations and learning together, rather than how organisations have brought individuals together. CaLP’s genesis was as a learning group and has grown into the \textit{go-to} consortium for CTP with its own identity, website, resource centre and global team of staff. For more detail, please refer to the full story included at Annex 2 (The History of the Cash Learning Partnership) and Annex 3 (Timeline).

CaLP’s development, from inception to 2013, can be divided into approximately four phases. \textbf{Phase 1: 2005–2008} – In 2005, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, SCUK, Oxfam GB, BRC, Mercy Corps and Concern came together to promote good practice in both cash and voucher responses in countries affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami. They documented and shared experiences, and developed resources to guide managers of future CTP in emergency responses. The outcomes included a report reviewing CTP responses after the Tsunami\(^{38}\) case studies, and the first CTP level 1 training. In \textbf{Phase 2, 2008–2009}, the association was formalised and the \textit{Global Learning Partnership in Cash-based Responses in Humanitarian Responses} was established and eventually became \textit{the Cash Learning Partnership}. The partnership secured ECHO funding of 168,000 Euro\(^{39}\) for a one-year programme to continue documenting and capacity building, and expanded with two new member agencies – NRC and ACF. In \textbf{Phase 3: 2010–11}, with further funding from ECHO (1.5 million Euro) and new funding...

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\(^{36}\) Up until the most recent strategy, as this was only finalised in mid-2013.

\(^{37}\) From CaLP Strategy 2013–2014 (June 2013).

\(^{38}\) Adams, L. (2007) Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami, Overseas Development Institute – other documents produced during this partnership with Overseas Development Institute are located here: \url{www.odi.org.uk/search/site/learning%20tsunami}

\(^{39}\) It was GBP 150,000.
from VISA, CaLP hired a team including a coordinator, an advocacy and communications officer, two capacity builders and five country-level focal points in disaster prone countries. CaLP developed a new strategy; re-activated the D-group; undertook a substantial number of level 1 trainings; held learning events; continued documentation; set up a website; and created its first communications and advocacy material. In the most recent period – Phase 4: 2012–2013 – CaLP transitioned from country focal points to regional focal points in order to multiply CaLP’s impact and to influence regional dialogue. Further, the level 2 training was developed, the website and D-group became highly used, the research and advocacy agendas were expanded, and CaLP launched the Cash Atlas.

3.3 CaLP’s Achievements and Challenges

As one key stakeholder said, ‘it was an extraordinary idea to have CaLP and it has played its role fully’. There is a fairly universal sense that CaLP has been, as one interviewee put it, ‘a big force in bringing cash to the forefront of the humanitarian agenda’. An important source said CaLP has done an ‘amazing job’ of developing a ‘common understanding’ around CTP in the humanitarian community. The review found that CaLP is viewed as being very influential in raising the profile of CTP and in improving the quality of CTP. It has positively influenced the perceptions and agendas of donors, UN agencies and NGOs in relation to CTP through evidence, tools and individual interactions.

Overall the review and other evaluations make it clear that CaLP has been successful in achieving and/or progressing many of its objectives up until the 2012–2015 strategy (Annex 5). The objectives and many of the indicators in the 2012–2015 strategy were ambitious and difficult to measure or attribute directly or indirectly to CaLP. Some of the objectives pertained to the whole community of practice, not CaLP alone. However what CaLP has achieved/contributed towards the goals and objectives of the 2012–2015 strategy includes:

- global advocacy and direct outreach to the IASC and clusters;
- influencing senior staff of key organisations through meetings, presentations and personal representations;
- supporting collaboration platforms – regionally through the regional focal points and regional meetings and trainings, and with the cash focal points at country level;
- building a community of practice;
- training;
- improved collaboration through CaLP-initiated/supported country-level Cash Working Groups (CWGs).

Although CaLP has had a positive influence on the development and quality of CTP, as can be seen in section 3.4 below, there is still a long way to go in terms of influencing humanitarian actors and agencies to routinely consider and implement cash at scale (as discussed in 2.2 and 2.3). The various evaluations that have been undertaken of CaLP’s work provide a more detailed picture of specific achievements against project objectives rather than organisational objectives, so these will not be repeated here.

CaLP’s success appears to have been largely based on a few factors:

- A timely, visionary and strategic decision to establish and grow the initiative. CaLP was a catalyst for, and also ‘rode the wave’ of a global shift in the humanitarian sector towards CTP. It was in the ‘right place at the right time’; the ‘ball was rolling’.
- The commitment and hard work of key individuals in CaLP and the member agencies – ‘the role of champions cannot be overstated’.

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40 CaLP Steering Committee June 2010: creating CaLP focal points in eight disaster prone countries to advocate on CTP, develop contingency plans, train local government as well as humanitarian agency staff, develop and maintain a roster of trained people, pool learning on CTP in the country/region, create common standards as well as formats for implementing CTP in countries, coordinate CTP responses by agencies and provide sector-wide technical backstopping, if required.

41 An online discussion group started by the Overseas Development Institute in the initial post-Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) phase, the kick start to phase 1. A virtual community of practice.

42 For an outline of CaLP’s objectives over time see Annex 4.

• Policy shifts by certain donors towards CTP, and increased commitment to CTP amongst key UN agencies and NGOs have also been important.

There was a sense among a few informants that ‘CaLP started with a bang’ and had amazing momentum, but then, as one key stakeholder said, ‘it ran out of steam’. Some of this was attributed to CaLP beginning to struggle with its internal systems and governance structures as it took on more member agencies, more grants and multiple donors, and lost staff and funding at strategic points. It was also attributed to CaLP becoming ‘projectised’ – CaLP and its team being driven by and working towards the objectives of different projects funded by donors, rather than visionary strategic goals and influence.

The previous evaluations of CaLP’s work indicated that CaLP had a more modest impact in advocacy and communications due to lack of strategy (up to 2012). A number of informants reported that in the last two years CaLP’s move towards global advocacy and influence has been significant, well-led, and is beginning to have impact. Personal representations by CaLP staff and Steering Committee members to key stakeholders, and interactions with key stakeholders, have been important. Three positive examples provided were CaLP presentations at IASC, at Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator training and to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).

CaLP is widely known among United Nations agencies, donors and INGOs, but the depth of awareness is variable amongst and within agencies. The key variables relating to how well CaLP is known within agencies and by individuals are: whether they have a direct link to CTP in a humanitarian context (rather than development or social protection); their sectoral focus (better known amongst food security and livelihoods staff); whether there is a CaLP focal point or a working group supported/led by CaLP present; and which country or region they are in (e.g. CaLP is better known where large CTP programmes exist, such as in East Africa). The presence of CaLP member agencies in a country does not necessarily appear to influence a greater recognition of CaLP.

Findings

• CaLP has broadly achieved its earlier objectives up until the most recent strategy 2012–2015. CaLP has contributed to progress on all of the objectives in the 2012–2015 strategy in different ways and to varying degrees.

• The direct influence of CaLP is difficult to measure, but there is widespread perception that CaLP has been instrumental, perhaps the lead, in improving capacity, evidence, awareness and collaboration around CTP to ultimately improve the quality of cash and humanitarian programming.

• CaLP’s success was largely driven by the visionary and strategic decision to establish and grow the initiative at a key point of change in relation to CTP, and by the commitment and hard work of key individuals in CaLP and the member agencies.

3.4 CaLP’s Value Within the Humanitarian Community

Overall there was limited negative feedback about the work of CaLP beyond those points identified above. This in itself is significant.

CaLP is influential, highly valued and positively viewed. It has exceeded expectation and achieved a lot with a little. In the online survey, 57% felt that CaLP has had significant influence on attitude and practice in CTP. Another 37% said it has somewhat influenced attitude and practice (see Figure 4). Of the 52% of respondents in the survey who said their agency had a formalised plan for institutionalising CTP, 40% said that CaLP had influenced this. The principal means of influence were listed in order as training, tools, research, coordination and advocacy (see Figure 5). This indicates that to date CaLP is perceived to be most influential through its products and services.

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45 Although the additional members also significantly added to the reach and impact.
46 It should perhaps be noted here that innovative, inter-agency, multi-sectoral initiatives like this often suffer from the same perception about their slowdown. It is not uncommon that initiatives appear to start with a bang when they are new and making inroads, but as things settle and become normalised it appears as though they slow down.
47 For specifics see Annex 4 – CaLP Objectives Since Inception.
According to survey respondents, 49% said that CaLP has been either somewhat, or solely, influential in the increase in budget for CTP within their organisation. Forty per cent said CaLP had influenced the development of their agency’s CTP plan primarily through training, followed equally by research, tools, policy and practice, and advocacy. There is a clear sense that CaLP has been/is vital in bringing CTP to the attention of key stakeholders and changing minds and influencing.

CaLP is perceived as being very effective at preaching to the converted, but less successful at reaching out beyond the inner circle of agencies already aware of and engaged in CTP. CaLP has clearly been most successful at influencing in the humanitarian sector. A number of respondents felt that CaLP had not yet made the strategic link to early recovery, resilience, development and social protection. There is a sense that CaLP has been ‘aiming too low’ in terms of reach and advocacy (perhaps until 2013), and has been ‘too timid and tentative’ and not hitting the right targets or influencing the right people at the right levels to get the leverage and traction it needs. The reasons for this appear to be a mixture of: a lack of advocacy strategy (the focus from 2010 to 2012 was on communications, with only one staff member dedicated to this); the Steering Committee members themselves not being senior enough within their own organisations or having the gravitas to influence internally and externally; a lack of ambition from the Steering Committee around influencing (until more recently); a lack of consistency of presence in countries and regions and on global inter-agency fora; and the member agencies not promoting CaLP at their most senior levels and externally.

Overall, CaLP is seen to have provided effective leadership in CTP (86% of those surveyed said this). It has been most effective through training (83%), tools (67%), research (59%) and coordination (52%). Seventy-five per cent said their organisation had increased its use of CaLP resources in the last three years. There was general
appreciation for CaLP’s role in directly coordinating those agencies working in CTP, or facilitating and supporting coordination efforts more generally.

The impact of focal points was generally positively reviewed. They have been ‘a huge strength… one of the main strengths’ according to one key stakeholder. Many felt that CaLP was most effective when close to the field and that the field connection enriches its credibility and impact; although some stakeholders questioned whether regional roles were the most effective. Others felt that CaLP has not had enough field presence, that its model is not flexible enough to support field coordination needs. It was noted by a number of stakeholders that CaLP lacked leadership in influencing, supporting and collaborating with national governments. A key gap mentioned by many is the lack of CaLP presence in the Syria Crisis (caused not by lack of will within CaLP, but lack of funding) – it is ‘not excusable’ said one interviewee; ‘a missed opportunity’ said another. The existence and formalisation of cash focal points who were not CaLP staff per se, is an area that was raised and warrants further investigation. This will be discussed later.

CaLP is seen as the ‘go-to’ place for resources on CTP. CaLP is seen to have ‘deeply enriched the do’s and don’ts of cash – no one else has that depth.’ There is a fairly universal sense that CaLP is ‘the’ place to go to and seek guidance from in the form of tools, evaluations, case studies, reviews etc. – ‘CaLP has been great at providing resources and documentation from all over the world and gathering them into a central location.’ The website is highly valued and widely used by staff and managers of NGOs, donors and UN agencies because it is seen as a ‘one-stop repository’ on key documents related to CTP. Improvements are needed in navigation and search capabilities, comprehensiveness and the degree to which it is up to date. Many felt that CaLP by now should have developed a standard toolkit or generic set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) which agencies could adapt. The Cash Atlas is appreciated and has potential, but its purpose is not clear and it needs to be more comprehensive. For example, it could include more detail about CTP globally, and the work of non-traditional actors in the humanitarian sector (e.g. faith-based groups that are not normally part of regular humanitarian coordination, and report fora or mechanisms).

CaLP is generally not seen as promoting CTP, but rather advocating a considered and balanced approach to assessing the humanitarian context and implementing appropriate and quality programming.

CaLP’s role in building a community of practice around CTP was frequently mentioned as a positive and the D-group is appreciated. ‘The CaLP email group has been great at allowing people to ask questions and get numerous responses’ which if they are new to CTP, builds their confidence. The D-group has had peaks and troughs in terms of its use, but many key and helpful discussions have reportedly happened there. A number of respondents indicated it was one of the most useful examples of online programme discussion fora.

The research is valuable, widely accessed and valued; however there are a range of views on its quality. There was an appreciation of what CaLP has achieved in its research and documentation over time, given its size and capacity. A range of respondents indicate that CaLP is best at operational research and case studies. There is also a sense that CaLP may be too ambitious in its research agenda and may not have the competency to support academic research. Many felt that CaLP’s research has been driven by the agenda of others instead of CaLP’s clear understanding of gaps in research. This has been ‘distracting’ for CaLP and taken it away from its core purpose. In general, the research most appreciated was the documentation of learning and experience from implementation. There is a sense that much of the CaLP research is primarily read by those who are experts or converted, as opposed to novices, field staff, those who are not interested or need convincing. Some respondents indicated that CaLP has not quite succeeded in producing evidence on how CTP works in different sectors or how CTP works cross-sectorally.

48 In early 2014 CaLP sought feedback from users of the Cash Atlas through an email and online survey, saying that ‘the opinion of the community of users is the most critical input for its development’.


50 Austin, L. (2014a) (above footnote 32) – operational research is understood to be research emanating from existing interventions through, for example, programme monitoring and evaluation.

51 Much of the research has been driven by the community of practice through surveys, rather than CaLP determining the priorities itself. This perception should be partly remedied by the following paper: ibid.

52 Although this is very hard to define.
**The training is highly valued and almost universally regarded as being of very good quality.** ‘CaLP has trained a generation of practitioners’ said one respondent. Another said that the training and the sharing of policy and practice documents has ‘shaped the ways CTP is implemented… and has ensured a degree of similar approaches among organisations’. For many, the training is their only exposure to CaLP and is seen as the main way in which their agency has linked to or been influenced by CaLP. One interviewee talked about CaLP training as a ‘status symbol’. Another interviewee said ‘people try and get CaLP-trained as it is seen as the best’. CaLP has trained a large number of practitioners\(^\text{53}\) and through this has created a community of practice. Many viewed training as the most useful thing CaLP does and the main CaLP service they would use in the future. This is interesting given the spectrum of views within the Steering Committee about whether training is a core part of CaLP’s work (this may reflect a lack of awareness of the value and impact of training, and perhaps fatigue because it is labour intensive and difficult to find and keep trainers). Training is also the key means by which CaLP has advocated for consideration of and quality in CTP and influenced the views of stakeholders. ‘It is amazing to think that everyone who went through the trainings received the same messages [about quality CTP]’. The training has had a secondary influence in that a number of agencies are using CaLP training materials and referencing CaLP research in the development of their own training materials.\(^\text{54}\) However, it was noted that changed practice and capacity does not come simply through training – it also requires institutional change (discussed further below). The learning events and workshops were generally highly rated by those who had attended.

**The absence of a capacity building strategy for CaLP has been a limitation** because it is not clear what CaLP is trying to achieve with its training programme, what needs it is trying to meet and how it is targeting trainees.

**Findings**

- CaLP has influenced attitude and practice in CTP, primarily through training, tools, research and coordination, and has been instrumental in budgetary increases and CTP policy and practice shifts in a number of humanitarian agencies.

- CaLP is perceived as having had most success with individuals and agencies already aware of and engaged in CTP, and less success at reaching out beyond the inner circle of humanitarian agencies and advocating and influencing the senior leadership of humanitarian agencies.

- CaLP’s influence has been primarily in the humanitarian sector, and has missed some key links to early recovery, resilience, development and social protection.

- The presence of country and regional focal points has, by and large, been viewed as pivotal in its outreach and ability to convene and build a community of practice – but the absence of a CaLP focal point in the Middle East has been noted as a major gap.

- CaLP has exerted the most influence through training, and CaLP’s training is highly valued. Influence through training goes beyond imparting skills – it has been an avenue for raising awareness, for advocacy and influence, for impacting on CTP practice – and through it the community of practice has been built. The lack of a capacity-building strategy however, is a perceived weakness.

- CaLP is seen to have been a success in CTP leadership, in particular through its resources such as tools, research, learning events, and through the building of a CTP community of practice.

- CaLP’s website is highly valued and used by a wide range of stakeholders from headquarter to field level, but it needs improvements.

- CaLP’s operational research is seen to be the most valuable; however the quality of CaLP research has fluctuated somewhat.

\(^{53}\) 1,588 since 2010 as at 22 April 2014, according to CaLP.

\(^{54}\) For example a former capacity builder of CaLP who is now with WFP in the Middle East.
Recommendations

- CaLP’s website needs to be improved in terms of navigation and search capabilities, and be even more comprehensive and up to date. It should include access to a generic toolkit of standard operating procedures which agencies can adapt to their own needs.
- CaLP should focus on the research it does best, which is operational research, and should continuously strive to maintain consistent, high quality research and undertake more research on cross- or multi-sectoral evidence of CTP usage, with ‘novices’ or the uninitiated as a key audience or benchmark.
- CaLP needs to continue its training and develop a capacity-building strategy.
- CaLP needs to increase its advocacy focus and its influencing.
- Institutional change or a supportive institutional environment towards CTP is a key priority and should be a focus for CaLP and its member agencies, with adequate donor funding for this. Training, advocacy and research without institutional change is a poor investment. A set of training and awareness events should be pitched strategically to key influential individuals, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), business leaders etc.

3.5 EVALUATION OF CaLP GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL MODEL

3.5.1 CaLP’s governance model

CaLP’s launch was primarily driven by the passion of individual champions, supported to a greater or lesser degree by their agencies. It began in 2005 as a form of professional collaboration with no formal governance structure. The current governance model of CaLP is more like an alliance model,\(^55\) or a blend of alliance and lead member model. The different member agencies of CaLP receive funding from different donors and channel it to the overall work of CaLP, primarily to Oxfam GB as the host of the CaLP secretariat. The majority of CaLP positions are hosted by Oxfam GB, although some staff members are also housed in other member agencies’ offices. The five member agencies nominate one staff member to sit on CaLP’s Steering Committee. The role of the Steering Committee appears to combine both that of board and technical advisory group. It is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The implementation of the consortium model

A consortium approach was a valid model for the launch of CaLP and for the ambition of its first few years. Most stakeholders indicated that CaLP is a positive example of a neutral, cross-mandate initiative. As one stakeholder said, ‘as an inter-agency initiative it has succeeded in working outside the sectoral and methodological boundaries of any single organisation. This had helped strengthen the legitimacy of the partnership’. Many respondents said that CaLP is not viewed as being strongly identified with the five member agencies\(^56\) nor representing them, and this is generally seen as very positive. ‘in the field no one can identify CaLP with one or other organisation... it has never been thought as representing five NGOs working together on cash’. This is very significant and is symbolic of the power of a consortium created for the benefit of the whole humanitarian sector. As one respondent said about CaLP ‘...it moved from being neutral to being owned within the system’.

However, the challenge for CaLP has been in the operationalisation of the vision and commitment of a consortium model and the adaptation of the model to the changing context and changing role of CaLP. The governance model has increasingly distracted CaLP staff, member agencies and Steering Committee members from the core of their work supporting CaLP, taking up valuable time and energy. However, only a few stakeholders are aware of this. As one key stakeholder said, ‘from the outside it looks beautiful, but inside it’s chaos’; another said ‘the core issue is governance, not the technical stuff’. The growing challenges of CaLP’s governance model appear to have been a key factor in a number of obstacles for, and negative working experiences of, the CaLP team. These include: different staff packages and conditions, the management of staff by different agencies, funding and financial management issues – all linked to challenges around the governance model.


\(^56\) Although a few respondents felt that the research agenda was driven more by the interests of the five agencies.
3.5.2 Membership, the Steering Committee and the role and contribution of members

Member agencies have made varying contributions to CaLP. *CaLP has been driven by a few key individuals* (usually technical staff), namely those in the Steering Committee and the host agency, who, on top of their full-time workloads, have put in substantial effort. As one stakeholder said, ‘the role of champions cannot be overstated’. This effort has not been matched by the commitment of the organisations they represent, either in country or by the active promotion of CaLP by senior executives – ‘it’s hard to know who is on board, the people or the organisations’; and ‘organisational ownership doesn’t match the vision’.

CaLP being composed of five member agencies (since 2009) enabled a close working relationship between the agencies, created a solid foundation and provided very good technical oversight and leadership in CTP. However, *the fact that CaLP membership never progressed beyond the two additional members ACF and NRC, and the consequent absence of some key CTP implementing agencies from CaLP, has limited the possible reach and impact of CaLP somewhat*. There is perceived to be inadequate transparency on the inclusion and logic of certain members and the exclusion of others.\(^57\) There is great uncertainty about how agencies can get involved in CaLP and support its work if they cannot be members.

*Global commitment to collaboration and the vision and work of CaLP has not been mirrored at country level. This has hindered the work of CaLP at country and regional levels and had some negative impact on its image.* As one interviewee said, ‘if you’re in the five you should be a leading light’, and *CaLP member agencies have not been universally seen as the ‘leading lights’ of CTP and institutionalisation.*

*Overall the role of the CaLP Steering Committee in setting vision, developing strategy initially and supporting strategy development later, and being a champion for CaLP, has been relevant and helpful.* The contributions of the individual Steering Committee members have been instrumental in guiding the work of CaLP and in some cases actually ‘being’ CaLP. However, the current Steering Committee Terms of Reference (October 2013) includes no formal requirements for funding CaLP or fundraising for CaLP, nor does it include any formal requirements for progressing the goals of CaLP in committee members’ own organisations or being external champions.

Unlike in other comparable initiatives and consortia, CaLP’s Steering Committee members have rarely been senior managers (such as humanitarian/emergency or international directors). Membership of the Steering Committee has primarily comprised technical advisors/directors, mostly from the food security and livelihoods sectors; although from 2012 BRC and Save the Children did bring in managers as their representatives. While CaLP has sought to influence cross-sectorally, it has been more dominant in, and focused on, the food security and livelihoods sectors. The mainly technical nature of the Steering Committee has ensured a rigorous oversight on the technical aspects of CaLP’s work such as the research, training and tools, and contributed to its solid technical reputation. However it means that the Steering Committee has been too technical and has not been sufficiently strategic. The level of seniority of the Steering Committee members may also have limited the level of organisational buy-in from the member agencies.

\(^{57}\) It should be noted that this is the case with a number of consortia which are created by the interest of certain organisations and which invite like-minded agencies in, and do not necessarily have clear criteria.
Findings

• CaLP is viewed as a successful inter-agency initiative, and only a few external stakeholders are aware of its governance model or any challenges with it. CaLP’s governance model was appropriate for its first few years, but as CaLP has grown and its work has become more complex and diverse, the model has become a limiting factor and caused increasing management challenges.

• CaLP has benefited greatly from, and been driven by, the close collaboration between key technical staff in the five member agencies.

• CaLP membership consisting of only the current five agencies has limited its possible reach and impact, as has the level of seniority of representatives from the member agencies.

• The commitment of key individuals in agencies has not been mirrored by organisational commitment, and global commitment to collaboration by CaLP has not been mirrored at country level.

Recommendations

• CaLP should expand its membership in the future to invite more agencies with substantial or influential experience in implementing CTP, in order to be more representative and to have greater leverage and influence.

• The global consortia of CaLP should be replicated at country level to strengthen the partnership and the impact.

• The functions of the current CaLP Steering Committee need to be split into two parts: a high-level board and a technical advisory group. The board would provide strategic leadership, organisational buy-in and high-level commitment from the member agencies, and external influence. The technical advisory group would include cross-sectoral representation, support the substantive work of CaLP, and ensure that high standards and the link to field programmes are maintained.

3.5.3 Funding

‘Funding has been the Achilles heel for CaLP.’

‘Funding has detracted from leading, from fulfilling the real objectives.’

Under the current CaLP model, institutional donor funding comes through three CaLP member agencies only and they bear the risk of the contracts. Accessing funding and the management of funding have been a struggle, a source of tension and a pre-occupation for CaLP; and especially from 2012–2014 getting sufficient funding for CaLP has been a major struggle. In this regard, the current consortium model has let CaLP down on the accessing and management of funding. While the increase in CaLP member agencies brought in new donors and funding, which is positive, it has also brought a much greater management load for the members and the CaLP staff.58 As one key stakeholder said, ‘the way CaLP has been financed has not contributed to success, it has been a major detriment…it has been an extraordinary process and cost. It took so much capacity and infrastructure away from learning and innovation. It took 50% of CaLP energy.’

There has at various times been a push (primarily from the CaLP team) to require funding targets of CaLP member agencies. This has always been rejected by the Steering Committee. The members have neither been willing, nor able, to put in unrestricted funds to support CaLP (apart from BRC).

The mixed support of donors (this includes INGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors) has had a significant impact on CaLP’s ability to have its intended impact. ECHO has been a great supporter and took a risk investing in CaLP when it was not yet a formalised initiative, and continued its commitment. Other donors have indicated

58 Other consortia and alliances have also experienced funding challenges, such as Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPs), Sphere and the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA). CBHA had to get members to agree to put in funds to keep it going when its only/major donor, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) pulled out. It could do this because it had the heads of agencies on its board. Sphere’s programme has had to shrink and expand based on funding; only the Project Manager is always funded with member contributions.
their support and seem to value CaLP. USAID/OFDA provided relatively modest grants over the past two years and has indicated interest in continuing to fund CaLP. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA – now the Department for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development [DFATD]) and VISA have also provided modest grants to date, but again with further possibilities for 2014 and beyond. DFID’s funding has been specific to a particular piece of research which DFID wanted conducted. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation has provided some core funding to CaLP since September 2013, stretching through to the end of 2014. It seems that Scandinavian donors have been interested in supporting, but the framework agreements with NRC have complicated this, and no funding has yet been secured. However, overall the level of funding support of many donors has been disappointing, despite the very positive view of CaLP and recognition of its key added value. This is also surprising given the fact that funding to consortia such as CaLP is currently a priority for many key humanitarian donors.

Other somewhat comparable initiatives have been much more successful at getting longer-term core funding, such as the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). Ideally donors should have been funding a core programme of work rather than specific, small projects with different objectives. The lack of senior-level representation from the member agencies to influence donors was a limiting factor. Different members seeking different funding from different donors is also a scattered approach to funding and is not strategic. Much of the funding has been too short-term (three-year cycles are ideal), but this is not something CaLP has control over.

The lack of forward planning in funding, and subsequent gaps in funding have also had a major impact on staff. At one key point it led to all but one CaLP staff members losing their jobs. There was considerable loss in momentum, institutional knowledge and enthusiasm, and resulted in a dismantled team – ‘people worked so hard and then called it a day.’ CaLP’s success has been driven, in part, by the many hard-working and dedicated staff of CaLP over its life. The recruitment, management, investment in, support and retention of staff has however been a significant challenge for CaLP. The general sense is that none of the CaLP member agencies have taken a holistic view of CaLP as an organisation, and one which revolves around people, and instead tend to see it in terms of its vision and strategic outputs.

**Findings**
- A strategic approach to funding was absent for much of CaLP’s life to date, and accessing funding and the management of funding have both been a struggle and a preoccupation for CaLP, especially since 2010.
- Donor in-principle support for CaLP has not been matched by adequate, long-term, core funding for CaLP. Also the nature of some of the funding CaLP has received has been too project-based.

**Recommendations**
- Key donors should demonstrate their support for CaLP, their recognition of its vital and unparalleled role in advancing CTP, and the pivotal role that CTP will play in the future of humanitarian aid, by providing large-scale (ideally a minimum of USD 750,000 per year per donor), multi-year grants (three year minimum) to CaLP for a core programme of work, by CaLP and its member agencies.
- CaLP should have a new funding model whereby funding is longer-term and goes to a core programme of work, rather than to many projects through different contracts and different members with different project outputs.
4.0 THE FUTURE OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

To overcome the barriers of CTP implementation, institutionalisation and scale-up described in section 2.3, a number of areas for future focus and investment can be summarised as follows:

- shifting organisational and key stakeholder mindsets;
- improving leadership and coordination;
- institutionalising CTP in humanitarian organisations;
- investment at country level with host governments and support to NGOs and community-based organisations (Cos);
- funding frameworks and programming support.

These suggestions are relevant for a range of actors, and specific recommendations for CaLP are noted in section 5. A brief summary of these is provided below, and outlined in more detail in Annex 7.

To shift organisational and key stakeholder mindsets, global discussions need to move ‘up’ from the technocratic community. There needs to be a drive for high-level global and regional advocacy targeting executive and senior decision makers. This includes heads of state, foreign ministers, other government ministers, international financial institutions and regional bodies in both host countries and in donor and humanitarian headquarters, along with private sector and technology providers. CTP needs senior-level champions and spokespeople who can influence the public and key decision makers. It also needs better messaging and more advocacy products.

Improving coordination and leadership on CTP will contribute to better quality CTP programming. There needs to be an agreed place for CTP within the global humanitarian architecture supported through the IASC and the global clusters. This would assist in steering global CTP issues, creating global standards and greater predictability in support, financing/funding CTP in emergencies, and possibly the creation of a rapid response mechanism for cash coordination or roster of experts. The vision of mainstreaming CTP through all the clusters is still valid. This needs to be supported by IASC agencies through the nomination of a lead agency/agencies. CTP must be addressed in preparedness work, contingency planning and common assessments for all humanitarian agencies. Supportive donors could play a more convincing role and steer agencies towards collaboration, coordination and global tracking of CTP.

Significant change in CTP (quality, scale and attitude) will not happen without major shifts in humanitarian organisations – institutionalisation, including strategy and systems reform in all areas (finance, logistics, programme etc.) of agencies engaged in humanitarian work. Organisations need a CTP vision and a strategy or means to achieve the vision, plus the will and commitment to change. A structured institutionalisation initiative to support reform would be beneficial. The drive for institutional reform to support CTP must come from within organisations, but CaLP’s advocacy work and that of its members and allies could assist this, along with CaLP’s specific support for institutionalisation. It is strongly recommended that a generic SOP for CTP, with training/briefing materials and a simple toolkit for starting CTP in an organisation, is developed. This would enable humanitarian agencies whose primary focus is to support local partners.

Continuing to build CTP capacity, knowledge and skills will be instrumental in tackling many of the barriers to implementing CTP. There is a continued need for more research and documentation, as well as events focused on CTP.

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59 Such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Pan American Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Economic Community Of West African States and the Southern African Development Community.
60 Such simple case studies and stories of impact in the form of: one-pagers; video tools for key decision makers; digestible communications products accessible to high-level people; high-level events with the right people; and clips for training and social media.
61 Some would not agree, saying that cash is a modality, it does not need a strategy, but this is short-sighted as CTP requires systemic changes and cross-sectoral engagement, which is best helped by having an agency strategy or plan around CTP institutionalisation.
62 Such as Diakonia, Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid, Finish Refugee Council, etc.
on learning and sharing. Topics suggested through the review, which complement those outlined in the recent CaLP commissioned study on research gaps, include:

- monetisation;
- misuse and losses of in-kind versus cash;
- multi-sectoral use of CTP in a holistic programme;
- multiple examples of CTP use in WASH, shelter, health, nutrition, education;
- success stories;
- examples of collaborative approaches with government and national investment in governments;
- examples of CTP in urban settings, insecure environments and refugee contexts;
- examples of good market analysis and its impact on programming in all sectors;
- case studies showing how CTP and in-kind aid can work side by side;
- cost benefit analysis of cash interventions;
- examples of how CTP has achieved the whole outcome of an objective in a humanitarian operation;
- shared learning on how to use technology as a way to move cash to beneficiaries;
- shared experience of using innovations in banking, mobile phone and financial services.

Investment and collaboration at country level and in regions with limited experience of CTP in emergencies is vital, to support the goal of making CTP at scale more possible, more efficient and with less risk, especially with governments and NGOs.

There is a stated need for more tools, guidelines and standards including: better practice examples which are related to shelter, WASH, health and so on; cash templates; operational minimum standards; SOPs; and indicators by sector. A few key agencies/consortia should collaborate (OCHA, CaLP and ACAPS specifically, but also others such as donors, the IFRC and major NGOs) on ensuring that CTP indicators start to be included routinely in common assessment tools and that measurable indicators for CTP and market-based assessment are included in monitoring plans, real-time evaluation guidelines, and monitoring and evaluation frameworks. An active roster of expertise in CTP implementation such as a CashCAP with global funding and recognition was suggested.

Donors can support CTP development programmatically through more and larger-scale funding of CTP along with quicker and simpler funding mechanisms; non-sector specific logframes; and reporting requirements which are not more stringent for CTP. Encouragement and incentivisation by donors for better UN/NGO collaboration, larger joint CTP proposals, and quality programmes which meet beneficiary preferences would be a positive step.

The humanitarian community needs diversification of donor funding for CTP. Advocacy between donors on CTP was found to be a gap and a much-needed step forward. Donors which have indicated support for CTP, such as ECHO, USAID/OFDA, the Canadian DFATD and the Swiss government, need to be encouraged to play a critical role within the donor community to campaign for more and longer-term funding for CTP from other donors and the Banks. There is also a need for increased donor coordination around CTP in the interest of good humanitarian donorship.

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63 Such as those which promote intra- and inter-organisational learning and country-level and regional learning events (not in Europe) especially in regions where CTP is not yet widespread.
64 Austin, L. (2014a) (above footnote 32).
65 The creation of a cash marker (such as the IASC gender marker) was suggested, along with a marker on beneficiary preference.
66 Such as the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCAP) and the Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCAP).
Finding

- There are a number of areas needing further investment and action from a range of CTP stakeholders. These relate to: shifting organisational and key stakeholder mindsets; improving leadership and coordination; institutionalising CTP in humanitarian organisations; investment at country level with host governments and support to NGOs and CBOs; and funding frameworks and programming support.

Recommendations

- CTP institutionalisation should be a priority across the humanitarian sector, with support to NGOs and governments prioritised. Donors should provide substantial investment for this. CaLP with its member agencies would be best placed to manage and support a broad programme of institutionalisation with donor support.

- There needs to be high-level agreement, through the IASC and the global clusters, on a place for and leadership of CTP within the global humanitarian architecture. A reformed CaLP, working as a neutral inter-agency initiative with broader membership, could be the nominated lead for CTP coordination and mainstreaming.

- A roster to support CTP in the field should be developed. This could be a CashCAP, managed in a similar way to the Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCAP) and the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCAP), or it could be managed through existing rosters such as those of DFID, OCHA, or RedR Australia.

- Additional programme quality and accountability elements need to be developed, such as: a cash marker; new logframe formats which remove sectoral barriers; a measure of beneficiary preference/satisfaction as an evaluation criteria; justification of programme choice as being most appropriate as a project selection and evaluation criteria; and market assessment as an evaluation criteria.

- Donors, UN agencies and INGOs should proactively look to establishing and funding consortia for CTP in large emergencies to provide a simpler, coordinated means to fund large-scale CTP responses.

- In the interest of good humanitarian donorship, there should be increased donor dialogue, coordination and leadership on CTP. The larger donors should actively engage and possibly partner with smaller and emerging donors and governments, sharing experience and policy, and having discussions about CTP and its merits and drawbacks, types of systems, and the funding and support it requires.
5.0 FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CaLP

This section will focus on a specific set of recommendations for CaLP, drawing from the broad range of ideas for the future of CTP in section 4.0, and also with a focus on a future model for CaLP.

5.1 LIFE OF CaLP

’If CaLP didn’t exist, it would have to be created.’

It is a key finding of the review that CaLP should continue and have an open-ended role. The vast majority of those surveyed and interviewed recommended this across a broad cross-section of all stakeholders. Most respondents were surprised that CaLP was considering phasing out in 2015, with one respondent describing it as ‘ludicrous’. This is not the appropriate time to end this initiative – it is the time to ‘step it up’. CaLP is bigger, and its impact resonates much further than its current five members.

The future role, and possibly also the governance structure, of CaLP would ideally be determined jointly by the members and some key stakeholders. This could be done as a collaborative exercise with a small reference group of key stakeholders including donors, UN agencies and NGOs. Using an experienced facilitator and organisational change manager would optimise this process and ensure that those involved were well-briefed about CaLP and familiar with this report. This would ensure accountability to the agreed governance structure, as effective governance structures and the perception of rigour and accountability are important. As one stakeholder said, ‘these days it’s all about the governance…people have to believe in the process’. Once there is agreement on CaLP’s future role, a new governance model should be determined (options are discussed later).

Finding

- There is almost universal support for CaLP to continue and to grow in its scope of action, its reach and influence, and ultimately its impact.

Recommendation

- CaLP should continue with an open-ended role. It is needed and it has a substantial future role in enhancing CTP, along with others.

5.2 THE ROLE OF CaLP

CaLP should remain a catalyst for change in attitude and practice around CTP. It should focus on promoting good/better practice in programming of CTP as part of appropriate humanitarian programme intervention. CaLP should continue to provide guidance and encourage quality CTP programming across all key humanitarian programme sectors where appropriate. It should encourage understanding of CTP as a holistic and multi-sectoral modality, and promote the principle of beneficiary preference where appropriate. CaLP must keep a careful balance between evidence, capacity building and advocacy. It is the marriage of these three elements which gives CaLP its value, leverage and impact in the humanitarian community.

The general view is that CaLP should be more appropriately ambitious and ‘have pride in what it has done well and keep doing it on a larger scale’. Building CaLP’s scale and maturity includes a focus on increasing its influence and impact through multiple, but focused, methods. Respondents to the online survey have overwhelmingly validated CaLP’s resources as invaluable for CTP to date and would use CaLP’s resources in the future (see Figure 6). As one respondent said, ‘If CaLP scales up, CTP will benefit’. Stakeholders provided clear guidance in the areas they would look to CaLP for support in the future.
Figure 6: Future use of CaLP resources (source: online survey)

Q36 Our organisation plans to use the following CaLP resources in the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Research articles</td>
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<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Reviews/evaluations</td>
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<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Advocacy documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Mailing list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CaLP must be, and must be seen to be, a neutral, inter-agency, inter-cluster/inter-sectoral initiative, with the UN, NGOs and donors as its members, leaders and constituents. Without this broad constituency and network of allies, CaLP will not have leverage in the wider humanitarian community and decision-making apparatus. ‘People [are] looking for something which straddles agencies. CaLP is it’.

**Recommendation**

- CaLP needs to be more ambitious in terms of advocacy and influence in order to remain a catalyst for change in attitude and practice around CTP. For CaLP to have impact it must be, and be seen to be, a neutral, inter-agency, inter-cluster and inter-sectoral initiative.

5.3 THE STRATEGIC FOCUS OF CaLP

*To fulfil its role, CaLP needs a new longer-term vision, and strategy of at least another five years.* The strategy will need good socialisation, agreement and buy-in from key stakeholders to ensure that CaLP’s role is clearly understood and supported. The broad areas of focus for CaLP for maximum impact should be:

- outreach and influencing;
- capacity building;
- evidence building, sharing and promotion;
- facilitating and promoting effective collaboration.

As an outcome of this review it is suggested that these areas can be acted on through the means outlined below.

5.3.1 Strategic and mainstreamed advocacy

It is critical that all CaLP members, staff and stakeholders support a common vision around advocacy and invest in the means to achieve this. The current advocacy strategy needs to be reviewed in light of whatever agreed new role CaLP will have. CaLP, with key allies, will need to go through a renewed analysis of allies, key points of leverage, who to influence, how to influence and how to measure that influence. CaLP needs to significantly upgrade its status in the humanitarian community, its profile and its champions in order to reach the kind of traction, leverage and change it is trying to achieve. To have a voice within the global humanitarian coordination architecture, CaLP can:

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67 Models such as the Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix could be considered as it looks at who to influence and how. It is documented in Mendizabal, E. (2008) The Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix (AIIM), Guidance Note, Overseas Development Institute.
• make use of openings and opportunities for advocacy with key UN agencies through well-informed and supportive individuals;
• work through member agencies that co-chair clusters: IFRC for Shelter, Save the Children for Education and Oxfam’s link with the WASH cluster;
• actively engage with the cluster coordination through the IASC and global leads in Geneva;
• engage through the current IASC working group’s focus on preparedness and other relevant cross-cutting initiatives such as Accountability to Affected Populations, OCHA’s work on the programme cycle, and ACAPS;
• actively\(^\text{66}\) seek out opportunities in ongoing, in-country, large-scale emergency response coordination — formal or informal;\(^\text{69}\)
• CaLP, along with its member agencies, engage Humanitarian Country Teams.

5.3.2 Continuation of training

Through its trainings CaLP can influence change, impact programme quality and support CTP institutionalisation. The first two priorities are: to continue ongoing level 1 and 2 training (maximising the use of member staff and previous trainees as the trainers); and to undertake a number of trainings of trainers (with a certification/accreditation element). CaLP could perhaps build capacity in relevant member agencies at regional or country level who can then take this training on. The cost recovery model is the correct model, but the fee structure needs to be examined more carefully to ensure financial sustainability, and perhaps be country-specific to reflect local market costs.

The second tier of priorities is to develop and facilitate more targeted CTP training or workshops for specific sectors, non-programme staff, senior managers and leaders of humanitarian organisations, as well as for humanitarian coordinators/cluster coordinators. There needs to be a focus on delivering (or supporting CBOs or other training organisations to deliver) specialised trainings such as market analysis and CTP coordination, targeting those organisations which are already institutionalising CTP and which have key staff that have completed level 1 and 2 training. Full cost recovery trainings, where they are commissioned by specific organisations, should be continued.

Other areas to consider:

• The e-learning developed by CaLP with IFRC is a good initiative and needs to be further promoted, and its impact and usage reviewed.
• There could be more country-level workshops to share good practice and learning. These can be run by CaLP, or initiated and supported by CaLP or CaLP member agencies and CWGs.
• CaLP could provide a more specific service of designing and developing training or modules of training for humanitarian agencies on a fee basis (directly or acting as an informal broker).
• CaLP should now actively pursue more strategic partnerships with training service providers who could provide some of the CaLP training.\(^\text{71}\) CaLP needs to continue to own its role in the curriculum development to ensure quality control due to the added value it brings through its link to theory and practice, the field experience of its trainers, and the relationship it has to the global cash community. However, CaLP should adopt an open source approach to its materials to maximise the spread and use, and gain through the multiplier effect.

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\(^\text{66}\) If no member agency is taking the lead this can be initiated by CaLP regional staff and eventually be handed over to CaLP members/national governments where appropriate.

\(^\text{69}\) For example, the current Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response in the Philippines and the response in Syria. This comes from both the review findings and the current advocacy strategy.

\(^\text{70}\) A more formalised example is the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group, established as a partnership between 14 NGOs in Somalia and coordinated by UNICEF. CaLP could provide such a role or a bridge between more informal structures and the more formal humanitarian architecture where no other actor is willing or able to take the lead, especially given that CaLP is perceived as neutral. Longley, C., Dunn, S. and Bruin, M. (2012) Final Evaluation Report of the Somalia Cash and Voucher Transfer Programme: Phase 1 September 2011–March 2012, HPG.

\(^\text{71}\) For example, the ACF Regional Training centre in Nairobi has been successfully working together with CaLP on training.
5.3.3 Support for cash transfer programming institutionalisation and programme quality

CaLP’s advocacy work and the influencing by its members and allies should assist in progressing institutionalisation. A first step that CaLP and its members could assist with is agreeing to share key internal documentation related to institutionalisation. This could include SOPs, toolkits, assessment formats, market analysis tools, examples of multi-sectoral implementation of CTP etc. Members could also share electronically or through seminars, webinars etc., their experiences in institutionalisation.\textsuperscript{72} CaLP members, as a proactive collaborative gesture, could offer to support or mentor agencies, or suggest names of suitable consultants to assist organisations.\textsuperscript{73}

The current Cash Info Package is unwieldy with too many resources and documents included\textsuperscript{74}. It is strongly recommended that a second priority be for CaLP to develop a more user-friendly and simple starter toolkit for CTP institutionalisation for agencies new to CTP or wanting to launch a more formal programme of institutionalisation. This would be something like an ‘institutionalisation-in-a-box’ product, possibly including a basic SOP that agencies could adapt; an institutional strategy or framework; an outline of change processes needed; a capacity-building plan; and basic training/briefing materials. This would support the many humanitarian agencies whose primary focus is to support local partners rather than directly implement CTP.\textsuperscript{75}

CaLP could also step this up into a third phase through the development of a formal and funded programme that supports institutionalisation amongst its members, the broader humanitarian community and governments. This would need multi-year funding at a more significant scale, and would include partial implementation at field level by CaLP member agencies. This will require more active forms of outreach through facilitating a mentorship model and brokering links with agencies starting the process of CTP institutionalisation. CaLP could second CaLP staff or CaLP member agency staff within strategic agencies or institutions to influence and support institutionalisation. It could also partially fund positions within agencies to undertake institutionalisation, and run a programme of support, capacity building and systems reforms with certain agencies that seek assistance.

The gap between the humanitarian and development worlds is an ongoing issue. CaLP could explore a longer-term view and start to develop tools for CTP in early recovery and resilience. CaLP could also be involved in developing a cash marker, supporting the process of greater inclusion of CTP in integrated and multi-sectoral assessments (with OCHA and ACAPS) and in monitoring and evaluation tools and frameworks, such as those for real-time evaluation.

5.3.4 Documenting learning

As a first priority it is recommended that CaLP limit the scope of its research work to operational learning and evidence building of CTP in practice. While a strong evidence base is important in changing minds, it must be used in conjunction with many other advocacy tools. Some specific recommendations for CaLP to make its research more useful and effective include the following:

- The language of the research needs to be accessible to different audiences, including non-technical audiences and non-programme staff of humanitarian agencies.
- CaLP could promote and disseminate research that is geared toward non-Western agencies and is in languages other than English.
- Executive summaries need to be clear and comprehensible.
- One-to-two page strategic advocacy documents should be produced.
- Research should be directly linked to learning events at country and regional levels.

\textsuperscript{72} Save the Children, IFRC, ACF and Oxfam GB would be ideal initial candidates for this because of the process they went through to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
\textsuperscript{73} For example, links with alliances such as Action by Churches Together Alliance (ACT Alliance), InterAction, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Australian Council for International Development, etc. and holistic ways to support its members.
\textsuperscript{74} It is not so useful for organisations starting in CTP, especially NGOs/CBOs.
\textsuperscript{75} Such as Diakonia, Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid and the Finnish Refugee Council.
Clear guidance to CaLP regarding research is provided in the paper completed in February 2013 by Lois Austin, *Research Gaps in Cash Transfer Programming*. Specific recommendations of note are: that CaLP should develop a research strategy; that CaLP should undertake a ‘cataloguing process to collate the CTP action and evidence-based research currently available’, as well as a ‘synthesis of guidelines, prescriptive tools and lessons on CTP’. These are strongly supported by this review. CaLP should focus on specific pieces, encouraging member agencies or others to do other pieces. Additional suggestions for research are made in section 4.

A second priority, in collaboration with OCHA (and perhaps a research organisation), would be to determine a better way of measuring CTP spend and establishing a globally agreed definition of what is included in CTP amongst humanitarian (and development) agencies. Linked to this, or following from it, a baseline on CTP is needed, perhaps using 2013 as a starting point, along with a more comprehensive analysis of CTP spend from 2008 to 2013. This will need to be undertaken with the support and close collaboration of a significant range of donors and humanitarian agencies.

CaLP should continue to encourage members and stakeholders to document and share their learning, including CTP evaluations. Documenting and sharing the process of institutionalisation, capacity building and reform of CTP programme quality, would also be very useful. Through technical working groups CaLP could guide pieces of research which other agencies undertake.

5.3.5 Coordination or facilitating collaboration

There remain critical and noticeable gaps in CTP coordination, especially at country level, and there is an appetite and a need for better CTP coordination. This is the first priority for CaLP, as it is best placed to either offer this role directly or indirectly through its members, at country and regional levels. CaLP and its members need to take a flexible and creative approach to instigating collaboration by seconding their own staff, supporting a government agency in this role, adding this as a responsibility to a position or seeking in-country funding for CWG positions. CaLP can continue to actively seek out opportunities in ongoing, in-country, large-scale emergency response coordination – formal or informal. The regional focal points could also support ‘home-grown’ CWG initiatives. CaLP branding of any coordination positions is not necessary per se, but the linkages to CaLP should be clear. Close collaboration with the Humanitarian Country Team (especially OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator) is vital to ensure legitimacy and support.

CaLP and its supporters need to push for an agreed and recognised place for CTP in global humanitarian coordination. There are a number of ways in which this could happen, but CaLP should at least spearhead this discussion through the IASC, and with some of its key supporters and stakeholders. If there is to be a global lead for this CTP coordination role to ensure progress, CaLP may be the obvious body for this role. This could be in an ongoing predictable leadership role such as that of global cluster leads, or just for emergencies. Capacity and knowledge building about CTP for leaders (including humanitarian coordinators, cluster leads, heads of agencies and heads of INGOs) should be instigated by CaLP. CaLP should collaborate with OCHA, especially at regional and country levels, on IASC contingency planning. CaLP could support preparedness work with products, support, resources and evidence, and by promoting and disseminating research.

There is a clear need and desire for surge capacity to be available from or facilitated by CaLP to establish CWGs, in particular at the beginning of a rapid-onset emergency, or when there is a shift in an ongoing context or protracted situation. It is recommended that CaLP, as a secondary priority, only offer this service as a start-up, undertaken by itself or its members. CaLP would need to have a clear position on the parameters for this and for

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76 Gaps in coordination were identified in previous research commissioned by CaLP, but it appears that these were not followed up on and little has changed. Kaufman, D. and Collins, O. (2012) Comparative Study of Emergency Cash Coordination Mechanisms, CaLP.
77 An example of this exists in Afghanistan, where NRC hosts the Cash Working Group (CWG) coordinator, but this has remained informal and this person is not well-supported in their post by CaLP and its broader membership.
78 If no member agency is taking the lead this can be initiated by CaLP regional staff and eventually be handed over to CaLP members/national government where appropriate.
79 For example, current Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda response in the Philippines, and Syria. This comes both from review findings and current advocacy strategy.
80 A more formalised example is the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group, established as a partnership between 14 NGOs in Somalia and coordinated by UNICEF. CaLP could provide such a role or a bridge between more informal structures and the more formal humanitarian architecture where no other actor is willing or able to take the lead, especially given that CaLP is perceived as neutral. Longley, C., Dunn, S. and Bruin, M. (2012) Final Evaluation Report of the Somalia Cash and Voucher Transfer Programme: Phase 1 September 2011–March 2012, HPG.
81 This is already happening in some countries whereby the CaLP Regional Focal Points have supported country-based CWGs but engagement from CaLP members in-country has been absent.
Organisations consulted for this review include: Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), the CORE group, Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Sphere Project, Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB), Start Network (formerly known as the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies – CBHA), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), Vega Mala Consulting, and Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International. Others briefly examined include: Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG); Global Emergency Group (GEG), Food Economy Group (FEG), Sanitation and Water for All (SWA), the Protection Standby Capacity Project (PROCAP), Joint Standards Initiative (JSI), and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET).

It is strongly recommended that CaLP remain a consortium model rather than a private company or independent NGO. The consortium model can ‘bring together organisations and individuals who remain geographically separated and institutionally distinct’ and can ‘help diverse actors work together to reach their goals in a cooperative manner’. A consortium can be defined by the extent to which all the members have managerial and strategic input and how far there is joint decision making about the programme, as opposed to

CaLP also needs to continue to build closer strategic and useful alliances and partnerships with key organisations that will assist in furthering its goals. These could include the World Bank, Better Than Cash Alliance, the IASC, global and country cluster leads, ACAPS and JIPS. OCHA is a key partner for CaLP to engage with around coordination, Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator capacity building and the IASC Multi-Cluster/ Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA). CaLP should be closely connected to key initiatives around quality, standards and accountability such as the JSI and other (joint) quality and accountability initiatives such as Sphere and HAP.

**Recommendation**

- CaLP’s future focus should be on the following: outreach and influencing; capacity building; evidence building, sharing and promotion; and facilitating and promoting effective collaboration. This will be done through: strategic and mainstreamed advocacy; training; support for CTP institutionalisation; documenting and sharing learning; coordinating or facilitating collaboration; and building key alliances and partnerships.

5.4 **RECOMMENDED FEATURES OF A FUTURE CaLP MODEL**

As outlined above, CaLP has outgrown the current consortium governance model. In order for CaLP to respond to the call to step up, the model and ways of working will need to change to enable it to succeed with its new operational reality and future role. This review included an examination of possible governance models for CaLP. Three broad models were explored, namely private company, independent NGO and the consortium model. As requested by the Steering Committee only the last two of these were examined in detail and the findings provided to CaLP separately. A full description of the models and the benefits and drawbacks of each is discussed in Annex 8, and diagrams of the models are in Annex 9. In light of the successes and challenges of CaLP’s governance to date, and in light of the possible governance models examined for this review, the sections below outline the review team's recommendations on the model and the key features which need to be present in the future model of CaLP.

5.4.1 **Governance and membership**

*It is strongly recommended that CaLP remain a consortium model* rather than a private company or independent NGO. The consortium model can ‘bring together organisations and individuals who remain geographically separated and institutionally distinct’ and can ‘help diverse actors work together to reach their goals in a cooperative manner’. A consortium can be defined by the extent to which all the members have managerial and strategic input and how far there is joint decision making about the programme, as opposed to

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82 The parameters could be, for example, that the role would be for a maximum of four to six weeks to set up the mechanism; that it would be resourced by agencies/donors/government; that it would then be filled locally by CaLP members and stakeholders; and that it would be supported by country and/or regional cash focal points. CaLP could also organise and manage surge support from within its staff, members and the extended community to start up CTP coordination in countries that desire it, or to support technical working groups. Ultimately, coordination should be handed over to local coordination mechanisms as soon as possible.

83 Other options were considered during the review process: CaLP merging with another consortia; CaLP phasing out parts of its work to have them taken up by others; or CaLP ceasing to exist. These were not pursued because they either did not match the review findings or were beyond the scope of the review. The possibility of a merger with another consortia could still be explored by CaLP using many of the recommendations and some of the learning from this review.

84 There are many names for this kind of model, including network and partnership. Examples include HAP and the Start Network. Some of these groups have to wrangle with what they really are and what their purpose is (see also the Start Network’s questions on this in their report by Partnership Broker’s Association [2013], Dealing with Paradox – Stories and Lessons from the First Three Years of Consortium Building, Start Network).

just joint implementation. This would best suit CaLP’s role in the humanitarian sector as a convener, facilitator, and advocate through collective action. The consortium model is appreciated by stakeholders who see it as an inter-agency initiative, representing a broad cross-section of the humanitarian community. It allows CaLP to have the strong technical link to operational agencies implementing programmes; this link is essential for relevance and validity. Donors also highly value collaborative action in the humanitarian community.

There are two primary models – the lead agency consortium model and the alliance consortium model. **The lead agency consortium model is recommended by the review team.** It provides the simplest hosting and funding arrangements and minimises transaction costs without losing flexibility in implementation. It avoids the considerable costs and time involved in trying to establish a new NGO. The lead agency model should be a true lead agency model, where the host holds all contracts with donors and staff, and one organizational system of human resources, finance and reporting is followed. Membership and governance procedures will need to be carefully developed in order to keep these manageable, functioning and beneficial to the focus of CaLP.

**CaLP should be a broad and inclusive membership-based organisation.** This will give CaLP greater legitimacy, demonstrating that it represents a significantly broader base than the current five INGOs. Its membership should include key UN humanitarian agencies, international and local NGOs, donors and private sector representatives. However each of these may undertake a range of different roles, from technical and advisory to strategic. CaLP needs to be seen as a true inter-agency, inter-cluster, inter-sectoral initiative, with buy-in at senior management level in member agencies and the UN. This may ensure that CaLP has a place in the inter-agency coordination fora to have the influence and impact it needs. Broad membership and donor engagement may also assist in gaining larger long-term funding. With broad membership it will be easier for CaLP to identify leads at country level for CTP working groups, and to hold member agencies accountable for leadership and coordination at country level. It will be important to determine the optimum number of members, tiers of membership, and how broad membership impacts collaboration. With tiers of membership it is easier to manage a larger number of members and be clear about their contribution, role and the level of control they have over the consortia.

As Updegrove (2006) outlines, there can be four tiers of membership: strategic member (full); technical committee member (full or associate); advisory member (associate); and informational member (observer). **It is recommended that CaLP consider only two tiers of membership: strategic (full); and advisory (associate).** CaLP could also consider a third category of informational (observer). Member agencies (or individuals) would need to be those with a significant engagement in or interest in CTP. CaLP would need to vet members and may determine if they wish to set a limit on the total number of members for manageability. If CaLP sets limits, there is a risk of exclusivity, but the structure may be easier to manage. CaLP should establish clear criteria for joining, along with expectations and responsibilities for members at each tier, such as a member commitment/code.

**The level of representation by members on the board is important; CaLP needs senior board members.** Many consortia similar to CaLP have fairly high-level representation to ensure they have a voice in the organisations and are getting the buy-in of senior people who can influence and allocate resources. **Membership would attract a fee on a sliding scale** based either on their tier, or on the kind of organisation they are (INGO/LNGO/donor etc.) and their annual turnover. The membership income will give CaLP some stable core funding, and the ability to raise funding from members is generally viewed as a positive by donors who classify it as matching funding.

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88 JIPS has a number of UN agencies and NGO amongst its members. It has found this to be very beneficial in terms of its influence and getting traction with senior people in the UN (it has even managed to get two UN resolutions related to its work, and has now been joined by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons). JIPS has also found this beneficial in terms of playing both the NGO role and UN role in various contexts, as this works best. It has generally not found it to be limiting. ACAPs has UN, NGO and donor representatives on its board and has found this to be beneficial in terms of getting multi-stakeholder buy-in.
89 It is possible to have more members that all have equal say in governance, but this becomes very difficult to manage as the Start Network has discovered (see Partnership Broker’s Association (2013) (above footnote 85)).
90 ALNAP has 73 full members and more than 6,000 subscribers. The Core Group has 55 members.
91 ALNAP has 73 full members and more than 6,000 subscribers. The Core Group has 55 members.
92 The Core Group has criteria for the different types of members on its website and members must also sign a commitment code. The Start Network is planning to introduce criteria and a more rigorous approval process in the future. The Sphere Project has an application process for organisations wishing to apply to be members of its board.
93 This includes ACAPs, JIPS and the Start Network. Stakeholders indicated that the level of representation of members on the board is particularly significant in terms of the UN hierarchy.
The choice of a hosting member for CaLP would be best determined by a clear set of criteria including: ability to operate in the chosen location for the consortium (discussed later); capacity and interest to support CaLP including: providing back-up investment; global reach; presence in all regions of the world and key regional hubs; ability to support field staff with office space, security and administrative support; the ability to receive funding from all major institutional donors; and willingness to sign-off on operating procedures and staffing packages which may differ from those of the host. Leadership in CTP (volume, programme proportion or global usage) would not necessarily have to be a criterion, as the role of the host agency should largely be invisible externally.

Role of and accountability by members is important. A terms of reference for board members and advisory group members, or commitment code is essential. CaLP members must show leadership and commitment, and promote the work of CaLP and CTP at country and regional level. There should also be some expectations/obligations of funding/fundraising to members at the higher tiers with some replication of the global consortium at regional/country level as well as a commitment to progressing the work of CaLP internally and externally. Examples could include: leading CWGs at country level; funding CTP advisory or coordination roles in country programmes; and CEOs of member agencies taking an active global leadership role in relation to CTP advocacy.

The functions of the current CaLP Steering Committee needs to be split into two parts, a board and a technical advisory group.

CaLP needs a high-level board to guide its strategic vision and provide the level of gravitas needed to influence the key stakeholders. This board could include some of the current member agencies, UN agencies, possibly the World Bank and a donor, plus perhaps one or two prominent and influential people in the humanitarian sector, including possibly the private sector. At optimum the board should have no more than eight to ten members. The representatives will need to be senior in their organisations and leaders in the humanitarian sector in order to have the gravitas, influence, decision-making power, and the strategic experience required to guide CaLP as a consortium and through the complexities of the humanitarian system. The role of this board is to create and define the mission of CaLP (in collaboration with member agencies); to approve and provide oversight on its systems and procedures; to approve its programme strategy and staffing structure and strategy; to approve its funding strategy and support CaLP to meet its funding goals through promotion and representation; public promotion of CaLP; and management of the CaLP Director. This group will also provide the needed buy-in and legitimacy from a wider range of stakeholders.

CaLP would benefit greatly from a technical advisory group with technical or programme representatives of the member agencies, as well as academics or relevant experts. The group could be overseen or jointly chaired by the CaLP technical lead. This group should remain small but cover all key humanitarian programme sectors – shelter, health, public health, protection, food, nutrition and livelihoods. It would support the CaLP team to ensure the work of CaLP remains relevant, technically sound, well-grounded in the field reality, and would share organisational priorities and experiences of member agencies and across sectors. Their role could include: identifying gaps and priorities in research and reviewing the quality of research; initiating and overseeing the production of materials and tools; providing sectoral and programme links; and providing quality overview and input into training and advocacy materials. There could be separate smaller technical workings on key strategic topics, established to enable broader member and field participation and cross-sectoral collaboration (monitoring and evaluation, CTP in public health and e-transfers).
Recommendations

- A clear process for inviting new members and clear criteria for becoming a CaLP member agency must be drawn up. This would include a requirement that new members are leaders of CTP and CTP institutionalisation, and that member agencies progress the work of CaLP.
- CaLP should remain a partnership with a consortium (lead agency) model. The choice of a hosting member for CaLP would be best determined by a clear set of criteria.

5.4.2 CaLP team

CaLP should review its staffing structure to ensure the structure and the positions within it will best help CaLP achieve its goals. CaLP should have a Director post with a competitive package to draw a senior, experienced humanitarian, who can have global impact with key stakeholders. It should also have access to senior management amongst CaLP member agencies and the host agency. CaLP may need to examine its salary package, and undertake a market comparison to ensure it is competitive with similar kinds of inter-agency initiatives.

CaLP staff should ideally be co-located, with the exception of regional and country focal points. The CaLP team headquarters should be physically located where it is most likely to be able to have an impact on its key influencing targets. The most likely location would be Geneva as this is really the nexus of key elements of global inter-agency fora, especially the IASC and global cluster coordination. Another option is New York, however this offers less immediate benefits to CaLP. Remaining in the UK is not considered ideal. If located in Geneva, CaLP may also need a senior representative in New York. While it would be more helpful to be hosted inside a member’s office, with current technological solutions it should be possible for CaLP to be technically ‘hosted’ by a member agency and rely on its support systems without being physically located in its office.

CaLP needs to retain strong links to the field through regional and country focal points. CaLP focal points, or focal points linked to CaLP through members, should ideally exist in southern Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, along with East and West Africa and East Asia. Establishing a Middle East Focal Point would seem to be a high priority, and regional focal points should have very strong links to any country cash focal points or CWGs. The model has to be specific to each country and region’s needs, demands and working context. CaLP members could agree either to fund or support the role themselves, allocate the role as a component of an existing post, or seek funding from a donor for a local-level solution. The sustainability of this and the management implications need to be carefully reviewed. CaLP could also help to facilitate country-level consortia to seek larger volumes of funding for CTP and make it simpler for donors to contribute.

Recommendations

- CaLP should undergo a staffing structure review for the future, including a review and harmonisation of staff packages, reporting lines and establishing recruitment procedures suitable for CaLP.
- CaLP should have a senior-level Director with high-level access within its host agency.
- The CaLP team should be co-located. Geneva is the recommended location, given that it is a hub for humanitarian coordination and the location in which CaLP could have the greatest access to those it seeks to influence.
- CaLP should retain regional focal points, and should make the appointment of a Middle East focal point a priority. CaLP should consider re-instating country focal points where there is demand, and consider a range of operational models for country focal points.

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101 Washington is also an option, but this would be seen as US-oriented and would not benefit from the UN connection.
102 ACAPS has NRC as its lead agency; however, as NRC has no office of its own in Geneva, it is hosted by IDMC/NRC in Geneva.
103 For instance Somalia, where NGOs formed a consortium for implementing a large CTP, as mentioned previously.
5.4.3 Funding

CaLP should have a funding strategy that matches the overall workplan/strategy for a three- to five-year programme. All funding would go towards this one central programme, allowing CaLP flexibility to respond to the community of practice and to emergencies. It will need effective lobbying by influential champions and good relationships with key donors to enable this, hence the necessity for members to advocate.

CaLP should include a programme of supporting institutionalisation in organisations implementing CTP, including governments and NGOs. CaLP could look at a model whereby members receive funds to implement programmes in line with the overall CaLP programme. Clear links to other quality and cross-cutting initiatives, and collaboration with these is important for CaLP, along with a demonstrated link to development, resilience and early recovery. In addition, members should include components for CTP investment/institutionalisation in country-level or regional projects/grants. These could be for coordination or capacity-building positions, training, research and so on. These would not be CaLP projects per se, but through a committed and accountable membership these activities would directly support and relate to the work of CaLP. It is not recommended that country-level funding be raised by members and treated as CaLP funding and accounted for through CaLP, as this would simply perpetuate the fund management problems that CaLP has experienced. High priorities for the CaLP funding manager include approaching non-traditional donors and seeking three-year grants. Higher-level influence and global mandated role/status may assist with this.

Niger: The BRC and IFRC are pioneering an innovative new cash project in Niger, which is supporting 4,000 families. 84 villages in the district of Tanout, in northeast Niger, are the focus of the project, which is providing £120 per household. Credit: Cathy Lenghal, BRC.

104 There are examples of this in Afghanistan, Liberia and Myanmar.
105 Such as the Gulf States (Qatar Charity, Kuwait Fund), international banks and financial institutions which have Corporate Social Responsibility programmes, Asian governments and the World Bank.
5.4.4 Visualisation of CaLP as consortium with lead agency model

While the final governance structure and organigram of CaLP will be determined by the CaLP Steering Committee after reviewing this report, the diagram below represents a visualisation of the broad structures recommended by the review team.

Description of the diagram

- CaLP is a consortium composed of its member agencies, which form the overarching guidance for CaLP. CaLP full member agencies can nominate representatives to the board and the technical advisory group and participate in technical working groups.

- A small governing board oversees the work of CaLP and provides high-level strategic guidance and governance. All legal and fiduciary responsibility rests with the hosting agency and its board. The CaLP governing board chairperson is answerable to the full membership.

- The technical advisory group reports to the board and provides technical guidance to CaLP’s work. Some technical working groups (TWGs) may also be formed, and they report to the technical advisory group.

- The CaLP team is hosted by one of the members (the host agency).

- Donors channel all funds to CaLP through the host agency. Donors may also collaborate with CaLP by being on the board, the technical advisory group or some of the working groups.

- The community of practice is key in guiding the work of CaLP, as well as being a prime beneficiary or target. It is able to support CaLP by being nominated to the board or the technical advisory group, or can choose to participate in the TWGs.

Figure 7: A possible future model for CaLP
CaLP should consider hiring a senior organisational change manager to support it through the process of change over the next 12 months. This kind of organisational change process, which possibly involves review and change to staff salary packages, recruiting a ‘new’ team, seeking a director, geographical and host agency relocation, and change to governance structure and funding, is complicated and needs to be done well. It also needs someone to provide consistency and maintain momentum.

**Recommendation**

- CaLP would benefit greatly from the hiring of an experienced, senior organisational change manager to take it through the process of change.

## 5.5 CONCLUSION

CTP is a growing area of importance for the humanitarian sector and one which has the potential to substantially change aid programme design, coordination, delivery and evaluation. It has a strong support base, primarily among practitioners, although not widespread acceptance, especially at senior levels within the IASC membership. There are many examples of implementation in multiple sectors and CTP at scale. Although there are only a few examples of CTP at scale in the first stages of a large humanitarian response (such as the response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines 2013/14), this has been possible due to different processes of institutional change and policy shift within a number of humanitarian agencies and donors. The level of understanding of CTP and its possibilities and implications for the humanitarian sector, the degree of uptake by organisations in a comprehensive way, and true systemic changes in the humanitarian system to embrace CTP, are critical areas that need attention. It would seem that CTP is at a pivotal/tipping point in terms of the way it could transform the humanitarian sector. What is needed now is for CTP to have a recognised place at the global table of humanitarian coordination and a partnership with programme quality and accountability initiatives. There needs to be a notable leap forward in the institutionalisation of CTP, not only within member agencies but also by major humanitarian actors. This trend has already begun – but needs to be supported by a more structured programme of assistance and provision of tools. Solid leadership, which may require a shift in mindset at the heads of key humanitarian organisations, is important, as is collaboration with and support to host governments and local organisations in disaster-affected countries. A fresh approach to funding and programming in terms of scale, breaking down sectoral divisions, measures of success and funding mechanisms is key.

CaLP has been a leading light in advancing the quality of CTP. CTP is more often considered as one option in the menu of programme delivery choices. Capacity for CTP across the humanitarian sector to implement quality CTP has improved. CaLP has helped build a common understanding of CTP, developed a strong evidence base and tools for CTP implementation, and built a community of practice. CaLP is universally supported and there is a clear demand and need for CaLP to continue and step up its work and impact in the future. In order to preserve its status as a successful and neutral inter-agency initiative CaLP should maintain a partnership/consortium model. CaLP will need to expand its membership and the nature of membership (criteria and member requirements), transform its governance model to meet the new challenges, and improve its staffing structure and management and funding model. It also needs to consider moving its base to a location where it may have more influence and impact on key stakeholders. In order for CaLP to grow and continue to be effective and influential it will need strong institutional support and promotion from the leadership of its member agencies. It will also need visionary support, and sufficient and reliable funding from its donors, for its core programme, rather than a scattered, limiting and a project-based approach.
ANNEXES

LOOKING BEHIND TO LOOK AHEAD

Cash Transfer Programming and the Cash Learning Partnership 2005 – Post 2015: A Review from Inception to Inform Future Planning

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**ANNEX 1: BARRIERS TO CTP IMPLEMENTATION, INSTITUTIONALISATION AND SCALE-UP**

**Skills, capacity and institutional knowledge gaps**

Despite recent investment in cash transfer programming (CTP) training (spearheaded by the Cash Learning Partnership [CaLP], but also undertaken in-house and externally by a range of actors), a general lack of knowledge, capabilities and skills was described in many interviews and was the most cited barrier in the online survey. Gaps were identified at all levels of organisations and in all parts of the lifecycle of a humanitarian response: assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Many stakeholders consulted also identified a lack of executive-level buy-in within the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that leads to poor institutionalisation or lack of support, drivers and incentives. Some interviewees identified high staff turnover and high mobility of international staff in the humanitarian sector as driving the constant need for training. The lack of institutional strategy or systems to support CTP and those trained, and to really institutionalise their capacity building, is also a factor. The point here being that, while there may be attitude shifts among key people, and some programme staff may have received training, if the whole organisation has not adapted new systems to manage CTP, then little will change.

Skills, capacity, knowledge and openness to considering CTP are also viewed as lacking in many host governments. This is a barrier to implementing cash at scale and would generally require collaboration with and support by host governments. Linguistic and cultural barriers were also noted as a barrier to CTP adoption.

There was generally an optimistic perception among those surveyed that their organisations would be able to implement CTP. However they indicated that capacity is often found within a small group of people who ‘get it’, given that CTP has mainly been led by technical teams (in food security and livelihoods), with limited senior management support. Many respondents indicated that responsibility for CTP within an organisation should be shared between operations/support departments and programme departments, rather than in one technical sector. There was a clear message that staff in finance, administration, logistics etc., must be brought into the change process, be closely involved in developing procedures and policies related to CTP and encouraged to see CTP as an opportunity not a threat.

**Organisational culture**

There is a sense that despite change in many agencies, outdated attitudes around CTP still exist among key stakeholders. One key respondent said that they were: ‘shocked by how little understanding there is of the transformative impact of cash’ within senior UN and cluster leadership. ‘They see cash as innovation like solar power or mobile phones. A good thing, but cutting edge, esoteric … people are not seized of the issue, not grasping it … it’s at a sterile place’.

Many respondents reported that humanitarian organisations are often slow to change, and that they tend to hold on to outdated thinking, and struggle to adapt. One interviewee, in a country where CTP is currently rare, but which had previously experienced large-scale CTP, described certain country directors of humanitarian agencies there as ‘resistant, reserved, conservative’. This leads to resistance or blockages in promoting CTP. This is especially the case where agencies are large, have multiple members or affiliates and a vast network of country offices and structures. This does not, however, have to be a barrier to change as can be seen in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and WFP, which are among the largest of the humanitarian actors and have made significant change. Agencies are primarily driven by what is familiar: ‘they tend to operate on the basis of accumulated experience and instinct, rather than waiting for analysis to be completed’.

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106 Quotations that are not referenced are from interviews and the online survey. Names have been withheld to maintain anonymity.

107 Some respondents indicated that the majority of CTP resources are ‘Western-centric’, meaning driven, developed and written by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in English, and that this contributes to lack of capacity, knowledge and openness to considering CTP. The documentation produced by Adeso is seen as one of the exceptions to this, as this is an African-based NGO producing CTP materials and training.

with what they can do quickly, which is not always driven by logic, or by what is best for the beneficiary. One interviewee described the attitude of many NGOs by saying ‘if it’s not inappropriate, then we’ll still do it, rather than doing what is most appropriate’. There is still discomfort in giving beneficiaries money and therefore the responsibility to determine their own needs. Despite many years of discussion around the importance of accountability, beneficiary preference is still very low on the agenda. Paternalistic models of charity, where the implementing agency ‘knows best’ and maintains control, are still the norm. There is also a perceived barrier for organisations to shift public perceptions about what effective humanitarian aid looks like, and to come up with creative ways to gain agency visibility beyond images of in-kind goods being distributed by smiling, logo-clad humanitarians.

Most agencies specialise in one or more specific humanitarian sectors or have a mandate or sectoral mindset, and this can contribute to ‘missed opportunities from not looking holistically’. Many agencies really struggle to move beyond their mandates or perceived mandates, especially UN agencies. As one interviewee said, ‘cash could be a threat to the mandate of UN agencies’. As a number of respondents mentioned, not only does CTP need to shift more from the food security and/or livelihoods sectors to other sectors, but agencies need ‘to think to the future and whether their traditional roles will remain sectorally focused’. As one respondent said, ‘cash is a challenge. It’s an existential payment which waives the need for technical specialists’. While this is not strictly true, it does mean that multi-sectoral skills and approaches are critical. Another obstacle to change comes from those agencies that have a long and substantive history of delivering food and their links to US government food aid policy and programmes.

Another organisational barrier for embracing and institutionalising CTP relates to the perennial gap between humanitarian and development programmes. As one respondent said, humanitarians need to think about the ‘bigger picture beyond the emergency and early recovery phases’ and build more links with development to leverage CTP with longer-term programmes. Since many humanitarian crises are due to failures of governance and development, these links with development programmes should include Disaster Risk Reduction and preparedness as well. A key thing here, as one respondent said, is to look at ‘the impact [of CTP] on traditional solidarity systems and [wealth] redistribution’.

CTP institutionalisation needs to be part of organisational strategy, and bought-into by senior management. CTP is still missing from the preparedness planning and contingency planning process in many agencies. As one key respondent said, ‘cash requires a lot of ground work – counter terrorism, audits etc. Agencies need to have contractors and links with banks [that are] water tight … it needs a ‘big framework agreement with banks or VISA … get those right and spend a lot of time on that’ This means a big shift in preparedness for some agencies that are used to stocking warehouses and prepositioning in-kind aid rather than pre-negotiated deals with the private sector, banks, money-handlers and stores. It is clear there are also big gaps between changes in one member of a consortium and the whole family.

Fear and risk aversion

Recent reports go into great detail about fear and risk aversion. Some of the cultural blocks stem from fear and perceived risks associated with CTP (which in turn also derive from lack of knowledge, capacity and systems). While there is more than enough evidence to show that CTP is no riskier than in-kind assistance in almost all contexts, and, according to some is in fact less risky in some situations, there is still a fear that CTP poses greater risk and thus hinders change and adaptation.

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109 The study cited in the note immediately above ranked factors affecting programme response choice in food aid, and found that response analysis, context and recipient preferences were very low in the order. The highest factors influencing choice were related to organisational ethos, and factors such as what worked last time and donor resources.

110 Interview with UN agency staff member referencing some internal risk assessments undertaken.
One interviewee raised a number of salient points related to fear and cultural mindsets:

‘There are a whole set of visceral fears around cash in particular – the stuff that has long been discredited empirically, but where fear still holds … someone will steal it, it will upset markets, it will go to fund terrorism (unlike food aid!?!), men will drink it … These fears are found in donors, NGOs, UN, governments, etc. … on top of those fears, we have the fear of what I don’t know how to do … “cash is very difficult”, “we don’t have the skills” and so on. It’s outside of people’s comfort zone.

‘On top of that, we have the vested interests of organisations and individuals. People who want to give away surplus food, people who want to sell food to agencies, people whose jobs depend on in-kind aid of all kinds … there are easy ways of masking this – you just talk a lot about “your mandate” which can’t be met if people get to choose what their problems are’.

There are risks in all forms of humanitarian aid delivery mechanisms and responses, including in-kind assistance and cash. However, the misconstrued fear that CTP provides a greater risk than in-kind or programmed aid still persists. A number of interviewees expressed great frustration that the debate has not moved on, and that uninformed and outdated attitudes still exist. There is still a lack of recognition that people will always consider monetisation of in-kind aid to get cash to meet their individual family needs. Some feel that it is the visibility of ‘misspent’ cash which is the greater problem. One outcome arising from this fear is the perception that CTP is put under higher scrutiny by some donors and the reporting/monitoring hurdles can deter agencies from considering CTP.

Evidence and research

The survey respondents overwhelmingly report there is enough broad evidence that supports CTP as a viable modality (80%), and many indicated that it is more likely to meet multiple needs of beneficiaries and empower them.112 So when a lack of evidence is used as justification to not explore CTP, it seems to point primarily to an issue of perception or outdated attitude (see above). Or it may point to an inability to absorb, or an unwillingness to accept, what evidence does exist. As one respondent said, lack of evidence can no longer be used as an excuse to ‘sit back and wait’. Conversely, there may also be a ‘gap between theory and practice’ where evidence or knowledge exists at management level but has not yet spread to the field level, or vice versa.

There was a general sense that we should have moved beyond proof of concept research by now in CTP, and a recent piece of research commissioned by CaLP on research gaps and needs found that ‘CTP research has developed from a focus on the viability of CTP to the production of large quantities of action-based and operational research by a range of humanitarian stakeholders. Whilst there is still some research focusing on the proof of concept, the focus today is more upon specific thematic topics and studies …’.113 Respondents identified a number of gaps and ideas for future research, tools and other resources that would contribute to better understanding and better quality programming.114

Barriers to quality programming

Interviewees identified a number of gaps that negatively impact the quality of some CTP implementation. For instance, although there is a recognised need for market analysis and that market analysis can lead to better quality programming in all sectors, it is still not included in most multi-sector needs assessment tools. Proper assessments identifying needs and examining the contexts are still not routinely done and, as outlined above, programme staff tend not to wait for an analysis to be completed.115 In many situations analysis of gender roles and of cultural practices is still not done, and this curtails a sound understanding of needs and how distribution will work best. In general, many programme evaluations show that programmes were implemented without thorough analysis up front. As one interviewee aptly said, ‘… for as long as agencies get money without this, why would it get better? And for as long as evaluations don’t ask those difficult questions (i.e. not “how well

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112 Interviews and online survey.
113 Austin, L. (2014) *Research Gaps in Cash Transfer Programming*, commissioned by CaLP.
114 The six areas defined in Austin, L. (2014), *ibid.*, are: (i) a cost efficiency and effectiveness comparison; (ii) multi-sector cash programming; (iii) water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); (iv) health potential with CTP; (v) links between social protection systems and emergency CTP; and (vi) cash in refugee contexts.
did you do X" but "why did you do X?"), then there is no driver of change at all. A number of respondents felt that there remains an overall lack of incentive for quality programming. Agencies still get away with doing inadequate work, not being accountable and not being beneficiary driven.

There was strong agreement that cash is not a sector – it is a modality which can be applied to many sectors. So while it is not exactly a cross-cutting issue like vulnerability, gender, protection or the environment, it tends to suffer the same fate in terms of finding a home or people to take responsibility across programmes. Either organisations tend to nominate a group or an individual to be responsible for CTP (most commonly in the food security or livelihoods/economic security teams), and then no one else appears to take much responsibility. Or else they push for it to be mainstreamed, but then no one appears to be leading on ensuring that it is.

Some agencies are able to do high quality CTP in one sector but staff struggle ‘to see how cash could work in other sectors’. Some organisations are apparently struggling to move beyond CTP in the food sector because they lack capability to define a multi-sector cash intervention and are unable to find relevant case studies and other resources to help them. NGO staff from sectors other than food security and livelihoods indicated that they felt it harder to control the results with cash. As one interviewee said, ‘if you need public health outcomes or nutrition outcomes, you still must engage with the beneficiaries directly to change behaviours or practice’ and many practitioners believe this is more difficult to do through CTP. However this perhaps indicates a view that CTP is generally used as an alternative to other methods of programming, rather than as part of a holistic package of assistance used in combination with other methods. Some of the more successful examples are where CTP has been used to complement other types of responses. It is also important to note that the quality and rigour of monitoring and evaluation systems also has an impact on the quality of CTP, as it does for all programmes. Many respondents indicated that CTP is no more difficult to measure than other methods of programming or implementation. A key point made by one interviewee was that for cash ‘verification has to be individual, not like an NFI [non-food item] distribution … we would never let a community leader dish out cash like we do with NFIs’.

Coordination and leadership
Currently there is lack of global and country-based high-level strategic coordination of CTP, leaving a gap in leadership, resourcing and joint advocacy with donors and host governments. While there is some coordination of CTP globally, in general CTP coordination in emergencies has been done ad hoc, rather than as a regular and reliable part of humanitarian coordination. Sectoral areas of focus and the cluster system reinforce silos that prevent better coordination and response on cross-cutting issues including CTP: we are ‘trapped by sectors and silos’. Cash is a modality not a programme and this is confusing for people: ‘they don’t know where to put cash’. ‘Coordination of cash transfer programming is not formally linked to the cluster approach, which leads to a lack of recognition and involvement of donors, host government, UN agencies and the Humanitarian Coordinator’.

Many see cash as ‘holistic’ and that it ‘gives equity, accountability and space for innovation where nothing fits’. However, cash may also ‘get rid of sectors and silos’ which is challenging for the humanitarian system. As an internal document of one key stakeholder from a UN agency said, ‘the most striking aspect of CTP is that if it ever becomes the dominant form of humanitarian response it could impact the current humanitarian sector-by-sector response model and would challenge cluster coordination, assessments, information management, agency specialisations [and] the way funding is requested’.

CTP indicators are rarely, if ever, included in common needs assessments, monitoring tools, or in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ‘Who What Where’ products. A number of respondents expected OCHA to take a lead role in CTP coordination, and were disappointed at OCHA’s lack of engagement in most countries. As reported in a study commissioned by CaLP, ‘OCHA has rarely been involved in cash coordination groups’.

118 NRC is an example of an exception to this, where the cash and vouchers advisor used to sit in the food security team and now works cross-sectorally to support programmes.


Humanitarian coordinators are not guiding that inclusion nor providing leadership via Humanitarian Country Teams (of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC]) and cluster coordination. CTP is often not included in preparedness planning or in contingency planning. There is also a lack of networks/communities of practice in individual countries that could contribute to technical coordination and working groups during a response.

Finally, the role of host governments is also an important factor, and they can have a significant influence as to whether CTP proceeds and progresses. Many governments have demonstrated great reservation about CTP due to factors such as the perceived welfare nature of cash, perceptions of cash hand-outs\textsuperscript{120} and impact on informal safety nets. These reservations exist even in countries which have large social safety net programmes. Where governments are taking on coordination roles, but lack understanding of CTP and capacity for implementing it, they may not be able to provide adequate leadership.

**Donors, funding and reporting**

Despite the fact that donors have been reported more than once as saying that there are no barriers from their side on CTP implementation, NGOs and others still reported many barriers or perceived barriers. Barriers reported include: getting large-scale funding for large-scale response; in-kind aid continuing to be the preferred business model for many donors; some donors seeing CTP as more of a technical issue (especially in the food security and livelihoods sectors) than a strategic approach; donors and agencies having specific sectoral mandates and objectives that have to be met, as well as a swathe of their own technical experts by sector (which ‘curtails unconditional cash grants’); the objectives seeming more important than meeting actual needs at times … than for helping people to meet their own objectives and being reinforced through sectoral logframes which are not well-suited to CTP; and the perception of donor reporting requirements as being more stringent for CTP than for in-kind assistance because of fear.

Donor policies may also favour certain kinds of aid. There is also a sense that both NGOs and donors are possibly affected by the perception that CTP is not or will not be as well-supported by the public as in-kind aid. It is also important to note that shifts in donor policy cannot completely change practice at a field level, especially with UN agencies. While donors can have significant influence on both NGO and UN programming, and significant changes to policy and practice by NGOs and the UN have occurred following donor requests and policy changes, these agencies do retain independence over their policies and programmes and have their own boards and strategies. There is somewhat of a misconception that donors have direct influence over UN programmes in the field. Donors have strategic influence through global funding, but they rely for the most part on global programme management, quality and accountability systems. At a country level, their influence is through agreeing to fund or not fund country-level appeals and response plans, and trying to influence the country office of a UN agency on their programme.

**Technology**

In addition to fears about potential technological risks in CTP, another technological barrier includes the need for more and better financial instruments, especially to help implement cash at scale and to induce trust. Many people hold trust only in the tangible nature of hard cash. Where funds are to be transferred electronically, there is also reliance on a certain amount of local technology and hardware, which does not always exist or exist equally\textsuperscript{121}.

Despite the significant volume of e-transfers that have been used in humanitarian and development work in recent years, and despite the volume of electronic and mobile phone banking that is undertaken in many developing countries, there remain great concerns about data management protection. Most humanitarian agencies are not adequately set up for this kind of work, and most programme staff are unfamiliar with the processes and implications. Protecting the privacy of individuals’ information is a fundamental human right, and in many contexts, due to the political environment and broad human rights concerns, this is even more critical.

\textsuperscript{120} Especially where this modality is used by politicians during elections.

\textsuperscript{121} The Better than Cash Alliance is looking into this issue more broadly and focusing on ‘accelerating the shift to digital payments’. As its website \url{http://betterthancash.org} says, it provides ‘expertise in the transition to digital payments to achieve the goals of empowering people and growing emerging economies’. It is working with governments, the development community (including the International Financial Institutions) and the private financial sector.

\textsuperscript{122} CaLP developed a set of guidelines on this called ‘Principles and Operational Standards for the Secure Use of Personal Data in Cash and E-Transfer Programmes’.
ANNEX 2: THE HISTORY OF THE CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP (CaLP)

Phase 1: 2005–2008

After the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, cash-based responses were being undertaken by multiple agencies across affected countries. In 2005 Save the Children United Kingdom (SCUK), Oxfam Great Britain (Oxfam GB), British Red Cross (BRC), Mercy Corps and Concern came together to promote good practice in cash and voucher responses in the Tsunami-affected countries and future emergency responses, documenting and sharing experience and developing resources to guide managers of future cash transfers. This eventually led to the creation of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Tsunami Cash Learning Project in 2006, established in collaboration with ODI. This initiative resulted in issue papers, various case studies, a comprehensive final report reviewing cash transfer programming (CTP) responses after the Tsunami (produced in 2007) and the first CTP level 1 training. Most cash responses after the Tsunami focused on the food security and livelihood sector and were led by technical staff in this sector. This fairly tight-knit group of technical people all had interest and experience in exploring appropriate responses to food and livelihood security, of which cash- and market-based responses were a key consideration. ODI had historically supported this lobby through research and advocacy pieces so it was a natural collaboration. The first CTP level 1 training was also developed through the initiative, driven by the three most engaged members of the initial collaboration: SCUK, Oxfam GB, and BRC. These three agencies also used this experience to advocate within their agencies and begin some internal training.

Phase 2: 2008–2009

This positive experience of collaboration on CTP learning, a great deal of momentum around CTP, along with interest in the trainings developed, provided a springboard for SCUK, Oxfam GB and BRC to form the 'Global Learning Partnership in Cash-based Responses in Humanitarian Responses'. The member agencies developed a three-page concept note from which to solicit proper funding, rather than rely on their own resources and time. At this stage the initiative was envisioned as a three-year proposal with the potential for extension. A key strategic decision was also made at this point to work with Sphere to mainstream cash and vouchers standards in the Food Security section for the revision of the Sphere handbook of 2011.

Oxfam was in discussion with the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO – now titled the European Commission Directorate Generale for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), which was concurrently developing its own guidelines on CTP. ECHO had undertaken internal research to assess the volume of CTP it was supporting globally, as it had been piloting small CTP projects. The Oxfam senior food security advisor, after much lobbying of the funding team and senior managers in the humanitarian department, was able to convince Oxfam to support the bid. ECHO had specific capacity-building funds through the enhanced response capacity building fund that could only be accessed through a UN agency or Red Cross agency/consortium. From this pot ECHO funded CaLP’s first official ‘life’. In February 2009 ECHO financed the first grant with 168,000 Euro for a one-year programme, which extended to 18 months. The funding was channelled through BRC. At this time the only staff member of CaLP was an Oxfam programme manager (from the Humanitarian Support Personnel pool) seconded into the coordinator role. For training and research pieces external consultants were hired. It was in the proposal that the name CaLP for Cash Learning Partnership was first used. CaLP was focused on developing common standards, common monitoring tools, working on mainstreaming CTP in the Sphere Handbook review, training and some advocacy.

In the same year the CaLP Steering Committee chose to expand its membership to include new members. This was motivated by the desire to expand its reach and influence, access diverse funding sources and bring in more CTP expertise from outside the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) sector. The Steering Committee developed a one-pager, which explained what it was and the criteria required for membership. It approached the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Action Against Hunger/ACF International (ACF) and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

123 www.odi.org.uk/search/site/learning%20tsunami
127 GBP 150,000
128 This is titled ‘Working Together to Improve the Quality of Humanitarian Cash Transfer Programming’.
(NRC), and through an interview process in which agencies had to explain what they had to offer, selected NRC and ACF as its new members. NRC was a strategic choice to expand cash beyond the FSL sector to shelter, and as an entry point to Scandinavian donors. ACF already had a lot of experience in international cash programmes, and through the ACF office in the USA would provide an entry point to US donors.

**Phase 3: 2010–2011**

This phase marks the period during which CaLP began to access more substantial funding, create a name for itself and have significant impact. The funding was again through ECHO (1.5 million Euro) with co-funding from VISA Inc., BRC and other funding sources amounting to almost 2 million Euro, for an 18-month programme. This allowed CaLP to hire a team: a coordinator, an administration and finance officer, an advocacy and communications officer, two capacity builders and five country-level focal points129 in disaster prone countries (Kenya, Niger, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Pakistan – the latter was never filled). The focal points were seen as advisors in CTP who could engage in contingency planning, train local government, and facilitate learning and coordination.

In that period a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to guide relations between the member agencies began to be discussed. It was drafted in 2010 but not signed until May 2013. There was also an attempt to clarify the role of the Steering Committee, and the first Terms of Reference (ToR) was written in May 2010.130 The funding period was short for the volume of activities that CaLP had set out to undertake. From that moment CaLP became increasingly project driven, but the Steering Committee continued to play a hands-on role in the formation and management of the CaLP team. During the period CaLP also went through its most significant strategic review process to develop a new strategy, driven by the reality that CTP was no longer a question; it had become an acceptable and exciting option. However there was no systematic attention given to CTP within the humanitarian architecture, and information on CTP was still not systematically collected or shared. In the beginning, CaLP had been about advocacy and basic training for CTP. The CaLP team said they wanted to do more than advocacy for CTP and training, but they felt they were ‘treading water’. Primarily two Steering Committee members worked on developing the first strategy document with the aim to ‘steer CaLP away from the past’ and have a coherent strategy with ‘far-reaching areas of work for the future’ (from interviews).

After a long process of development, including reaching out to gain input from the community of practice, three main areas emerged: 1) CTP should be considered in sectors to meet all needs; 2) there should be a ‘dramatic’ increase in financing of cash; and 3) major investment was needed in building the institutional capacity of large agencies to programme with cash. The strategy included an ambitious set of objectives and indicators and its first full CaLP logframe.

CaLP set itself a sunset clause of the end of 2015. This was felt to be quite aggressive by some Steering Committee members and not fully re-affirmed or supported by all. The idea of this was to assume that CaLP should end if there was no need to continue, and that it might not have any value-add after a certain time. It was thought there would be so many doing CTP work by 2015 that CaLP might be a competitor rather than a form of collective action or support. The clause also meant to reassure potential members and donors that CaLP did not intend to keep going forever if it served no purpose and to ensure that CaLP stayed self-critical about its value.

By the end of this period, CaLP had managed to achieve great things. It had: re-activated the online discussion group which had first been initiated by ODI in 2006, the so-called D-group; rolled out a substantial number of level 1 trainings around the world; hosted and organised several learning events; produced key learning documents (including the Good Practice Review with ODI on CTP – one of the most downloaded ODI documents); set up a website and created its first communications and advocacy material; and created an identity, inhabiting a niche and establishing a CTP platform across the humanitarian world. However when the funding came to end, with no forward planning on future funding, and members unwilling or unable to offer bridging funding, CaLP lost most of its team, until the next phase.

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129 From CaLP Steering Committee June 2010: Creating CaLP focal points in eight disaster prone countries to advocate on CTP, develop contingency plans, train local government as well as humanitarian agency staff, develop and maintain a roster of trained people, pool learning on CTP in the country/region, create common standards as well as formats for implementing CTP in countries, coordinate CTP responses by agencies and provide sector-wide technical backstopping, if required.

130 From CaLP Workplan (2010–2013) and CaLP Steering Committee Terms of Reference (May 2010).
Phase 4: 2012–2013

During this phase CaLP was able to access a third phase of ECHO funding, continue its VISA funding as well as gain additional funding from the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). CaLP created a new team and expanded it with three additional posts: a technical coordinator who initially managed the focal points (although they are now managed by the CaLP Coordinator), an administration support and communications officer. CaLP transitioned from having Country Focal Points to having Regional Focal Points in Asia, East Africa and West Africa. The main driver behind this was to multiply CaLP’s impact in a region by covering multiple countries and also to influence regional dialogue. The level 2 training was developed and rolled out, the website became a highly used portal of information and networking, the research and advocacy agenda were expanded and the D-group was seen as one of the most functional and active communities of practice. A cost recovery approach for the training was adopted in July 2013 as a strategy to encourage agencies to be selective about who they chose to train and to ensure greater attendance, as well taking the first steps towards making one part of the CaLP work self-sufficient. In this period CaLP commissioned several reviews and research pieces to explore what its role could be in the future in relation to the growth of CTP in the humanitarian community. It also launched the Cash Atlas, ‘an interactive global mapping tool aiming to visually represent cash transfer programmes at a global level. It is envisioned to be an advocacy and learning tool’.131

At some point in 2013 it seems that CaLP staff decided that regardless of the sunset clause, CaLP would likely continue past 2014 and began to plan on this basis.

An image from the Cash Atlas.

131 www.cash-atlas.org
### ANNEX 3: TIMELINE

**Timeline – Development of CaLP 2005–2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase¹</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key events</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Funding/donor</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>HPG Tsunami Cash Learning Project.²</td>
<td>None – FS technical HQ advisory staff collaborated as part of their regular jobs with consultant support (Lesley Adams from ODI working with CaLP).</td>
<td>SCUK, Oxfam GB, BRC, Concern and Mercy Corps.</td>
<td>The total budget was GBP 113,115.00 from all parties. The final expenditure was GBP 85,098.24 and the surplus funds returned to each of the consortium members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Case studies produced ODI.org.uk/learning from cash responses Indian Ocean Tsunami.</td>
<td>None – FS technical HQ advisory staff collaborated as part of their regular jobs with consultant support. Nupur Kukrety (SCUK), Pantaleo Creti (OGB), Charles Antoine-Hofmann (BRC).</td>
<td>Through regular positions in respective agencies.</td>
<td>Budget GBP 46,300.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Learning from cash responses to the Tsunami 2005 – Final Report, HPG Background Paper.</td>
<td>Lesley Adams from ODI working with CaLP.</td>
<td>Tsunami funds, multiple sources via Oxfam GB, SCUK, BRC: left-over money from the Tsunami cash learning project.</td>
<td>Approximately GBP 75,000 (GBP 25,000 each from Oxfam GB, SCUK and BRC).</td>
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</table>

¹ These are the phases of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), not the same as phases of European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) funding as sometimes mentioned in the report.


³ Training took place in India, Zambia, Thailand and the UK, and more recently in Bangladesh and Panama. A number of organisations took part in the training, with over 100 humanitarian practitioners trained.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key events</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Funding/donor</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Contact made to include Cash &amp; Vouchers into Sphere handbook as a companion standard under the Food Security and Nutrition section. This is now included in the 2011 edition.</td>
<td>Alex Rees (SC), Nupur Kukrety (Oxfam GB), Charles-Antoine Hofmann (BRC).</td>
<td>ECHO developed Cash and Voucher guidelines and called for proposals under the enhanced response capacity building fund.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 person Coordinator (Humanitarian Support Personnel [HSP] Oxfam seconded for 6 months) and hired trainers external consultants. Steering Committee played hands-on managing and technical support role (i.e. Sphere work).</td>
<td>Funding granted 1st proposal 3-pager: Oxfam GB bid (April 2009 – February 2010). Governance model – Oxfam GB as the secretariat and grant holder with two other agencies. Focus on training and research.</td>
<td>ECHO. Capacity-building budget has to be channelled through UN or RC not direct to NGOs. Euro 168,224 from ECHO. Oxfam seconds a HSP – Emma Delo as coordinator (60 person days budgeted for), project coordinator (BRC staff member), + technical expert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>D-group set up. Lesley Adams (ODI) started discussion group in 2005 (this did not stay active but was revived in 2009 as the current D-group). Focus on training and research.</td>
<td>1 person Coordinator (HSP Oxfam) and hired trainers external consultants. Steering Committee played hands-on managing role.</td>
<td>Partnered with IFRC to support access to funding from ECHO.</td>
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<td>One-pager developed as to what is CaLP – seeking new members.</td>
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<td>NRC and ACF invited by Steering Committee to join as new members; it was anticipated that others would join later, a phased approach.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>First Steering Committee ToR and MoUs developed though never signed. Grant moved to IFRC (Emma Delo cash focal pt. IFRC).</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key events</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Funding/donor</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>First Steering Committee ToR developed and MoU drafted, although these were not signed and not binding.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 2 funded July 2010–May 2012.</td>
<td>Budgeted for a team.</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>CHF 2,307,453 million through IFRC from ECHO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2010–December 2011</td>
<td>VISA</td>
<td>USD 30,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Developed CaLP level 2. 5 member Steering Committee and CaLP staff: 1 coordinator, 2 capacity building officers, 1 finance and admin, 1 communications and advocacy, 5 country FPs (1 recruited but position fell vacant shortly thereafter and was not re-recruited).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explored idea of regional FP.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2010–March 2012</td>
<td>BRC funding to support ECHO proposal.</td>
<td>GBP 18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Funding gap 1. CaLP team disbanded except one.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 3 funded: January 2012–December 2013 (21 months). 5 member Steering Committee and 11 CaLP staff: 1 coordinator, 1 technical Coordinator, 3 regional FPs, 2 capacity building officers, 1 advocacy officer, 1 communications officer), 1 finance, 1 admin.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>January 2012–June 2012</td>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>GBP 37,850</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 2012–March 2014</td>
<td>VISA</td>
<td>USD 261,300</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June 2012–May 2014</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Euro 1.6 million</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2012–June 2014: 2 grants.</td>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>USD 725,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Key events</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>Funding/donor</td>
<td>Amount</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>October 2012–June 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>CAD 383,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 2012–Mar 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>GBP 90,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>CHF 600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>May – MoU signed.</td>
<td></td>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>GBP 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December – Strategic Review for future of CaLP.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial cost recovery for training (commenced July 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial funding gap 2 (as of December 2013, 42% of CaLP Global Budget for 2014 is funded).</td>
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</table>
ANNEX 4: CaLP OBJECTIVES SINCE INCEPTION

First phase 2005–2008

- No formal objectives or strategy – CaLP did not formally exist.
- Started from a base of trying to ‘improve learning and organisational capacity on cash based humanitarian responses’\(^{132}\) amongst the three agencies. Focus was ‘to promote good practice in cash and vouchers programming’ by documenting agencies responses, and ‘facilitate the sharing of experience and ideas about cash transfers and to develop resources to guide managers of future cash transfer programs’.\(^{133}\)
- The subsequent focus was ‘building capacity through training’\(^{134}\) and a more unofficial objective of internal advocacy\(^{135}\) in the three agencies that continued after the initial phase above (SCUK, BRC and Oxfam GB).

2008

- The first set of objectives was developed in 2008, when CaLP was not yet CaLP. The name CaLP was first used end 2008.
- The purpose of the partnership titled the ‘Global Learning Partnership in Cash-based Responses in Humanitarian Responses’ was to ‘define and communicate best practice in cash transfer programming, through ongoing learning and capacity building activities in order to improve the quality of cash programming in the humanitarian sector’.\(^{136}\)
- The objectives were: ‘To document and improve quality of cash transfer programmes through learning activities across the humanitarian sector; to establish common standards for cash transfer programming; to build capacity of practitioners in a range of institutions through the inter-agency cash training; to deliver broader donor support for cash transfer programmes’.\(^{137}\)
- In general the agencies defined their purpose at that time as ‘capacity building, advocacy, and research’.\(^{138}\)
- The partnership was to exist for three years with the potential for extension.

2009

- The first funding proposal was made to the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO\(^{139}\)). ECHO described the objective of the programme (which was in essence CaLP at that point) as being: ‘to improve the quality of cash transfer programming across the humanitarian sector and key stakeholders through capacity building, research as well as development and communication of best practice standards and guidelines’.\(^{140}\) The specific objective was ‘increased capability within the humanitarian sector to design and deliver good quality and accountable cash transfer programmes by 2010’.\(^{141}\)
- After funding was secured, CaLP produced a one-pager describing itself and seeking new members, outlining its vision and ‘project’ objective.
- The vision was ‘that by 2015, cash will be considered as a viable programming mechanism by all sectors in humanitarian work’. CaLP’s purpose and contribution to this vision is to define and communicate good practice in CTP, thereby improving the quality of CTP in the humanitarian sector.
- CaLP’s project objective was listed as that which was in the ECHO proposal (see above).

\(^{133}\) Ibid.
\(^{134}\) Ibid.
\(^{135}\) Interview with Pantaleo Creti.
\(^{136}\) Save the Children UK, Oxfam GB and British Red Cross (2008) (above n. 1).
\(^{137}\) Ibid.
\(^{138}\) Interview with Nupur Kukrety.
\(^{139}\) Now titled the European Commission Directorate Generale for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection.
\(^{140}\) CaLP (Oxfam) Single Form Proposal to ECHO, late 2008.
\(^{141}\) Ibid.
2010

- The CaLP Workplan put out in May 2010 states the vision for CaLP as being: ‘that by the end of 2015, cash transfers will be considered as a viable programme mechanism by all technical sectors engaged in humanitarian preparedness and response work’.\(^\text{142}\)

- CaLP’s role and purpose in contributing and working towards that vision was ‘to improve the quality of cash transfer programming across the humanitarian sector and key stakeholders through capacity-building, research as well as development and communication of good practice’.\(^\text{143}\)

- CaLP had three objectives at this stage: ‘to be the lead inter-agency initiative in building capacity of practitioners to improve the scope and quality of cash and voucher transfer programmes through increased practical knowledge, skills and confidence; to ensure the evolution of accountable, relevant and innovative cash and voucher transfer programming through evidence based research to influence key stakeholders; to provide the cooperation platform for sharing knowledge and experience at field and policy levels’.\(^\text{144}\)

2011–2012

- CaLP went through a process to develop a new strategy; some Steering Committee members would say it was the first full strategy. It was ambitious, but also set a sunset clause for the end of CaLP if it were no longer needed. It pushed CaLP into a concerted focus on advocacy and influencing and CTP institutionalisation.

- The overall objective of this strategy was that: appropriate and timely humanitarian response routinely includes appropriate and accountable cash transfer programmes at scale.

- The four objectives were:
  1. By 2015, 85% of CTPs are designed and implemented using appropriate and consistent information analysis.
  2. By 2015, CTP is implemented at scale routinely across emergency settings to meet the range of needs of crisis-affected populations.
  3. By 2015, there is a clear leadership/coordination structure for CTP within the humanitarian sector (global and country level), ensuring shared learning, a consistent approach and the evolution of best practice.
  4. By 2015, humanitarian agencies have the tools, procedures and skill-sets to implement quality cash and voucher programmes rapidly, appropriately, and at scale.

- Each of these four objectives had indicators.

- The strategy has been viewed in hindsight as having been too ambitious, with too many indicators that could not be achieved by or possibly even attributed to CaLP.

2013

- CaLP reviewed its strategy. This process was led by CaLP staff who felt the strategy was unachievable. They also felt that the outcomes, even if they could be measured – which is questionable – couldn’t be attributed to CaLP. A particular focus in this review is a very careful rewording of the overall purpose/objective, and the focus became routine consideration of CTP, not routine implementation – an important difference.

- The objective for the period was that CTP be routinely considered as an appropriate emergency response option and, where implemented, is done so in a high quality and timely manner and, when relevant, at scale.

\(^\text{142}\) CaLP Workplan (2010–2013) and CaLP Steering Committee Terms of Reference (May 2010).
\(^\text{143}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{144}\) Ibid.
Four results were planned:

- Capacity building forming Result 1: Key humanitarian agencies\textsuperscript{145} acquire or improve their knowledge and practice to design and implement quality cash and voucher programmes.

- Action research and evidence gathering forming Result 2: Key humanitarian stakeholders access tools, good practice, action research and programme guidance to improve the quality of CTP.

- Given the importance of CaLP advocacy work, the advocacy work via information-sharing with key stakeholders and the advocacy for improved cash coordination and preparedness have been differentiated in Result 3: Key humanitarian stakeholders have a better understanding of the appropriateness of CTP through targeted advocacy and information sharing.

- Result 4: Key humanitarian stakeholders show progress in addressing limitations in CTP coordination and preparedness through targeted advocacy and information sharing.

The strategy says that achievement of CaLP's overall objective is not expected during this strategy period, but that the work in the phase 2013–2014 will contribute to it.

The strategy details how CaLP intends to contribute to the objective through a combination of activities within CaLP's three core areas of expertise.

At this stage the team seemed conscious that the deadline of 2014/15 was looming and so the strategy was only for two years, dependent on the outcome of the CaLP review.

\textsuperscript{145} Humanitarian agencies here include all stakeholders that are involved in design and implementation of CTP from all the different sectors.
ANNEX 5: CaLP STRATEGY 2012–2015


1 Background to the CaLP Strategic Process

The CaLP is a networking and knowledge creating/sharing platform aiming to broaden the capacity and support the adoption of cash transfer programming where appropriate in response to humanitarian crises. The CaLP does not provide value to beneficiaries unless it is promoting better, faster more cost-effective programming.

- Evidence and experience in the use of Cash Transfers in Emergencies are mounting. Structural conditions in global markets and in humanitarian relief circuits imply there will be increased pressure for the adoption of cash transfer approaches into the future.

- However, the humanitarian community has still not reached a critical mass whereby Cash is considered a “normal” response at scale.

- The CaLP (among other partners and donors) has contributed to the development in the sector and has developed an institutional capacity that offers continued benefit to promoting timely and effective adoption of cash transfer programming.

- The CaLP SC proposes to extend the CaLP to 01/2015 – recognising that by the end of this period the CaLP should either have achieved its objectives or will not be highly relevant. The CaLP will then be closed unless there are compelling reasons for continuation.

2 The CaLP Objectives for 2012–2015

As the CaLP enters a new period with wider recognition and stronger institutional capacity, the vision must evolve and become more ambitious.

*Humanitarian preparedness and response is more effective at meeting the diverse needs of affected people through increased capacity to deliver appropriate cash and vouchers in the humanitarian sector*

By continuing to promote appropriate, timely and quality cash and voucher programming in humanitarian response it is believed that the capacity of the humanitarian community for meeting the immediate needs of communities affected by crisis will be strengthened.

In order to meet the vision and purpose of the CaLP by 2015, the project will have to realign and refocus capacity and attention on a different set of objectives and actions

The CaLP will continue to work around its 3 key areas of expertise: Building skills and capacities, Coordination & knowledge sharing, and Research/evidence building. The CaLP will enhance its capacity to strengthen the partnership’s focus on global advocacy to promote real change in the mode of operations in humanitarian crises (evidence and support is abundant – now the CaLP must catalyse action).

In this strategy period, CaLP will strengthen partnerships (for enhanced action) with a range of humanitarian actors and members of the community of practice.

The next section details how each of the 4 objectives will be met through a combination of the 3 core areas of expertise. This section also aims to illustrate how the activities are expected to change over the period of the strategy.
Overall Objective

Appropriate and timely humanitarian response routinely includes appropriate and accountable cash transfer programmes at scale.

**Specific Objective 1:** By 2015, 85% of CTPs are designed and implemented using appropriate and consistent information analysis

**Specific Objective 2:** By 2015, CTP is implemented at scale routinely across emergency settings to meet the range of needs of crisis affected populations.

**Specific Objective 3:** By 2015, there is a clear leadership/coordination structure for CTP within the humanitarian sector (global and country level), ensuring shared learning, a consistent approach and the evolution of best practice.

**Specific Objective 4:** By 2015, humanitarian agencies have the tools, procedures and skill sets to implement quality cash and voucher programmes rapidly, appropriately, and at scale

3 CaLP Activities for 2012–2015

These objectives indicate the need for a significant shift for the CaLP team:

<table>
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<th>to:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• advocacy for cash based programming (and ensuring evidence to demonstrate it is a valid approach) + development of basic guidelines and rolling out training to individuals</td>
<td>• Development of institutional capacity; • Development of leadership and coordination structures and operational partnerships (donors, UN agencies and NGOs) to enhance actual rapid adoption of CTP options in early stages of emergency response. • Evidence base on impact of CTP (and how to design and implement CTP at scale in emergency conditions).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Specific Objective 1:**
*By 2015, 85% of CTPs are designed and implemented using appropriate and consistent information analysis*

By 2015 market analysis is an integral part of systemic information collection and evidence based decision making within the humanitarian sector throughout the project cycle. Specifically, agencies are able, and have confidence, to analyse the impact of shocks and response activities on market systems with the outcome of improved protection and recovery of local economies – while ensuring adequate assistance to targeted programme beneficiaries. In addition there are agreed standards for assessments for CTPs and agencies are complying with these in all major emergencies.

1.1 Indicators

- By 2015 comprehensive market analysis is standard (used in all humanitarian response and throughout the project cycle) and response plans explicitly include market based responses.
- By 2015 initial assessments by agencies are better coordinated and include necessary elements to take an informed decision for improved quality in the design of CTPs.
- By 2015 all decisions in CTPs are based on thorough analysis of needs and markets
• By 2015 core humanitarian sectors (WASH, Shelter, Nutrition Health, Food Security and Livelihoods, Protection) use appropriate and effective information analysis for CTPs.

• By 2015 information monitoring throughout the project cycle informs appropriate changes to implementation

1.2 Rationale

Inconsistent approaches to assessment and information analysis are limiting the timeliness, confidence and quality of CTPs. CTPs regularly fail to appropriately and systematically assess the impact and appropriateness of cash transfers on markets. As the use of cash transfers grow and cash becomes one of a range of tools available to respond to the needs of crisis affected communities, it becomes paramount that market analysis is integrated into the project cycle for all response, preparedness and recovery programmes.

Although coordinated inter agency market analysis is and should be a core practice in humanitarian response, improving decision making and efficiency at a practitioner level will involve systematic institutionalisation of market analysis. In order to achieve this objective it is essential that humanitarian actors are able to break down barriers related to the integration of market analysis. Key elements of market analysis should be incorporated into available analysis tools throughout the project cycle. Specifically these stages may include; Early Warning and information systems, emergency preparedness and contingency planning, rapid assessment and response analysis, programme monitoring and evaluation.

Through coordinating and leading learning on market analysis, CaLP will provide and promote the collection of evidence to support emerging best practice. In addition, CaLP will continue to develop and facilitate skill development in relation to needs assessment to promote quality programming. For the period of this strategy a particular focus will be on improving and promoting the use of CTPs for use in sectors other than FSL (suggested focus on WASH, Nutrition and Shelter).

1.3 Activities / Outputs

• Lead on and disseminate relevant research pieces, ensuring that they result in the development of tools and information to support best practice.

• Ensure that availability of minimum standards around CTP to support sector use of cash programming.

• Support multi sector mainstreaming through advocacy at a cluster level,

• Support development of sector specific training materials and tools.

• Advocate for the inclusion of private stakeholders at the design and implementation stages through actively widening the community of practice, supporting joint case study development and strategic learning partnerships.

• Development of tools to support institutionalisation of market analysis

• Link to work on emergency preparedness and contingency planning to ensure appropriate information analysis

• Identifying influential stakeholders in analysis (non EFSL)

1.4 Key stakeholders

FEWSNET, IPC, WFP, UNDP, NGOs, IFRC, National Government (/ VAM, VAC), private sector (capacity to respond, set up costs), the Cluster system (Early Recovery & GFSC, followed by Shelter & WASH)
Specific Objective 2:  
By 2015, CTP is implemented at scale routinely across emergency settings to meet the range of needs of crisis affected populations.

2.1 Indicators

- Donor portfolios reflect at least an equal allocation of resources to CTP as to in-kind
- 50% of all humanitarian aid disbursed is in support of CTP in 2015
- Key humanitarian agencies146 will have implemented large scale CTP147 in major emergencies
- Research and advocacy contributes to greater join up and coordination in humanitarian response with the result of at scale funding and response in CTP
- By 2015 all large scale, well funded emergencies include multi sector cash programmes
- Link to specific objective 4 to ensure that agencies have systems, procedures, tools and staff in place for effective and timely CTP

2.2 Rationale

Cash transfer programmes do not come close in scale to the more usual distribution of goods and attempts to reach tens of thousands of people have failed or been delayed so significantly that they have limited impact on affected communities. In addition, the bulk of cash transfer programming remains within the FSL sector.

It is envisaged that at scale CTPs will be facilitated by a range of activities targeting the existing obstacles, examples of which are restrictive donor policies, weak agency operational systems, poor information analysis and a lack of confidence in cash and voucher programming. This specific objective will be supported by targeted advocacy, information and tool development and enhanced coordination.

2.3 Activities

- Research – scale up and preparedness/dissemination.. follow up on research; develop key messages for advocacy and ensure adoption of research recommendations through the appropriate dissemination of findings
- Coordination of CTP preparedness planning – focal points, tool development, facilitating in country coordination mechanisms and pre-agreements for distribution channels.
- Pilot’ response at scale with donors and agencies in humanitarian response – scenario planning
- SOPs for operations – finance systems / transfer mechanisms/ accountability standards
- Working with donors for consistent policies on cash – advocacy

2.4 Key stakeholders

Institutional donors (ECHO, DFID, USAID, AUSAIID, CIDA, SDC, NORAD), UN Cluster lead agencies, IFRC, Finance staff and Ops Managers.

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146 At least 3 UN agencies, the IFRC, 2 Governments and 5 INGOs
147 Reaching more than 40,000 households
Specific Objective 3: by 2015, there is a clear leadership/coordination structure for CTP within the humanitarian sector (global and country level), ensuring shared learning, a consistent approach and the evolution of best practice.

3.1 Indicators

- By 2015 an effective inter cluster CTP coordination system/mechanism is set up at the global level
- By 2015 cash coordination and learning platforms are established in all countries and contexts with humanitarian interventions (not under the responsibility of CaLP)
- By 2015, CTPs are evaluated and documented across all different sectors of assistance
- By 2013 a more systematic sharing of learning/resources exists between agencies for mutual learning

3.2 Rationale

Although cash and voucher transfer programming has increased in the past years, no formal coordination mechanism exists for quality control and facilitating sharing/learning. This in part reflects the tension between aid systems organized by sector and CTP which breaks down distinctions between sectors. Informal coordination mechanisms exist on the ground, but they are not very inclusive.

As CTP requires the effective coordination of not only NGOs and implementers but also private sector and Governments this coordination will not necessarily sit within the cluster system. CaLP will also look into the possibility / appropriateness of supporting coordination of emergency CTP within long term structures, especially in countries facing frequent slow onset or complex emergencies.

3.3 Activities

- Lead the process to develop/influence the structure, the composition and home of the global and national coordination mechanism and in emergencies/countries.
- Where possible, provide support to set up inter-cluster cash coordination group in large scale humanitarian crises to ensure appropriateness, quality and consistency of response by agencies.
- Advocate for the creation of a global and national cash coordination mechanism to ensure new quality control standards are developed and/or are adhered to.
- By 2013, develop a more systematic mechanism of sharing and learning between agencies for mutual learning. (Documentation, learning events, website)
- Identify gaps in knowledge and bridge these through research and evidence collection (ongoing)

3.4 Key stakeholders

- Humanitarian NGOs – local and international, Donors – ECHO, DFID, OFDA/USAID, CIDA, AusAID; UN agencies and IO-WFP, IFRC, UNDP, OCHA, UN Cluster Leads; Country Government and relevant ministries.
Specific Objective 4:
By 2015, humanitarian agencies have the tools, procedures and skill sets to implement quality cash and voucher programmes rapidly, appropriately, and at scale

4.1 Indicators
- A comprehensive set of CTP trainings are available and accessible to all humanitarian actors.
- By 2015 e-learning courses, guidelines and other tools are available /accessible / integrated / handed over
- By 2015 key humanitarian agencies have appropriately skilled people and staffing structures that support cash transfer programming
- By 2015 all major donors have systems, procedures and resources to support CTP during emergencies

4.2 Rationale
Limited capacity encompasses a lack of confidence, skills and tools to deliver CTP to an appropriate quality. Although the use of CTP is growing, poor quality programming and decision making is limiting the impact and scalability of CTP. It is envisaged that a diverse approach to increasing and institutionalising capacity will support scalable and high impact programming.

As well as focusing on coordination, analysis and scalability through objective 1, 2 and 3, by 2015 CaLP will have effectively supported agencies to implement cash programmes and will support quality through skills sharing and development. By 2015, CaLP will no longer be required to conduct training as skills and tools will be available and all major humanitarian agencies will have mainstreamed the appropriate systems, skills and human resources to deliver on quality.

4.3 Activities
- CaLP will continue to conduct CTP trainings throughout 2012 and 2013. During this time a focus will be on developing the appropriate information and guidance to institutionalise training within organisations and make available training on e platforms and through external training agencies (CaLP will begin to focus on developing institutional capacities not individual skills).
- Research and knowledge sharing will support the development of emergency preparedness and contingency planning.
- Advocacy will target a wide range of donors and institutions to develop policies and systems that support scalable and quality transfer programming.

4.4 Key Stakeholders
Institutional donors, private sector, UN agencies, IFRC and NGOs. Local and National Governments.

4 Operating Principles
- We seek synergies between humanitarian response and longer term assistance strategies
We will do this through our work on focal countries, coordination and ensuring this is routinely considered in our research pieces.
- We work with a range of stakeholders, including the private sector, governments, NGOs and IFIs
We will do this by actively engaging different stakeholders in all elements of our work. In addition, in this strategy period we will work with key strategic stakeholders to ensure that learning encompasses and informs practices beyond the typical humanitarian actors, particularly strengthening relationships between NGOs, the IFRC and UN with private sector and institutions.
• We are not a consultancy / HR services provider

Through all elements of our work we will commit to providing high quality and accurate technical support to CTP. We do not aim to provide surge capacity or technical oversight from the CaLP Steering Committee or the CaLP team. However, we may facilitate the exchange of HR services and consultancy through the website, the community of practice and through our country focal points.

• We promote good practice through collaboration and learning

We will continue to hold learning events, which we expect to get increasingly technical as our community of practice develops. In addition, we will support the role out of similar events and initiatives undertaken and led by members of the community of practice with tools and technical resources. We will actively seek collaboration in our Workplan at all stages and endeavor to include similar initiatives undertaken outside of this strategy in our learning events and communications.

• We value and encourage the active participation of the whole community of practice

We will maximize the opportunity to engage the community of practice in our work and continue to develop the technology used to disseminate this

• We promote a multi-sector approach to cash

This new strategy sees an increased focus on cash use in other sectors. We learnt in phase one of the CaLP strategy, specifically through our work on the SPHERE, that development of CTP outside of FSL is limited. We will work with the sector system, through our research and through tool development to increase capacity in other sectors.

• We recognise cash is just one modality option for response in an emergency

Our updated vision looks at improved overall humanitarian response. We do not advocate for the sole use of CTP but look to ensure that all appropriate opportunities to use CTP can be maximized. An example of this approach is the Market research which promotes the use of market analysis prior to decision making around the modality of transfers.

5 Internal Values

• Professional
• Inclusive
• Transparent
• Consensus
• Needs-driven
• Independent
• Challenging & critical
• Committed
• Objective
• Quality focused


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Context
The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) is a networking and knowledge sharing platform that originates from the will to gather lessons from the response to the Asian Tsunami in 2005. The CaLP aims to broaden the capacity of the community of practice and to promote the adoption of Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) where appropriate in response to humanitarian crises.

The CaLP is comprised of Oxfam GB, the British Red Cross, Save the Children, Action Against Hunger/ACF International and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Members of these agencies make up a Steering Committee that helps ‘steer’ an implementing team made up of staff recruited across the agencies.

Evidence and experience in the use of Cash Transfers Programmes (CTP) in emergencies is mounting. Structural conditions in global markets and in humanitarian relief circuits imply there will be increased pressure for the adoption of cash transfer approaches into the future. However, the humanitarian community has still not reached a critical mass whereby cash is considered a "normal" response at scale.

Currently, programmes delivering in-kind aid far exceed the scope and scale of CTPs with the bulk of CTPs being implemented within the Food Security and Livelihoods sector. Yet, attempts to reach tens of thousands of people with in-kind programmes can often fail or be so significantly delayed that they have limited impact on affected communities. Through CaLP activities, it is envisaged that the use of CTPs at scale will be facilitated through targeting the existing obstacles, examples of which are restrictive donor policies, weak agency operational systems, poor information analysis and a lack of confidence in cash and voucher programming.

Inconsistent approaches to assessment and information analysis are limiting the timeliness, confidence and quality of CTPs. CTPs regularly fail to appropriately and systematically assess the impact and appropriateness of cash transfers on markets. As the use of cash transfers grow and cash becomes one of a range of tools available to respond to the needs of crisis affected communities, it becomes paramount that market analysis is integrated into the project cycle for all response, preparedness and recovery programmes.

Although coordinated inter agency market analysis is and should be a core practice in humanitarian response, improving decision making and efficiency at a practitioner level will involve systematic institutionalisation of market analysis. In order to achieve this objective it is essential that humanitarian actors are able to break down barriers related to the integration of market analysis. Key elements of market analysis should be incorporated into available analysis tools throughout the project cycle. Specifically these stages may include; Early Warning and information systems, emergency preparedness and contingency planning, rapid assessment and response analysis, programme monitoring and evaluation.

Through coordinating learning on market analysis, CaLP will provide and promote the collection of evidence to support emerging best practice. In addition, CaLP will continue to develop and facilitate skill development in relation to needs assessment to promote quality programming. For the period of this strategy a particular focus will be on improving and promoting the use of CTPs for use in sectors other than FSL (suggested focus on WASH, Nutrition and Shelter). A diverse approach to increasing and institutionalising capacity will support scalable and high impact programming. CaLP will support quality through skills sharing and development.
Furthermore although cash and voucher transfer programming has increased in recent years, no formal coordination mechanism exists for quality control and facilitating sharing/learning. This, in part, reflects the tension between aid systems organized by sector and CTP, which breaks down distinctions between sectors. Informal coordination mechanisms exist on the ground, but they are not always inclusive. Appropriate coordination structures and mechanisms need to be inclusive of all actors (Government, private sector and Governments as well as NGOs) and not done in isolation.

The CaLP, in line with its Advocacy strategy, will advocate for appropriate coordination mechanisms, primarily within long term structures, to enable improved response. The CaLP will also work on advocacy and capacity building for contingency planning and preparedness, in turn enforcing the need for coordination.

In this context, there is an important need to expedite the adoption of evidence and improve practice within the humanitarian sector. The CaLP is increasingly being looked to for leadership, expertise and evidence to support cash transfer programming in humanitarian situations. With an outreach to over 1,500 practitioners through trainings and online forums in 2012, and the presence of cash coordination groups in several countries, CaLP is well positioned to develop and mainstream tools and trainings, gather learning and collate information from research, and to advocate for better coordination and standardised approaches for CTP in emergencies.

**Rationale of the strategy revision**

In 2012, a strategy was developed for the CaLP covering the period January 2012- January 2015. Considering the evolution of the context and the progress in achieving its objectives, a review of the strategy document was undertaken in First Quarter of 2013. Discussions were held with regards to the need to update this strategy, to improve indicators and objectives as well as to operationalise the strategy so the activities implemented better reflect CaLP three core areas of expertise (capacity building, action research and advocacy).

This document therefore represents an interim revision for the period January 2013–December 2014. At this stage there are no significant changes to the overall direction, though indicators have been reviewed. Any full revision for the long term future of CALP will be dependent on a full review which is to take place before the end of 2013.

**CaLP Objective**

As CaLP enters a new period with wider recognition and stronger institutional capacity, its overall objective should evolve and become more ambitious. By continuing to promote appropriate, timely and quality cash transfer programming in humanitarian response it is believed that the capacity of the humanitarian community for meeting the immediate needs of crisis affected communities will be strengthened. CaLP’s overall objective for the period is:

*CTP is routinely considered as an appropriate emergency response option and, where implemented, is done so, in a high quality and timely manner and, when relevant, at scale.*

The achievement of CaLP overall objective is not expected during this strategy period but the work in the phase 2013-2014 will contribute to it. The next section details how CaLP intend to contribute to the objective through a combination of activities within CaLP’s three core areas of expertise.

**CaLP operational framework**

CaLP will work during the period 2013-2014 to contribute to the achievement of its overall objective which will be done by implementing activities across CaLP three main areas of activities:

- Capacity Building and training material development
- Action Research & Evidence gathering
- Advocacy

These areas of activities will form the results of CaLP operational framework for the period 2013–2014.
Capacity building forming **Result 1: Key humanitarian agencies acquire or improve their knowledge and practice to design and implement quality cash and voucher programmes.**

Action research and evidence gathering forming **Result 2: Key humanitarian stakeholders access tools, good practice, action research and programme guidance to improve the quality of CTP.**

Given the importance of CaLP advocacy work, the advocacy work via information sharing with key stakeholders and the advocacy for improved cash coordination and preparedness have been differentiated in **Result 3: Key humanitarian stakeholders have a better understanding of the appropriateness of CTP through targeted advocacy and information sharing** and **Result 4: Key humanitarian stakeholders show progress in addressing limitations in CTP coordination and preparedness through targeted advocacy and information sharing.**

The logical framework below details how CaLP intend to contribute to its overall objective within the period 2013–2014 by implementing activities in its 3 core areas of expertise, forming the 4 results of the below operational framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of the Action</th>
<th>Cash Learning Partnership 2013–2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CaLP Objective for 2013–2014</strong></td>
<td>CTP is routinely considered as an appropriate emergency response option and, where implemented, is done so, in a high quality and timely manner and, when relevant, at scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result 1: Capacity Building</strong></td>
<td>Key humanitarian agencies acquire or improve their knowledge and practice to design and implement quality cash and voucher programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result 2: Action research and Evidence gathering</strong></td>
<td>Key humanitarian stakeholders have free access to tools, good practice, action research and programme guidance to improve the quality of CTP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Humanitarian agencies here include all stakeholders that are involved in design and implementation of CTP
2 within the CaLP Competency Framework notation system
3 Ibid
4 Ibid

148 Humanitarian agencies here include all stakeholders that are involved in design and implementation of CTP from all the different sectors.
### Result 3: Advocacy/Comm and information sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key humanitarian stakeholders have a better understanding of the appropriateness of CTP through targeted advocacy and information sharing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• At least 2 Learning Events per focus region share good practice in cash and voucher programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• At least four different sectors (Wash, shelter, food security, nutrition, logistic, finance, etc.) are represented at each learning event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 100% increase of the French speaker members of the online community group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 5 CaLP Steering Committee agencies input CTP programme data into the Cash Atlas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 3 Donors (e.g. ECHO, DFID, OFDA) advocate for the use of the Cash Atlas amongst their partners by the end of 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Learning Event report and feedback mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• D-group registration number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cash Atlas usage data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donor communication (formal or informal) on the cash Atlas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Result 4: Advocacy for cash coordination and preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key humanitarian stakeholders show progress in addressing limitations in CTP coordination and preparedness through targeted advocacy and information sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• By the end of the project, 2 key humanitarian stakeholder’s contingency plans in each of the focus region have included adoption of CTP in their response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• At least one informal or formal country level cash coordination structure is functional(^1) (including adequate resources) in first phase emergency response in each focus region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• At regional level there is an active(^2) RCWG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OCHA integrates cash-relevant guidance into two of their coordination tools(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• At least two clusters include cash in strategic planning and coordination guidance at global level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contingency plans document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordination meeting attendance list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OCHA’s coordination tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guidance or strategy documents developed by the global clusters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1. Criteria for a functional coordination group during first phase emergency: meeting at least once every fortnight, including at least 10 participants from 5 different agencies
2. Criteria for an active RCWG outside of emergency phase: meeting at least 6 times a year, with at least 20 persons from 5 different agencies
3. e.g. MIRA guidelines, CAP preparedness and management tools, CERF, CHF, HC and head of office guidelines and/or training materials

### Operating Principles

- **CaLP seeks synergies between humanitarian response and longer term assistance strategies**
  
  This will be done through its work on focal region, coordination and ensuring this is routinely considered in its action research pieces.

- **CaLP works with a range of stakeholders, including the private sector, governments, NGOs and IFIs**
  
  CaLP is actively engaging with different stakeholders in all elements of its work. In addition, in this strategy period CaLP will work with key strategic stakeholders to ensure that learning encompasses and informs practices beyond the typical humanitarian actors, particularly strengthening relationships between NGOs, the IFRC and UN with private sector and institutions.
• **CaLP seeks partnership with other agencies within the community of practice**
  To increase its reach and the impact of its action, CaLP is seeking partnership (formal or informal) with agencies from the CTP community of practice, to work on specific area (i.e. capacity building, action research and advocacy) or activities.

• **CaLP is not a consultancy / HR services provider**
  Through all elements of its work CaLP commit to providing high quality and accurate technical support to CTP. CaLP do not aim to provide surge capacity or technical oversight from the CaLP Steering Committee or the CaLP team. However, CaLP may facilitate the exchange of HR services and consultancy through the website, the community of practice and through its regional focal points.

• **CaLP promotes good practice through collaboration and learning**
  CaLP will hold learning events, which are expected to get increasingly technical as the community of practice develops. In addition, CaLP will support the roll out of similar events and initiatives undertaken and led by members of the community of practice. CaLP will actively seek collaboration in its work plan at all stages and endeavour to include similar initiatives undertaken outside of this strategy in its learning events and communications.

• **CaLP values and encourages the active participation of the whole community of practice**
  CaLP will maximize the opportunity to engage the community of practice in its work and continue to develop the technology used to disseminate this.

• **CaLP promotes a multi-sector approach to cash**
  CaLP has learned, specifically through its work on the SPHERE, that development of CTP outside of Food Security and Livelihood is still limited. CaLP will work with the sector system, through its research and tool development to increase capacity in other sectors.

• **CaLP recognises cash is just one modality option for response in an emergency**
  CaLP do not advocate for the sole use of CTP but look to ensure that all appropriate opportunities to use CTP can be maximized.
ANNEX 7: THE FUTURE OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

To overcome the barriers of cash transfer programming (CTP) implementation, institutionalisation and scale-up, a number of areas for future focus and investment can be summarised as follows:

- shifting organisational and key stakeholder mindsets;
- improving leadership and coordination;
- institutionalising CTP in humanitarian organisations;
- investment at country level with host governments, and support to local non-government organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs);
- funding frameworks and programming support.

These suggestions are relevant for a range of actors, and specific recommendations for CaLP are noted in the report.

Shifting mindsets

Global discussions need to move ‘up’ from the technocratic community. There needs to be a drive for high-level global and regional advocacy, targeting executive and senior decision makers. As one interviewee said, we ‘have to hit to big players and the small and fringe ones also’ and get cash on the ‘top three or top ten list’ of topics that are discussed with heads of state, foreign ministers, other government ministers and regional bodies in both host countries and in donor and humanitarian headquarters within Europe, the UK and the US. General advocacy must continue at country/region/field level with UN agencies (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], World Food Programme [WFP], Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO], United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)/clusters. There should also more lobbying with governments, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Pan American Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Economic Community Of West African States, the Southern African Development Community and other regional bodies, along with private sector and technology providers.

CTP needs senior-level champions and spokespeople who can influence the public and key decision makers. Messaging should help ‘raise beneficiary voices and change perceptions of disaster and war-affected people and communities’ and create more positive ‘narratives’ about how beneficiaries use cash. The fact that CTP is a regular part of many social safety nets in developed countries can be used as a key argument with the general public in prime donor countries. More advocacy products such as simple case studies and stories of impact are needed including: one-pagers; video tools for key decision makers; digestible communications products accessible to high-level people; high-level events with the right people; and clips for use in training and on social media.

Improving leadership and coordination

Effective coordination and leadership on CTP will contribute to better quality CTP programming. There appears to have been little improvement from Kauffmann and Collins’s critical gaps in CTP coordination. They recommended that cash be mainstreamed through the clusters. However as one respondent said, ‘we didn’t advance on that, the document was produced, but nothing changed’. Some have pushed for OCHA to take global leadership of cash coordination because it is cross-cutting, but as one key respondent said, ‘the dream of having OCHA take over cash coordination is misguided. OCHA will never be able to lead cash inter-clusterally and globally… they won’t be seen as neutral’. There was a fairly universal view amongst stakeholders that WFP should not have this global lead role on CTP, especially given its sectoral focus on food. A reformed CaLP with broader membership, including key UN agencies, could be the nominated agent to lead CTP coordination and

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149 Quotations that are not referenced are from interviews and the online survey. Names have been withheld to maintain anonymity.
mainstreaming. It would have the benefit of being seen as a neutral inter-agency initiative without the perceived bias of a specific agency agenda.

Thus there needs to be an agreed place for CTP within the global humanitarian architecture agreed and supported through the IASC and the global clusters. This would assist in steering global CTP issues, creating global standards and greater predictability in support, financing/funding of CTP in emergencies, and possibly the creation of a rapid response mechanism for cash coordination or CashCAP. The vision of mainstreaming CTP through all the clusters is still valid. This needs to be supported by IASC agencies through the nomination of a lead agency/agencies. CTP must be addressed in preparedness work, contingency planning, and common assessments for all humanitarian agencies. Supportive donors could play a more convincing role and steer agencies towards collaboration, coordination and global tracking of CTP.

Institutionalising CTP in humanitarian organisations

Significant change in CTP (quality, scale and attitude) will not happen without major shifts in humanitarian organisations – institutionalisation. What is specifically needed is strategy and systems reform. This is especially in the operational support areas including administration, finance, logistics, procurement and communications, as well as in the programme-operations interface which includes Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), preparedness and contingency planning. Institutionalisation is a holistic and multi-faceted process. First, organisations need a CTP vision and a strategy or means to achieve the vision, plus the will and commitment to change.151 A structured institutionalisation initiative to support reform would be beneficial. The drive for institutional reform to support CTP must come from within organisations, but CaLP’s advocacy work and that of its members and allies could assist this, along with CaLP’s specific support for institutionalisation. It is strongly recommended that a generic SOP for CTP, perhaps some training/briefing materials and a much simpler toolkit for starting CTP in an organisation, is developed. This would enable humanitarian agencies whose primary focus is to support local partners.152

Capacity building

Continuing to build CTP capacity, knowledge and skills will be instrumental in tackling many of the barriers to implementing CTP. There exists, in general, an expectation that capacity can be built through conducting a short training course. Evidence shows that training is just a part of the capacity-building process – a process that needs institutional vision and strategy, appropriate institutional systems and procedures.153 Training ‘must take place as an integrated part of a development process, grounded in good human resources practice”154 including a capacity-building strategy with the means to measure impact. One idea is to link training with the process of institutionalisation – so trainees for CTP courses would have to come from organisations which had progressed with institutionalisation. The need for more resources and training to support non-Western partners (especially NGOs) was highlighted, along with documents in other languages, especially French, Spanish and Arabic, to overcome language and cultural barriers. There could also be an accreditation process or certification programme for CTP training, as well as links to a university or learning institution in Europe, North America or South Africa, or to the Humanitarian and Leadership Academy.

Evidence building and sharing

There is a continued need for more research, documentation, and learning and sharing events. Topics suggested through the review, which complement those outlined in the recent CaLP-commissioned study on research gaps,155 include:

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151 Some would not agree saying that cash is a modality and it does not need a strategy, but this is short-sighted as CTP requires systemic changes and cross-sectoral engagement, which are best helped by having an agency strategy or plan around CTP institutionalisation.
152 Such as Diakonia, Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid, Finish Refugee Council, etc.
153 Mountfield, B. (2011) Review of the Partnership between IIRC and CaLP, commissioned by CaLP.
154 Ibid.
155 Austin, L. (2014a), Research Gaps in Cash Transfer Programming, commissioned by CaLP.
monetisation;
- misuse and losses of in-kind versus cash;
- multi-sectoral use of CTP in a holistic programme;
- multiple examples of CTP use in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), shelter, health, nutrition and education;
- success stories;
- examples of collaborative approaches with government and national investment in governments;
- examples of CTP in urban settings, insecure environments and refugee contexts;
- examples of good market analysis and its impact on programming in all sectors;
- case studies showing how CTP and in-kind aid can work side by side;
- cost benefit analysis of cash interventions;
- examples of how CTP has achieved the whole outcome of an objective in a humanitarian operation;
- shared learning on how to use technology as a way to move cash to beneficiaries;
- shared experience of using innovations in banking, mobile phone and financial services.

More sharing and learning opportunities to promote intra- and inter-organisational learning forums were suggested. Country-level and regional learning events (not in Europe) were favoured, especially in regions where CTP is not yet widespread. This includes more ‘informal events of which the format is standard and can be rolled out simultaneously in different locations’ and events like the World Humanitarian Summit where CTP should be a key theme.

CTP needs a ‘clear link’ to the development community which has been doing conditional cash transfers at scale for ten years. There would be an obvious benefit to building on this infrastructure, the robust evidence and the experience in Asia, Africa and Latin America to capitalise on that and work together. This is also a way to bridge the humanitarian-development divide.156

**Investment at country level with host governments and support to NGOs and CBOs**

Investment and collaboration at country level is vital to support the goal of making CTP at scale more possible, more efficient and with less risk. There is a need to work with governments to prepare to implement cash at scale quickly in large emergencies. This includes work on legislation and infrastructure to improve the use of technologies in CTP distribution. Capitalising on the ‘renewed assertiveness’ of host governments, and an increase in the involvement of regional bodies (ASEAN, etc.) to provide more leadership and coordination, is a good place to start. This work could begin in Asia and East Africa where governments have been previously involved (Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines) in CTP, and would help build momentum there.

Additionally, or alternatively, a more structured CTP coordination and institutionalisation approach could be piloted in countries where governments have the architecture and capacity to house CTP, such as in Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines or in Latin America. There is also a need to spread the discussion about and use of CTP to other geographic regions (perhaps with an initial focus on Latin America and the Middle East) and overcome current linguistic and cultural barriers.

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Programming, funding frameworks and partnerships

Programming support and partnerships

There is a stated need for more tools, guidelines and standards including: better practice examples which are not Food, Securities and Livelihoods (FSL) related; cash templates; operational minimum standards; SOPs; and indicators by sector. It is recommended that a few key agencies/consortia collaborate specifically (OCHA, CaLP and Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), but also others such as donors, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and major NGOs on ensuring that CTP indicators start to be included routinely in common assessment tools. There is also work to be done to ensure that measurable indicators for CTP and market-based assessment make it into monitoring plans, real-time evaluation guidelines, evaluation frameworks for humanitarian programmes, and other monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Another idea is the creation of a cash marker (such as the IASC gender marker), which could be a question or series of questions, with a ranking. This would measure the degree to which CTP and market analysis have been considered in assessments, responses, monitoring, and real-time evaluations etc. A significant idea in the interest of accountability would be also to include a marker on beneficiary preference. This could transform measurement of impact and accountability.

Much more effort needs to be put into moving CTP into new sectors, but few practical ideas were given beyond research on good examples and the creation of specific CTP guidelines in shelter, public health and education. It is necessary to engage staff from these sectors to participate in Cash Working Groups (CWGs), especially at country level, and for CTP to be a part of other sectors’ agenda at global and country-level clusters. This role is beyond CaLP and is the responsibility of the cluster leaders, or of agencies with strong capacity and ability to influence the work of the clusters.

In addition to all of the capacity building, training and resources CaLP provides, many would like to see an active and useful roster of expertise in CTP implementation. A number of respondents suggested a CashCAP (such as the Gender Standby Capacity Project [GenCAP])\(^{157}\) and the Protection Standby Capacity Project [ProCAP]) with global funding and recognition. This would be linked to the yet to be determined global mandated home for CTP and CaLP, as mentioned earlier.

Continued collaboration and support is needed with the private sector on the development of new tools and financial instruments. This could include tools for electronic transfers, and methods that help monitor and track CTP with less risk and with improved data management and privacy protection measures.

Funding frameworks and partnerships

More and larger-scale funding of CTP was identified as a need, along with quicker and simpler funding mechanisms. There was a call for donors to break down barriers for funding windows which currently exist by sector and to remove requirements related to food aid funding, to maximise and encourage local purchase. The humanitarian community needs diversification of donor funding for CTP. This requires more outreach to: new donors who have been comfortable with in-kind but not CTP (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Arab States); to the public in regions other than the West; to corporations and non-traditional donors such as philanthropic organisations; and to direct-giving actors, crowd-funding and private sector partnerships. Advocacy between donors on CTP was found to be a gap and a much-needed step forward.

Respondents called for clearer expectations on reporting, such as: not expecting CTP to respond to monitoring and evaluation demands over and above in-kind programming; non-sector specific logframes; guidance on sectors other than food; and bringing in accountability for programming choices, i.e. requiring reporting on why particular methods were chosen.

There is an important role for the donors to stimulate cross-sectoral and quality programme development in CTP. Donors should actively encourage UN agencies and NGOs to work together on a larger proposal for CTP in some contexts. Agencies should be held accountable for ensuring true collaboration and information sharing.

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157 GenCAP – an IASC initiative created in 2007 in collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council – seeks to facilitate and strengthen capacity and leadership of humanitarians to undertake and promote gender equality programming to ensure that the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men of all ages, are taken into account in humanitarian action at global, regional and country levels. It deploys technical advisors.
Donors often require this from agencies, and notice when it is absent, but there is usually no negative fallout from this. They can provide a strong impetus to implement good practices in CTP which can include incentives for using rights-based approaches and considering beneficiary preference. Incentives should encourage and invest in capacity building specifically in support of CTP institutionalisation, provision of medium-term technical assistance to organisations wishing to implement CTP for the first time, and support for NGOs. Donors have a critical role in bridging development and humanitarian aid programmes via social protection, social safety nets, resilience and disaster risk reduction programmes.158

Donors which have indicated support for CTP, such as ECHO; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within USAID (OFDA); the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development; and the Swiss government need to be encouraged to play a critical role within the donor community to campaign for more and longer-term funding for CTP from other donors. Active engagement by leading donors, the UN and humanitarian actors should increase with the World Bank and the Asian and African Development Banks to support links with ongoing national-level social safety net programmes and long-term cash transfers that could be linked to emergency CTP. There is also a need for increased donor coordination around CTP in the interest of good humanitarian donorship.

ANNEX 8: POSSIBLE GOVERNANCE MODELS

Private company

The private company model would work best if CaLP aims to become primarily a service delivery agency. It would be less viable if CaLP aims to focus on advocacy and reform in the humanitarian sector. The benefits and drawbacks are outlined below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More flexible and responsive model.</td>
<td>Seen as ‘outside’ the humanitarian and development inner circle, as a private sector body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent status.</td>
<td>Usually private companies cannot be part of national or country-level coordination bodies for the humanitarian and development sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to determine its own work agenda.</td>
<td>It would also not be able to take a place within the global or regional coordination structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not accountable to multiple member agencies.</td>
<td>It would lose the legitimacy it gains from being made up of and drawing from a critical mass of large humanitarian agencies who directly implement cash transfer programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplify the management, financial and staffing processes.</td>
<td>Its existence and viability would be primarily market or demand driven and profit driven, rather than needs or community of practice driven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its existence and viability would be primarily market or demand driven.</td>
<td>It may struggle to remain relevant and have that direct link to field implementation which is crucial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could be located anywhere or nowhere.</td>
<td>Its work would all be on a fee or short-term contract basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could possibly avoid the complexity of staff management, labour laws and registration, depending on the form taken.</td>
<td>May also struggle financially and have to develop a financial model to retain staff or pool earnings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could take various forms in terms of formal registration.</td>
<td>May seek the activities that provide higher fees for service rather than those that are the priority of the community of practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could bid with other private sector companies or NGOs for larger pieces of work.</td>
<td>It would have to compete for contracts to do research and these would be unlikely to provide stable ongoing core funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could still access institutional donor funding but only in categories for which private companies are eligible.</td>
<td>May be unlikely to be able to retain core staff at senior level funded full-time, and so staff may drift in and out to find work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be able to create an investment fund to support innovation and research or tide the organisation over in lean times.</td>
<td>Unlikely to have the credibility, traction and leverage needed for the influencing work, so this would probably cease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It may be able to reach more stakeholders outside the humanitarian sector and become a resource with wider remit and links.</td>
<td>Unlikely to attract ongoing donor funding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may not have a board or steering committee, which could be a gap.

May be difficult to attract a board or steering committee if it decides to have one.

If it has an actual office (as opposed to a virtual or informal structure) it may also run into difficulties with local work permits, international recruitment or insurance.

Less control over financial sources and may prioritise due diligence less due to this.
Independent non-government organisation (NGO)

This option is characterised by CaLP seeking to register itself as an independent charity/NGO/non-profit organisation. CaLP would be an NGO working in the humanitarian sector like any other international NGO (INGO) and would be able to apply directly for funding and manage all its own systems and processes. There are a few examples of collaborative initiatives becoming their own independent entity. The Core Group is one of these, and the Start Network is moving in this direction.\(^{159}\)

\(^{159}\) The Core Group started in 1997 as an informal coalition of NGOs, initially housed in World Vision. It incorporated in 2001, thus moving from an alliance hosted by World Vision to an independent entity. This decision was driven primarily by identity issues – there were concerns that donors and other key stakeholders might perceive that the hosting agency, World Vision, was being favoured and/or benefited more from Core Group funding, as well as to limit rivalry between members. The Start Network (formerly known as CBHA) is also embarking upon a process of change and becoming an independent organisation.
### The benefits and drawbacks of CaLP becoming an independent NGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would have independent status and be able to establish direct partnerships with other agencies and consortia without approval of a set of members.</td>
<td>It may experience being seen as ‘outside’ the humanitarian/development inner circle as a new non-operational NGO, and thus it may be difficult to retain its current level of credibility, traction and leverage for the influencing work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be able to determine its own work agenda.</td>
<td>It may lose the legitimacy it gains from being comprised of large humanitarian agencies which directly implement CTP. It would be seen less as a collaborative inter-agency initiative focused on collective action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be accountable to a board and donors but not fully accountable to multiple member agencies.</td>
<td>It may struggle to take a place within the global, regional or country coordination structures, as this requires either country or regional presence or active members which can take this role on behalf of CaLP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would still gain from the connection to the NGO world.</td>
<td>Without a direct link to field implementation through its members, which is highly valued by its community of practice, it may lose some of its relevance and legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could seek donor funding through normal channels like other NGOs (note some limitations to this in right hand column).</td>
<td>Members may not have as great a vested interest as it would no longer be a consortium. Members would be buying a service through membership, but would perhaps be less likely to contribute time or other resources to an independent organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management processes would be simpler than the current model.</td>
<td>CaLP would be more clearly in competition with its members for resources as an equal independent NGO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be able to build on the reputation it has gained as a consortium and build on its current network.</td>
<td>There may be some different funding challenges with donors, as most generally fund agencies that they are already familiar with, have a track record with, and that have usually passed through some sort of process of accreditation, review or staging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could still have members that would contribute financially and possibly with time or technical input, but not by channelling funding from donors as this would be done directly.</td>
<td>Independent status requires considerable ongoing operational costs for all NGOs, which are difficult for a small NGO to manage. CaLP would likely have to ramp up the cost-recovery component of its work to raise enough money to cover all operational costs, and look at more short-term contracts, as it costs more to do all these processes independently rather than be subsidised by the host agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could have a board and a technical advisory group.</td>
<td>If CaLP wished to do research it would have to compete for contracts, and these would be unlikely to provide the stable, ongoing core funding that CaLP needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The financial costs for establishing this model are not prohibitive.</td>
<td>It may continue to be difficult to retain ongoing core staff at a senior level, funded full-time (as CaLP experiences now).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Annexes**

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77
CaLP will need to determine if it is necessary to become an independent organisation given the costs: financial; the timeframe; the investment and leadership needed; and whether the outcome can be justified by the cost. A few key people strongly advised CaLP to think very carefully about going down this path, and the implications of it. As one stakeholder said, ‘you don’t solve collective action by being a separate entity. You need a collective response.’

Consortium models

The main feature of the consortium model is that it can ‘bring together organisations and individuals who remain geographically separated and institutionally distinct’ and can ‘help diverse actors work together to reach their goals in a cooperative manner.’ A consortium can be defined by the extent to which all the members have managerial and strategic input and how far there is joint decision making about the programme, as opposed to just joint implementation, but also a great deal of joint negotiation and compromise. There are two primary models which will be discussed here — the lead agency model and the alliance model.

The lead agency model

In this model the alliance is hosted (ideally entirely) by one of the member agencies (although partial hosting as CaLP currently experiences is also an option, but provides more challenges). In the US this is called the fiscal sponsorship model. The host organisation is responsible for bearing the financial and legal risk, supporting all management processes, providing all systems support, and ideally contracting all staff and holding all donor contracts directly. The host does not however have control over the work of the alliance; this is done through the membership and any steering committees, advisory groups or boards.

The choice of a hosting member for CaLP would be best determined by a clear set of criteria including: ability to operate in the chosen location for the consortium; capacity and interest to support CaLP including providing back-up investment; global reach; presence in all regions of the world and key regional hubs; ability to support field staff with office space, security and administrative support; ideally, the ability to receive funding from all major institutional donors; and willingness to sign-off on operating procedures and staffing packages which may differ from those of the host. Leadership in CTP (or volume, programme proportion or global usage) would not necessarily have to be a criterion, as the role of the host agency should largely be invisible externally and CaLP derives its support from its member agencies.

There are various ways in which members can contribute to the lead agency model and this is very much influenced by the number of members. Certain means of working and decisions work optimally with certain numbers. Members are able, and expected to, contribute through fees, fundraising, board and committee membership (etc.). The smaller the number, the closer the working relationships and the more directly engaged agencies and their representatives are. With a larger number of members the relationships may not be so close on the whole. This is also influenced by whether there are tiers of membership, which offer varying degrees of influence and require varying degrees of contribution/involvement.

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160 There are many names for this kind of model, including network and partnership. Examples include the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and the Start Network. Some of these groups have to wrangle with what they really are and what their purpose is (see also the Start Network's questions on this in their report by Partnership Broker's Association (2013), Dealing with Paradox – Stories and Lessons from the First Three Years of Consortium Building, Start Network.


163 There are also other examples which are slightly different to these such as initiatives which are really hosted or contracted-out projects, for example the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), which is primarily a project of USAID contracted to a private company, and Building Better Response.


165 Multiple hosts are possible, as CaLP currently experiences, but this is problematic. The Joint IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) Profiling Service (JIP) is hosted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), but is moving to be almost fully hosted by DRC, apart from the UNHCR-funded work. The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAP) also has staff hosted in different agencies on different contracts, although all field deployments are on Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) contracts. The Start Network has staff in different agencies but all on Save the Children contracts.

166 For example JIPs has seven. The Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) – an inter-agency initiative created in 2005 in collaboration with the NRC which builds capacity of relevant actors to enhance humanitarian protection response and deploys technical specialists – has five agencies on the Steering Committee and two observers. The host agency NRC does not sit on the Steering Committee as a member. The role of the Steering Committee is pivotal, but the host does most of the actual implementation. ACAPs has 3 members, but 11 on its board, which has an advisory role. The Start Network has 19 members, all on the board. Core Group has 55 members and they all contribute to the work of the Core Group and sit on committees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides clear line of responsibility, accountability, clear leadership and risk management.</td>
<td>Removes some of the responsibility from the members as they bear no contracts and have limited risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduces overall transaction costs significantly, especially around funding, finances and staffing.</td>
<td>Might reduce buy-in from member agencies if they sense a reduction in their responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff would all be on the same set of conditions within one agency.</td>
<td>Heavy role for the lead, with burden of risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be able to build on the reputation it has gained as a consortium and its current network.</td>
<td>May limit funding by some donors if they cannot or will not fund the lead agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could still have members but draw members’ fees, and members would still be expected to take an active and hands-on role in guiding CaLP.</td>
<td>The lead agency may exert more influence over CaLP and have CaLP meet its own agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could increase its number of members.</td>
<td>CaLP’s ability to speak independently, critique the host agency or take an opposing position on an issue to that of the host agency, may be curtailed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could have a small board and a technical advisory group.</td>
<td>Global reach may be limited, depending on the host member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains a strong base in the humanitarian world as a consortium.</td>
<td>CaLP remains reliant on a host for systems and procedures, as well as support in-country where capacity may be variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enables the consortium to focus on the work rather than management.</td>
<td>Independent branding, while necessary, might be a hurdle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gives donors more confidence.</td>
<td>May not be a high priority for the host agency – dedicating time, resources and space.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The alliance model

What characterises this model is the nature of multiple agencies collaborating, but generally implementing independently. In this model one member agency generally hosts the core team of the alliance. In the case of CaLP it would be the CaLP staff, but in other models it is called the secretariat or project management unit. Different members of the alliance may negotiate and hold contracts with various donors, which go to fund the work of the alliance. This can be done in two ways. The first is that they channel funding to a central secretariat or body which sits inside one of the members and implements the overall programme of works (this is like the current CaLP model). Then the funding is usually managed on a day-to-day basis by the core staff of the alliance (the CaLP staff/secretariat). The second is that the various member agencies execute the grants themselves and spend the money directly, all working in parallel but towards the central goals or programme of the alliance. The channelling of funding to the work of the alliance is managed by various legal, funding and administrative arrangements. The alliance model probably works best for consortia which are more strategic rather than service- or output-oriented, and where reliance on funding is not critical to the work but is primarily needed to support the work of the secretariat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires the greatest buy-in and collaboration from the members.</td>
<td>Absence of clear leadership and fully shared responsibility may be a problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits from the collective wisdom and experience of the members.</td>
<td>Is not so effective where the number of members is large or requires many tiers of membership to then be manageable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truly collective action with no leading agency.</td>
<td>Collective decision making can be very cumbersome and slow, and may require a lot of time from members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members share the risk and maximise their buy-in as they collectively share responsibility.</td>
<td>Multiple systems and procedures can be very cumbersome and time-consuming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximises funding opportunities and provides the greatest flexibility in fundraising.</td>
<td>CaLP remains reliant on a host for some systems and procedures, as well as support in-country where capacity may be variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global reach maximised.</td>
<td>Ability to speak independently of, critique, or take a different position to the members, may be curtailed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be able to build on the reputation it has gained as a consortium and its current network.</td>
<td>Staff may be on different conditions, which can create a sense of inequality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could still have members and draw member fees, and members would still be expected to take an active and hands-on role in guiding CaLP.</td>
<td>The secretariat may have a significant workload chasing members for their participation and decisions, and the staff may not be technical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It could have a board and a technical advisory group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains a strong base in the humanitarian world as a consortium.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

167 This was the model the Core Group started with.
168 For example Sanitation and Water for All (SWA), where the work is done by the members and committees, and the role of the secretariat is to provide support to members and the committee but not to implement work independently.
ANNEX 9: GOVERNANCE MODELS

**Lead agency model 1**
In this model, the donors all provide funding to one lead agency or host and CaLP sits within that lead agency. CaLP and the lead agency then pass on funding to the members to implement CaLP work, and CaLP also implements with the funding.

**Lead agency model 2**
In this model, donors fund the lead agency and CaLP sits within that. The member agencies of CaLP participate and support CaLP, but do not directly implement with the funding. CaLP implements the programme.
**Alliance model 1**  
In this model donors fund the members and the member primarily implement the work of the consortium. Some funding is passed on by members to CaLP to support the whole consortium.

**Alliance model 2**  
In this model donors contribute to members who pass some funding to CaLP. CaLP is both a secretariat to the consortium, but also implements. Members may also implement part of the CaLP programme.
ANNEX 10: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

CaLP internal documents
Austin, L. (2012) Evaluation of IFRC/CaLP Capacity Building Project, commissioned by CaLP
Austin, L. (2014) Research Gaps in Cash Transfer Programming, commissioned by CaLP
Barouillet, N. (2012) CaLP Coordinator Handover Notes
CaLP 3 Year Strategy – Discussion Primer (probably 2011)
CaLP Advocacy Strategy (2011)
CaLP Advocacy Strategy (2012)
CaLP Consortium Memorandum of Understanding (March 2013)
CaLP Funding Strategy (2013–2014)
CaLP Review Terms of Reference (2013)
CaLP Steering Committee Terms of Reference (2013)
CaLP Strategy 2012–2015 (June 2012)
CaLP Strategy 2013–2014 (June 2013)
CaLP Strategy January 2012–January 2012 & Beyond (draft 2, 15 April 2013)
CaLP Workplan (2010-2013) and CaLP Steering Committee Terms of Reference (May 2010)
CaLP (Oxfam) single form proposal (to ECHO) (2008/9)
Consortium Agreement in Relation to Cash Learning Partnership (Draft – 2010)
CaLP (probably 2009) Defining the Cost Efficiency and Appropriateness of Cash Transfer Mechanisms: Plan of Action
Direction of CaLP 2014/5 and post 2015 – Initial thoughts from CaLP team (also known as Theory of change brainstorm) (Feb 2012)
Launch of CaLP in the US (proposed) (2010)
Letter from Sphere board to CaLP (11 December 2008)
Mountfield, B. (2011) Review of the Partnership between IFRC and CaLP, commissioned by CaLP
Save the Children UK, Oxfam GB and British Red Cross (2008) A Global Learning Partnership in Cash Based Responses in Humanitarian Responses – Sharing Global Experience and Defining Best Practice
Save the Children UK, Oxfam and British Red Cross (probably 2009) Working Together to Improve the Quality of Humanitarian Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) – Introduction to the Cash Learning Partnership
Williams, T. (2013) CaLP Coordinator Handover Notes (partial)

Other documents
Action Against Hunger| ACF International (ACF), Log Admin Guideline for Cash Based Interventions
Adams, L. (2007) Learning from Cash Responses to the Tsunami, Overseas Development Institute
Adams, L., Frize, J. and Austin, L. (2013) To Scale Up or Not to Scale Up – Trends in CTPs to support decision making (Summary), commissioned by Oxfam
Austin, L. and Frize, J. (2011) Ready or Not? Emergency Cash Transfers at Scale, CaLP


Humanitarian Futures Programme (2013) *CTP Drivers of Change Discussion Note*, King’s College London, commissioned by CaLP

Humanitarian Futures Programme (2013) *Is Cash Transfer Programming ‘Fit for the Future’? Report for the Trends Analysis Meeting*, 3 June 2013, King’s College London, commissioned by CaLP

Hutton, J. (2011) *Gender Capacity Building for the Humanitarian Sector*, a report commissioned by UNINSTRAW and Oxfam Canada

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2013) *Cash in Emergencies*, youtube clip


Oxfam (2013) *Market Learning Event Communiqué*


On governance models and influencing


Colvin, G. (2008) *Comparison of starting a new 501(c)(3) organization with using a fiscal sponsor (model a)*


Moshmann, J. *Principle Responsibilities of an NGO Board and its Members*, WANGO


# Annex 11: List of People Interviewed/Consulted

<p>| No. | Name                  | Title                                                                 | Location       | Organisation                  |
|-----|-----------------------|                                                                      |                |                               |
| 1   | Adam Berthoud         | Head Humanitarian Technical Unit                                    | London         | Save the Children UK          |
| 2   | Agnes Shihemi         | Regional Cash &amp; Vouchers Coordinator                                | Nairobi        | Adeso                         |
| 3   | Alexandre Castellano  | DG ECHO A4 Thematic Policies, Nutrition and Food Assistance         | Belgium        | ECHO                          |
| 4   | Andy Bastable         | Head of Water and Sanitation, Humanitarian Department                | UK             | Oxfam GB                      |
| 5   | Aninia Nadig          | Advocacy and Networking Management                                   | Switzerland    | Sphere                        |
| 6   | Annalisa Conte        | Deputy Director, Policy, Program and Innovation Division            | Italy          | WFP                           |
| 7   | Arafat Jamal          | Chief, IASC Secretariat                                             | Switzerland    | IASC                          |
| 8   | Austen Davis          | Former Chair of CaLP Steering Committee, current Senior Advisor for Global Health | Norway         | Norad                         |
| 9   | Breanna Bridsdel      | Previous CaLP Communications and Advocacy Coordinator, current Humanitarian and Development Communications Consultant |                | Independent                   |
| 10  | Camilla Knox-Peebles  | Head of Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods, Humanitarian Department | UK             | Oxfam GB                      |
| 11  | Carla Lacerda         | CaLP Asia Focal Point                                               | Thailand       | CaLP                          |
| 12  | Cecilia Pietrobono    | Coordinator of UNICEF's integrated cash-based assistance program DRC | Democratic of Republic Congo | UNICEF                      |
| 13  | Christer Laenholm     | Humanitarian Advisor                                                | Denmark        | DCA                           |
| 14  | Christophe Breyne     | CaLP West Africa Focal Point                                         | Senegal        | CaLP                          |
| 15  | Claire Mariani        | Head of Bamiyan sub-office                                          | Afghanistan    | UNICEF                        |
| 16  | Corinna Kreidler      | Current: Independent Consultant for Humanitarian Aid, Former: Deputy Director International Programmes Department NRC | Afghanistan    | Independent                   |
| 17  | Dan Maxwell           | Professor and Research Director, Feinstein International Center      | USA            | TUFTS University              |
| 18  | Dana T. Cristescu     | Social Policy Specialist (Emergencies) West Africa Regional Office   | Senegal        | UNICEF                        |
| 19  | Debbie Gourlay        | Current: Consultant in Humanitarian Cash Programming. Previous: CaLP Focal Point Zimbabwe | Lebanon        | Independent                   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Emma Delo</td>
<td>Current: Cash Responsible/Senior Officer Recovery, Disaster and Crisis Management. Previous: first CaLP Coordinator</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>IFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ernest Mushekuru</td>
<td>Facilitator of the Cash Working Group DRC</td>
<td>Democratic of Republic Congo</td>
<td>CARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Fe Kagahastian</td>
<td>Cash Advisor</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>c/o OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Glenn Hughson</td>
<td>CaLP East Africa Focal Point</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>CaLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Haley Bowcock</td>
<td>Former: CaLP Advocacy Officer</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Heidi Gilert</td>
<td>Humanitarian Adviser (CHASE OT)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Helene Berton</td>
<td>Sahel Coordinator</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Helene Juillard</td>
<td>Current: Humanitarian Consultant, Previous: CaLP Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Isabelle Pelly</td>
<td>Food Security &amp; Livelihoods Adviser</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Jackie Frize</td>
<td>Independent Consultant</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Jacqui Symonds</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer Humanitarian and Response Unit</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>CARE Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Jake Zarins</td>
<td>Current: Shelter Adviser, Former: CaLP Steering Committee Member</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>James Phelan</td>
<td>Deputy Director, External Relations</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>AAH US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Program Advisor Analysis and Nutrition Service</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Jean-Mathieu Bloch</td>
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<td>Jessica Chaix</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Joanna Friedman</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Jonathan Brass</td>
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<td>Kaitrin Booth</td>
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<td>Karen LeBan</td>
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<td>Emergency Officer, Humanitarian Policy Section, Office of Emergency Programmes</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Kate Ferguson</td>
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<td>Kirsten Gelsdorf</td>
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<td>Loreto Palmaera</td>
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<td>Marion O'Reilly</td>
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<td>Mark Henderson</td>
<td>CaLP Steering Committee Current Chair (since January 2014), Cash and Voucher Advisor</td>
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<td>Nick Mauder</td>
<td>Previous ECHO representative, now Independent Consultant</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>Nicolas Barrouillet</td>
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<td>Nupur Kukrety</td>
<td>Former: CaLP Steering Committee Member, Former: Social Protection and Food Security Advisor for Oxfam GB</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>Olivia Collins</td>
<td>Social Protection Specialist, UNICEF Somalia Support Centre (USSC)</td>
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<td>Pantaleo Creti</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>Pat Foley</td>
<td>Current: Consultant, Previous: CaLP trainer</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>Patrick David</td>
<td>Coordinateur Adjoint - Analyste Regional de la Securite Alimentaire, Bureau Sous-regional des Urgences et de la Rehabilitation - Afrique de L-Ouest/Sahel</td>
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<td>Pete Garratt</td>
<td>CaLP Steering Committee Chair (2013); Disaster Response Manager</td>
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<td>Peter Walker</td>
<td>Director, Feinstein International Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy</td>
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<td>Philippa Young</td>
<td>Previous Haiti Cash Focal Point, Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods Adviser</td>
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<td>Sharon Truelove</td>
<td>Previous CaLP trainer/Cash Focal Point in Haiti</td>
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<td>Sibi Lawson-Marriott</td>
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<td>Susan Hutton</td>
<td>Humanitarian Finance and Grants (responsible for capacity building on CTP, SCI)</td>
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<td>Tess Williams</td>
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<td>Yoann Tuzzolino</td>
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The core purpose of this review, commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), is to evaluate CaLP’s progress since inception and examine the status and continued needs of cash programming in emergencies.

Cash transfer programming (CTP) represents a significant shift in the way humanitarian aid can be delivered. For a range of key humanitarian stakeholders it represents the future of humanitarian aid. CTP has broad acceptance as an important cross-sectoral modality and is gradually being implemented more widely. However, it is not yet routinely considered across the humanitarian sector as a range of obstacles to broad acceptance and implementation still exist.

This report will enable the CaLP Steering Committee to make decisions on the appropriate role and shape of CaLP in the future. It is also envisioned that the review will provide a platform for discussion for agencies and donors through the examination of the status of CTP, along with barriers to implementation, and investments needed.

This research was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), with the generous support of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO), and the British Red Cross (BRC)